Uncovering the Rationales for the War on Iraq: The Words of the Bush Administration, Congress, and the Media from September 12, 2001 to October 11, 2002

by

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Abstract

For the first time, a research project took an in-depth look at the words of the Bush administration, Congress, and the media and mapped out the road to war on Iraq and the rationales for that war. This research examined, over three separate phases of time from September 2001 to October 2002, the words of President Bush, certain Bush administration officials and four Congressional senators, the Congressional Record, and articles from the New York Times in order to find out why the U.S. went to war with Iraq. Though not all of the statements for some officials could be found, this project analyzed every statement from President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (more than 150 remarks and interviews containing the topic “Iraq”) during the months chosen for review.

The results showed that twenty-seven rationales for the war on Iraq were used at one time or another, twenty-three of which can be attributed to the administration. Five rationales were prominent in all three phases: the war on terror, the desire to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of inspections, the desire to remove the Hussein regime, and the fact that Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator. One rationale surfaced initially and gained favor over time: the interest in liberating the people of Iraq. One other rationale emerged later and became very important to official sources and the media: the imminent threat that Iraq posed, though the words “imminent threat” did not appear in official statements of the administration but became the catch-phrase in the media and the public. The other twenty rationales can be classified as secondary and remaining rationales. Thus, the war on Iraq was broad and its rationales encompassed a wide array of topics and concerns, from terrorism to oil, from protecting peace and freedom to finishing unfinished business.
Following the described campaign, the war on Iraq began in March of 2003. President Bush declared the war on Iraq a victory only a couple of months after combat operations commenced. However, troops still fight and die daily in Iraq, more than a year after the initial invasion. No weapons of mass destruction have been found, the imminent threat was not quite so imminent, and the streets of Iraqi cities are violent and chaotic places. Yet, Saddam Hussein no longer despotically rules the nation, and Iraq no longer poses a threat to the world. The question remains, why did we go to war with Iraq? There has been a lot of speculation around this question but few definitive answers, until now. A look back in time reveals how the results of the war line up with the given rationales.
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Introduction

In the weeks and months that followed the events of September 11, 2001, the nation watched, listened, and read as the Bush administration declared a war on terror and the media began frenzied coverage of the military efforts in Afghanistan and the hunt for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. But in the midst of all of the chaos, speculation about the suspects at the heart of the attacks started to shift, though ever so slightly, into the direction of a familiar foe to the United States, and particularly to the Bush family: Saddam Hussein. Although he was mentioned by members of the media and the Bush administration as a possible conspirator in the terrorist acts on New York City and Washington, D.C. and any actual connection has yet to be established, the name Saddam Hussein was in the news and on the lips of government officials and President Bush himself only a couple of weeks after the dust had settled at Ground Zero.

Now, more than two years after the horror of 9-11, a war with Iraq has been fought and, supposedly, won. Saddam’s regime has been ousted and a new-found freedom awaits the Iraqi people. But how did we get here, to the point of final confrontation with an enemy once challenged and long despised? When did the road to war with Saddam begin? When did the nation start to focus on the threat of terrorism in Iraq as opposed to threats from other nations and networks?

Much discussion has occurred in political circles, in the news media, in classrooms, and in social settings about the reasons for the recent war with Iraq. The focus of the Iraq war rationales has been on the war on terrorism, a war that began as a result of September 11, 2001, and launched its first attack on Afghanistan and al Qaeda approximately one month later. Yet, as preliminary research for this project showed, many other states were harboring al Qaeda networks and the link between al Qaeda and Iraq has yet to be solidly proven by the Bush
administration or others. Iraq may or may not actually have been supporting terrorism against the United States. What was clear to the Bush administration, however, was Saddam Hussein’s outright refusal to allow United Nations’ inspectors in his country any longer. It seems, then, that another rationale behind the war emerges: the potential for nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons development in Iraq. In fact, Saddam Hussein had once used chemical weapons on his own people, another act that clearly warranted suspicion from the United States. Such a vicious crime against one’s people brings to light two other common themes for the war with Iraq in 2003: removing the Hussein regime and bringing a known villain and evil man to justice.

Saddam Hussein’s rejection of the United Nations Resolution 1441 by forcing nuclear weapons inspectors out of his country also takes its place in the long line of motivations for the war; defying the resolution gives the United States and any other member of the U.N. the right to take action, according to the resolution (at least as the U.S. and Britain argued). But other, more sinister and less established rationales litter the path to war, as well. The feud with Saddam Hussein began over a decade ago when President Bush’s father lived in the White House (though the United States’ connection to Iraq began before that time, as the U.S. supported Iraq in its war with Iran). Could this war have been about tying up loose ends and taking care of unfinished business? Or could it have been a personal vendetta against Hussein because of his attempt on George Bush, Sr.’s life? Even more cynical than that, was this a war for oil? Protestors often espoused this view of the war and give it some amount of credibility.

All of these motives surfaced at some point during the debate over and analysis of the second conflict with Iraq. There may be more reasons for war than this that have yet to appear or have been overlooked in the past. This paper intends to chart these rationales over the time
following 9-11 up until Congress passed the war resolution in October 2002 by examining the statements made by the President and his administration, by Congress, and by the media.

Research Questions

A number of questions must be asked and answered in order to fully develop this topic. To begin, when did the focus of the administration, Congress, and the media shift from Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein and Iraq? The war on terror began in Afghanistan as a result of the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., which were attributed to al Qaeda and bin Laden. Yet, the tide soon turned to Saddam Hussein. It is important to know how quickly these changes occurred and how interrelated these changes were among the Bush administration, Congress, and the media. Then, one can determine which rationales for the war were the strongest. For example, a quick shift to an emphasis on Saddam would seem to indicate that there were other factors working behind claims of a war on terror which encompassed Iraq. If there was talk of Saddam Hussein and Iraq during the campaign in Afghanistan, it would seem that challenging terrorism, a project already in place in one area, was only one aspect of the motivation. Waiting until the conflict there was complete would indicate that focusing on terrorism was the main goal. However, the number of stories and comments will not altogether answer this question; administration officials do not have to make a comment repeatedly in order for it to be of importance to the administration.

Yet, more questions must be posed. What was the government’s position on Iraq following the attacks on 9-11? How did its position change over time, if at all? In essence, what were the administration and Congress saying about Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the year following the terrorist attacks on the United States? Related to these questions is the concern over the rationales for the war. What were the reasons behind the invasion and did they change
over time? Adding another dimension to the paper, how did media coverage affect these rationales and opinions on Iraq? Overall, what was the path to war with Iraq in the earliest phases of the war?

Preview

The first two sections of this paper highlight some preliminary research done on the topic of the war with Iraq in its earliest stages. One section presents an overview of the war on terror as outlined from *Time* magazine. Basic information about the chain of events following September 11, 2001, and leading up to the initial invasion of Iraq in March 2003, as it relates to Iraq, orients the reader to the main happenings in the United States and the world during the relevant span of time. This is important because it alerts the reader to how the media were portraying the war on terror to the public and how the media were using information from the White House. The next section presents some statistics about the number of mentions Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and Iraq received in the news, in Congressional discussions, and in public statements made by administration officials. This data will answer the question, When did the focus change from Osama to Saddam?

The next three sections of the paper are all structured in the same way except they cover different spans of time: post-9-11 through the end of 2001, the 2002 State of the Union through April 2002, and the month preceding the passage of the resolution authorizing force, including President Bush’s address to the U.N. The first time period was chosen to lay out the initial response to 9-11 and how that response included Iraq. The second phase begins with another catalyst for considering the future of Iraq, President Bush’s reference to Iraq as a member of the “axis of evil,” and ends with the month in which the major shift from Osama to Saddam seems to have taken place and solidified for the administration (see Preliminary Statistics section for
explanation). The final period starts off with the second largest speech of the year, President Bush’s address to the United Nations General Assembly that targeted Iraq, and concludes with the resolution that finalized the decision to take action against Iraq. Each section will examine the statements from President Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Policy Board member and long-time adviser Richard Perle (representing the administration), as well as from Congress (Congressional Records and the statements of four Senators) and media coverage from the New York Times. The members of the administration used here are all prominent members of the White House team. Additionally, they all can be placed into different camps regarding their opinions toward the war with Iraq (stereotypes gleaned from the research done in this paper). Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Perle all formed a rather hawkish group, hinting at war in Phase One (though Perle advocated war in the first phase) and advocating war in Phase Two. Cheney spoke little throughout the phases but usually agreed with President Bush, aligning him with the previous group. Powell was more dovish, often calling for inspections first and invasion later. Rice can be said to fall somewhere in the middle, agreeing with much of what both Powell and someone like Rumsfeld would say. The four Senators chosen for this research were Tom Daschle, Joseph Lieberman, Trent Lott, and John McCain. The men all have been in the Senate for some time, have held leadership positions, and are recognizable names in the political world. They often partake in interviews so their feelings off of the floor can be easily pinpointed. Additionally, they equally represent the Republicans and Democrats. Daschle and Lott were more dovish than Lieberman and McCain, though all of them did eventually offer support for the war. All of the
information gathered about these individuals, Congress, and the media will be compared and contrasted to tease out rationales.

The last sections of the paper will synthesize the findings in all three phases of research and discuss the changing views on Iraq, the rationales for the war, the role of officials in media coverage, and the role of the media in shaping the views and rationales.

**Timeline of Events**

What was the chain of events following 9-11 that led to the war with Iraq? This question is crucial to understanding the nature of the road to a combat operation in Iraq. One way to answer this question is to look at a popular weekly news magazine, such as *Time*, and evaluate the material presented in each issue, expecting to find the most current, and general, events surrounding the war on terror as it relates to Iraq. This timeline will set up the basics (Appendix A contains a more detailed account of the months following 9-11 and stretching through a good part of the war) while the later material takes a closer look at a shortened period of time and attempts to discover the reasons these events unfolded and who was at the heart of the crisis. To note, this timeline pertains mostly to material concerning Iraq and not information about the hunt for Osama bin Laden (though such information can be found in Appendix A).

To begin, all people know what happened on September 11, 2001. That same day as he returned to Washington, D.C., President Bush declared a war on terrorism, a concept further developed by *Time* in early October, 2001. Shortly afterwards, mentions of cleaning up unfinished business in Iraq appeared in the magazine, along with attempts to tie Saddam Hussein to the destruction in New York City and Washington, D.C. In fact, Saddam Hussein applauded the terrorist attacks, according to news accounts, but no one could definitively prove the role of Iraq in 9-11 at that time. In November, 2001, the question was officially asked by the news
magazine: What if Saddam did it? That question was quickly followed by: Will there be another Gulf War? Yet, there were no known or suspected al Qaeda cells in Iraq, making the link more visible and believable. Even when discussion began about the future location of al Qaeda, once American troops were in Afghanistan, Iraq was never mentioned as a possible homeland and safe house for the terror group, as 2001 came to a close.

When President Bush gave the State of the Union Address in January of 2002, the phrase “axis of evil” was officially coined. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were, in some ways, put on notice, as Bush called the countries on their “evil” ways. In February, speculation in the news about a war with Iraq continued, as the administration considered taking action in Iraq. As March 2002, began, the realization hit that support from the Middle East would be necessary if a campaign in Iraq was to be successful. The problems in the area, especially the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, needed to be brought under control, particularly U.S. control, before any more conflict in the area could take place. In April, President Bush committed to solving the problems of the Middle East and declared to the world the Bush doctrine: you are either with us or against us. In May, Saddam Hussein appeared on the cover of *Time* and the pages that followed contained articles about the strength of his regime and the questions surrounding his nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities. The Bush administration’s plans to remove him from power had been delayed but were certain.

With Osama bin Laden still at large, on June 24, 2002, an article appeared in *Time* which discussed the Bush administration’s “forward leaning” strategy, meaning that the United States would not wait for Saddam Hussein and Iraq to strike the U.S. Pre-emptive action against the terrorist nation of Iraq would be necessary. Yet, not all of the administration was on board with the ways and means of the plan for Iraq; a war was breaking out within the government itself.
Similar debate continued into August, as reported by *Time*. September marked another surge within the government to prove a connection between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden but conclusive evidence still evaded the administration. President Bush planned to ask Congress for a war resolution but the media, and some Congressmen, wanted more proof of the link and more reasons for embarking on a war. Secretary of State Colin Powell continued to talk with the United Nations about the problem in Iraq and the U.S. plans to enter the state with force, much to the dismay of the U.N. After a few months of discussion, inspections for nuclear and other weapons resumed in the country. Yet, the U.S. was losing allies all across the globe. Congress passed the war resolution in October, as the C.I.A. remained unsure of any real threat from Iraq and its despotic leader, according to new reports. The following month, a new resolution was drawn and inspections continued in Iraq. But no information about the situation nor the reasons for war became available to the American people; President Bush was on good faith with the public that war was the right choice and that he was making the correct decision in the best interests of his nation. As the year came to an end, troops began to ready and the plans for overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime were well underway.

In 2003, questions about the dangers posed by other nations, such as North Korea, surfaced, as opposition to the war from much of Western Europe held strong and opposition at home grew stronger. Still, the United States entered Iraq in March 2003, and by April, the regime had fallen. No weapons were found initially but chaos, looting, and destruction filled the streets of Iraq and the war proved more difficult than the Bush administration had imagined. In May, the U.S. declared victory and the rebuilding effort commenced. But things quickly turned downward into the summer months, as disorder continued, Saddam remained elusive, no weapons were found, and evidence was revealed to be flawed. Though Saddam Hussein’s sons
were killed in an attack, by August of 2003 Saddam himself and Osama bin Laden had not been found. Finally, in December of 2003, Hussein was captured; Osama bin Laden is still at large.

Thus, the media quickly uncovered or possibly even introduced the idea that a war with Iraq would stem from the overarching war on terror. In the months that followed 9-11, Saddam Hussein was prevalent in the news, despite his lack of involvement in the terrorist attacks on the United States. This first step demonstrates the role that Saddam Hussein and Iraq played in the Bush administration’s plans immediately following 9-11. The preliminary statistics and the research below further emphasize the early transition to Iraq in the war on terror and the apparent and underlying motives for the eventual war.

**The Changing Focus: Osama, Saddam, and Iraq**

One of the questions posed in the introduction to this paper was, When did the focus change from Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein? An initial part of this research included finding the answer to that question. Again, the data that follows only answers this question in part; the number of mentions does not necessarily indicate the exact moment that a switch had been made. Though a more specific explanation of my research methods can be found in Appendix B, a brief summary of the task undertaken is important here. In order to find out who was the focus of the news, meaning who was receiving the most coverage, I used Lexis-Nexis to search all of the articles by month from July 2001 to August 2003. I counted the total number of articles containing the keywords Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden and compared the results. In order to find out who or what, Osama or Saddam and Iraq, was the focus in the administration, I searched various sources for the members of the administration and Congressional Record using search words like those used in the media search. The numbers recorded in those results were also compared.
The change of focus from Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein came at different times for each source examined here. President Bush began to mention more about Saddam Hussein in April of 2002 (see Figure A1 in Appendix C). The media switched to focusing on Saddam Hussein in July of 2002 (see Figure A2 in Appendix C). And, finally, Congress mentioned Saddam Hussein more in April then switched back to Osama bin Laden and eventually settled into a pattern of discussion on Saddam Hussein in September of 2002 (see Figure A3 in Appendix C). Yet, as much of the research that follows looks at the response to the search term “Iraq,” a comparison was made between the usage of Saddam Hussein and the usage of Iraq by the various people and sources studied here. The results show that, though Iraq appears more frequently, the trends remain the same for President Bush and the media (see Figure A4 and Figure A5 in Appendix C). Yet, these higher numbers do alter the changeover from Osama bin Laden to Iraq. For example, Congress moves to examining the topic of Iraq in greater number by January of 2002, an earlier and more stable change than the change to a focus on Saddam Hussein (see Figure A6 in Appendix C). Thus, all three keywords, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and Iraq, are compared in the discussion of the changing focus below. Tables containing the number counts for all three keywords can be found in Appendix C, as well.

As mentioned, these results need to be explained more fully to be better understood. Prior to 9-11, Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden all appeared in the news each month (see Figure 1 below). In July 2001, Osama bin Laden led Saddam Hussein in number, 20 articles to 14 articles, while Saddam attained more coverage in August, 14 articles to 8 articles. For both months, the country of Iraq was cited in the news more than forty times. After 9-11 and throughout 2001, not surprisingly, Osama bin Laden received more coverage than Saddam Hussein and Iraq as a whole, though coverage of Iraq was about a third of that of Osama bin Laden.
Laden, which is surprising considering that bin Laden was being hunted and there were battles in Afghanistan to rid the country of al Qaeda.

Figure 1: *New York Times* Articles Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and Osama bin Laden

As 2002 unfolded, coverage of bin Laden waned and Iraq and its dictator monopolized the news. In January, bin Laden appeared in 202 articles while Hussein appeared in 29 and Iraq appeared in 60. Yet, by February, Iraq got more hits in this news search than bin Laden, 123 articles to 114 articles, and remained ahead throughout the rest of the year, with the exception of a small dip in May and June. Saddam did not garner more mentions in the *Times* until July, after which he stayed in the mainstream throughout 2003. Thus, long before the war with Iraq actually commenced and while Osama bin Laden was still on the run, the media focused more on Saddam Hussein and the situation in Iraq. Approximately five months after the World Trade Center Towers fell, the press paid closer attention to the happenings in a nation uninvolved with the attacks than it paid to the terrorist ring and infamous terrorist leader identified as responsible for the disaster. Why?

One answer could be found in the words of President Bush. The indexing hypothesis (a topic discussed further in a later section) says that the media follows the lead of those in power, especially someone as powerful as the President of the United States. Thus, when President
Bush decided to focus more attention on the threat from Iraq and Saddam Hussein, the media may have quickly followed suit. The data indicates that President Bush began to mention Saddam Hussein more than Osama bin Laden in April of 2002, with 4 references to Hussein and 1 reference to bin Laden, which falls before the time that the media began to focus on Saddam Hussein (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2: President Bush Remarks Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and Osama bin Laden

Thus, after the media noticed the fact that the President had moved on to another target, it may have shifted its agenda to match that of the government. Yet, mentions of Iraq by the President surpassed the number of mentions bin Laden received by January 2002. Again, the President changed his focus before the media did, indicating that the indexing norm may be playing a role in the order of events. Also worth noting is the presence of discussion about Iraq and Saddam Hussein before the attacks on the United States. In July and August of 2001, President Bush made remarks containing information about Iraq and Hussein on four occasions. He did not, however, make any reference to Osama bin Laden during that time. It appears, then, that Iraq was on the mind of the President before 9-11, fell slightly out of the mainstream through the remainder of 2001, and then returned as a focal point for the Bush administration in 2002.
Congress tells a more confusing tale. Like the President, Congress held conversations during their sessions about Saddam Hussein and Iraq much more frequently than Osama bin Laden prior to the destruction of 9-11 (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3: Congressional Record Documents Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and Osama bin Laden

Yet, even after 9-11, Iraq remained close in number with the number of documents containing Osama bin Laden. After the attacks, bin Laden received more attention until March and April of 2002, when Saddam Hussein attracted more discussion. Yet, in May, more records contained information about bin Laden, again. By June, the topic of conversation most often returned to Saddam Hussein and remained that way into 2003 (though in August the two received the same number of hits). Yet, Iraq began to receive more coverage than bin Laden in January, with the exception of May 2002. Congress, therefore, seems to be on the same page as the White House, though there are some bumps in Congressional focus that are not present in the changing focus of President Bush; the Saddam Hussein focus shifts more often than the Iraq focus does. However, overall it seems that the focus of the legislative and executive branches had shifted to Saddam and Iraq from Osama by February of 2002.

As a result, it appears that the change in focus from Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein and Iraq took place sometime around February of 2002, with some small changes over the next
few months. By the summer of that year, the Executive and Legislative branches along with the so-called Fourth Estate had all altered their perceptions of the war on terror to include Iraq and the Hussein regime. The remainder of this research takes a closer look at what was actually being said during those crucial early months up until the time of the war resolution. The story that the number of articles, records, or remarks containing keywords tells may be quite different from what the actual words say, as keywords are not necessarily the focus of a story.

**Phase One (September 12, 2001 to December 2001)**

The first span of time that I examined was the three and a half months that followed the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., and finished the year of 2001. I chose these months to see how early the talk of Saddam Hussein and the potential threat of Iraq were available to the public through remarks made by the administration and Congress and through the release of those statements and other information from the media. Charting the path to war with Iraq must begin as early as 9-11 since one of the presumed rationales for the war is that Iraq poses a terrorist threat and must be handled, as the war on terror prescribes. This phase concludes at the end of 2001 in order to provide a break between Phase One and Phase Two, which begins with the 2002 State of the Union, and to demonstrate how things will change from one phase to another. The evidence from the statements and stories released shows that Iraq was indeed a part of the plan for the war on terror early in the game, though the exact consequences of this plan are not yet clear. Those early rationales, which will be explained more explicitly later, that were furthered by the administration, Congress, and the media were: the war on terror, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, liberate the Iraqi people, unfinished business, war for oil, lack of inspections, threat to the region, and because we can.
A few more highlights of this section may be useful in orienting the reader to the broader goals of the change in the dynamics of those studied here and their use of the rationales that emerged. This section, like the others, looks specifically at the members of the Bush administration, Congress, and the media in order to make more sense out of the rationales for war and the path that the United States took to get to such a war. In regards to the administration, much of the talking was done by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Additionally, almost all of the discussions about Iraq were initiated by members of the media. The media itself offered a lot of opinion and speculation, as there were no major events taking place in regards to Iraq. Finally, Congress talked mostly about energy and security policy and its relation to Iraq.

The Media

After the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., the media quickly began covering all possible angles for the motivations behind and conspirators involved in the plane crashes. It also delved deep into the reactions of the government and the officials’ plans for the future of all terrorist states. The *New York Times* was chosen as a proxy for all newspapers in the United States, since it is an elite paper and its coverage of events is often mimicked or even copied in other newspapers across the United States. The ways in which the *Times* portrays the events of the war likely characterizes the play similar stories are getting elsewhere. This section examines by month what was prominent in the news concerning Iraq and compares that coverage to the rationales and chain of events as produced by administration officials and Congress. Studying the media first sets up a timeline that can be used as a reference when specific occurrences are discussed by the administration and Congress. Additionally, the media can be said to interpret the comments and opinions of the officials and offer evidence to the contrary to
provide for debate. Thus, the media puts the events of the later months of 2001 into the context by which the public would have evaluated the situation with Iraq.

**September 12-30, 2001**

As soon as the campaign on terror was announced, which was previously noted to have occurred on September 11, the media named members of the list of countries associated with terrorism, placing Iraq on that list among others (Apple 2001a). A few days after the attacks, there seemed to be unity in the campaign against terror, and the concern over the possible involvement of Saddam Hussein began with media speculation and hints at possible condemnation for not eliminating the Iraqi threat during the first Gulf War (Purdum 2001a). In a September 17 article, Dick Cheney denied any such link but Saddam Hussein was still referred to as a terrorist (Gordon 2001). However, another article, appearing on September 23, reported that Paul Wolfowitz was more ambiguous about the possibility of a connection between Hussein and 9-11, sparking a controversy that would follow the administration throughout the road to war: conflicts between administration officials on how to proceed against Iraq, namely between the opinions of Wolfowitz and Cheney and those of Powell (Perlez, et.al. 2001). Time was spent trying to make the Iraq-9-11 connection, though in the weeks that followed the attacks, no information to support the hypothesis became available. Multiple articles spoke of the horrors that Hussein had committed against his people and the Kurds prior to and since the first Gulf War, attempting to compare his actions to those of the terrorists behind 9-11.

Another topic that emerged in September and was in the news frequently thereafter was the determination of the U.S. to eliminate terror in the world. The paper reported that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz wanted to broaden the campaign while a private comment from Powell surfaced in which he claimed that an attack on Iraq would destroy an international coalition against terror.
Additionally, the administration continued to argue over the likelihood that Iraq was a culprit in the 9-11 attacks (Perlez and Weiner 2001). These stories seem to support the rumor of conflict in the administration and show that some of this conflict was influencing the public. For example, even members of the public thought that Saddam Hussein could be behind the attacks, as an article printed that 6% of Americans agreed with such an assertion (Berke and Elder 2001). However, seeming to take a side early on as to how the U.S. should handle Iraq as a part of the war on terror, the media wrote of the need for diplomacy (Calibrating the use of force 2001). This sentiment was supported by many foreign nations in several articles in the *Times*. In fact, one article indicated that the U.S. would have difficulty trying to build a coalition abroad for uprooting terror networks (Kahn 2001).

To pull out the rationales that emerged in the first month of the war on terror, the media published stories that advocated including Iraq in the war on terror, cleaning up the unfinished business in Iraq from the first Gulf War, removing the Hussein regime, and stories that told of the evil nature of Saddam Hussein, which also support the idea that Hussein should be removed. To explain each rationale further, since they are new to the reader, the war on terror rationale stems from the campaign on terror initiated by the U.S. after 9-11, calling on all nations to stop terror anywhere and everywhere in the world whether the state engaged in, supported, or provided materials to terrorism. Unfinished business refers to the fact that the U.S. had the opportunity to remove Saddam Hussein from power during the first Gulf War and, thus, could have prevented the present threat of Iraq from ever existing. The stories of torture and control explain the evil nature of Saddam Hussein and support his removal from power. The media also hint at the idea that a connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda may exist, meaning that it could provide a reason for going to war with Iraq. However, there is little evidence presented
for this rationale and this debate continues throughout the phases of research conducted in this paper; it cannot be added to the list quite yet.

October 2001

The month of October opened with some reminders about past Iraqi transgressions, including its acts against its own citizens and failed compliance with promises made to the world community (Hoge 2001). Thus far, as the campaign in Afghanistan was being planned, the Powell approach to avoid broader attacks (on Iraq) had prevailed (Apple 2001c). In contrast, the paper wrote about Congress’ desire to expand the war on terror to Iraq (Mitchell and Berke 2001). Adding to the pressure of Congress, another article printed that the Pentagon and other defense experts wanted to move the campaign into Iraq’s backyard as the next phase of the war on terror (Sciolino and Tyler 2001). As if in response, the administration stated that it was monitoring Iraq (Tyler and Bumiller 2001). Since 9-11, more jets had been flying over the Middle East, monitoring the situation to ensure that Saddam Hussein did not take advantage of the troop preoccupation with Afghanistan and likely trying to send a message to Iraq (Myers and Shanker 2001). The concern over Hussein’s involvement in 9-11 continued to sprinkle the pages, as well. However, the paper called in experts to weigh in on the possibility of an Iraqi connection to 9-11; those experts declared that there was no link between the Iraqi leader and the attacks on the U.S., contrary to the ambiguous and leading answers that most White House and Congressional figures had given (Bonner 2001). This move by the media was a piece of information that fueled the debate about the merits of attacking Iraq.

The anthrax outbreak in Congress hit the pages of the paper mid-month. The anthrax letters served as fodder for many stories in the news; one story outlined a letter that President Bush sent to Saddam Hussein after the incident, warning him that Iraq should not commit any
“unconscionable acts” (Engelberg and Miller 2001). Yet, the person behind the anthrax letter remained anonymous, though the germ did initiate discussion in the paper about the biological weapons capabilities of Saddam Hussein (Butler 2001). A story had emerged in September about a meeting between an al Qaeda official (Mohammed Atta) and an Iraqi agent; the Czechoslovaksians confirmed this story in late October, though, as already noted, experts denied any Iraq connection to 9-11 anyway (Tyler and Tagliabue 2001).

The rationales for the invasion of Iraq remained the same as the previous month (the war on terror, unfinished business, removal of the Hussein regime, and Saddam Hussein is evil), including one new rationale to make the headlines: preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This first time mention of this rationale stems from the discussion of the capabilities of Iraq after the anthrax scare had been reported. As a part of the U.S. plan, keeping weapons out of the hands of Saddam Hussein would help to prevent the spread of terrorism, as well.

November 2001

A story was released early in November, on the 8th, about Iraq’s training of Islamic terrorists and some Iraqi defectors’ stories about the horrors of a Kuwaiti prison, released on the 12th, setting up more reasons for a war with the rogue nation (Hedges 2001b, Hedges 2001a). Yet, contrary to some of the intentions of the administration expressed earlier, the government turned down the Iraqi National Congress’ pleas for money to spy on Iraq’s leader (Tyler 2001a). Along the lines of the rationales for an offensive in Iraq, another account of the weapons capabilities of Iraq appeared in the paper on November 11 (Risen and Miller 2001). The debate in the administration over the next phase of the war on terror raged on, with a remark from President Bush that declared that Afghanistan was just the beginning (Bumiller 2001a). But the
foreign opposition to the war idea continued, with Saudi Arabia declaring that there was no link
between Hussein and al Qaeda and that the nation would not support an invasion of Iraq (Jehl
2001). An article in agreement with such statements was printed on November 25, as Powell
was reported to have said that the coalition would collapse if the U.S. entered Iraq and that there
was no connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, as well (Keller 2001). Also introducing rebuttals
to the administration’s arguments and goals, a column appeared on November 25 that noticed the
absence of North Korea from discussion about terrorist nations (Sanger 2001b). Still, President
Bush spoke out as the month came to a close, warning Iraq to allow United Nations inspectors
back into the country or face the consequences (Bumiller 2001b).

Once again, many of the rationales for the war with Iraq remain the same: war on terror,
the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein is evil
(because of the horrors of the Kuwaiti prison). Another new rationale surfaces in the press in
November: the lack of U.N. inspections. Though this rationale comes directly from the mouth of
the President, in his comment to Iraq that it must allow inspectors in or else, it is discussed in the
media. Related to the concern over the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of
inspections rationale faults Iraq for not giving the world community access to its stockpiles and
plans, as it was supposed to do according to United Nations resolutions.

December 2001

Many of the stories about Iraq prior to December were informational and opinionated, as
there really were no events that could be flatly presented in a factual way. Much of what
revolved around Iraq was speculation. Yet, December introduced a lot of solid information
about the plans of the White House. Once comprehensive story, released on December 1,
outlined the present and future plans of the administration, citing that the administration wants to
build up an opposition group to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, though there was no sense of timeline and no new threat from Saddam Hussein (Tyler and Sanger 2001). Opposition for the war still existed abroad, as one story outlined that Europe would not stand by the U.S. if it invaded Iraq (Henneberger 2001). Additionally, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned the U.S. against striking Iraq (Lyall 2001). Adding to the opposition abroad was a story about the conspiracy theories about the U.S. than run rampant through the Middle East, namely America’s support for Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war (Goodstein 2001). The opposition within the White House, by Powell, remained an issue, as Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz stood by their belief in war and watched as their belief gained support in the U.S. (Tyler 2001c, Sciolino and Mitchell 2001). Dampening the administration’s hopes at connecting Hussein to the 9-11 attacks, a report emerged that acknowledged the meeting of an Iraqi agent with an al Qaeda member in Prague but concluded that no evidence of Iraqi involvement in 9-11 came out of the meeting (Hedges and McNeil 2001). A column appeared on December 17, reminding readers of the words of National Security Advisor Rice: the war on terror is far from over (Sanger 2001a). It also called into question the merits of moving into Iraq as the next target in that war on terror (Sanger 2001a).

Still, there were plans underway at the State Department and the Pentagon for an attack on Iraq, as printed on December 18; however, no official recommendations from officials had been made to President Bush at the time (Tyler 2001b). Some members of Congress sent a letter to the President, expressing their desire to enter Iraq and remove the Hussein regime (Tyler 2001b). Offering some hope of support despite the above-mentioned conspiracy theories, Arab nations declared that they would not be upset to see Saddam Hussein go, though they felt that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict need to be resolved first (MacFarquhar 2001). Adding more to the administration’s argument, an Iraqi defector spoke of a secret facility for weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq in a story released on December 20 (Miller 2001). Yet, no evidence of an Iraqi connection to the anthrax letters came to light (Broad and Johnston 2001). A sensational story managed to make headlines, as well. Senator Daschle was accused of supporting Saddam Hussein after he admitted that he was opposed to drilling for oil in Alaska (Purdum 2001b). The connection was made because drilling in Alaska could possibly free the United States from dealing with the Middle East and specifically Iraq in order to supply this nation with oil.

The rationales that came up in the month of December were: war on terror and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, it seems that these two rationales were the strongest message out of the media in 2001, though it did mention other lines of reasoning. One more rationale was introduced in December: the war for oil hypothesis. This rationale stems from the debacle in Congress over Senator Daschle and his opposition to drilling for oil in Alaska. Seemingly over-the-top and unimportant, this move shows that there could be underlying motives for the war with Iraq. The war for oil rationale indicates that the U.S.’s oil interests in the Middle East and Iraq serve as a reason for wanting to invade the state and topple its leader.

The Bush Administration

More comments came from the Bush administration than from Bush himself, which is not at all surprising; the members do more interviews and are less culpable than the President in such instances. The media has more access to these officials and they often speak for the President, though they mostly claim that they do not extend the President’s opinions when they extend their own. Some of the search techniques used for the administration officials were better than others, turning up more results. For example, the State Department and the Department of Defense had websites that displayed all of the public statements made by members of the respective
departments. Additionally, President Bush’s statements are compiled on a website, as well. Yet, others had to be examined through searches of talk show interviews using Lexis-Nexis. A detailed account of all search methods can be found in Appendix B. Yet, the point of this exercise is to determine the main rationales for the war with Iraq and the point when the war with Iraq idea became known. The members whom this essay examines are Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle.

President Bush

Turning first to the President, all of the statements President Bush made concerning Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and the war on terror came from questions asked by the media during interviews at various times. Though none of the comments came in prepared remarks, there were four occasions on which the President discussed Iraq. The first mention of Iraq came exactly one month after 9-11, on October 11, 2001, in an interview during a prime time news conference in the East Room of the White House. A reporter questioned the President about word that his advisers were pushing for war with Iraq. He answered that the focus of the administration was Afghanistan but that they were watching Iraq closely (Bush 2001a). This comment inspired three articles, one column, and one reprinting of statements in the New York Times. Thus, the media seemed to be keyed into the idea of a war with Iraq and played heavily on the President’s minor comment about the situation. A week later, October 19, 2001, another event took place at which President Bush was questioned about the future of Iraq. At the United States and China Stand Against Terror, the leaders of both nations made remarks on the war on terror. Following the statements, reporters questioned both leaders. President Bush evaded questions from the media pertaining to the administration’s plans to attack Iraq or include Iraq in the war on terror (Bush 2001d). Bush stated that there was no evidence of a link between
Saddam Hussein or Iraq and Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, but he would not put it past Saddam (Bush 2001d). He further commented that the U.S. would achieve its objective in the war on terror (Bush 2001d). This statement, however, received no attention in the press, as it seems to be weaker than the previous assertion that the U.S. had its eyes on Saddam and Iraq.

More media coverage found President Bush again in November, when he received yet another question about the administration’s plans for Iraq. On November 26, 2001, the President welcomed aid workers back from Afghanistan and then took questions from the pool. One interviewer recalled a comment that the President had made at Fort Campbell about “evil ones” and the goal to remove terrorism from Afghanistan as the first step. The reporter then asked what President Bush would say to Iraq; he answered by saying that terrorists and weapons of mass destruction will be handled (Bush 2001c). The President also was asked about Iraq and inspections, to which he replied that if Iraq did not let inspectors back into the country, he would find out what would happen (Bush 2001c). The President, in my reading of the transcript of the exchange, seemed to dance around the question, trying to find the right answer. President Bush also spoke about Afghanistan as just the beginning of the war on terror (Bush 2001c). This revelation sparked two articles and a column in the next news cycle, as printed in the New York Times, and coverage of the comment continued throughout much of what was left of the year. In 2001, President Bush made one more comment that related to the impending conflict with Iraq. On December 17, in his remarks about Ramadan and Eid Al-Fitr, President Bush told all that he will not reveal to the enemy what is coming next and that the U.S. is there, watching, as long as terrorist nations plan attacks and “murder innocent people” (Bush 2001b).

Though President Bush does not explicitly admit that he plans to attack Iraq, there is an underlying threat in much of what he says; for example, the “or else” comment indicates that
there will be consequences if America’s requests are not fulfilled. If he was not considering the possibility of attacking Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from power, there would be no reason to say that Hussein will find out what will happen to him and his country or to say that he cannot reveal the next stage of the mission to stop terrorism. Still, it could be argued that the presumed threat may be only that, a threat to scare the Hussein regime into abandoning any support of terrorism against the United States and any plans to continue or begin a weapons of mass destruction project. Overall, discussion of the role of Iraq in the war on terror takes the stage soon after the declaration that such a war exists.

Thus, the early stages of Iraq war planning included four main rationales: war on terror, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, and Saddam Hussein is evil. The war on terror includes Iraq and that is reason enough to take preventive steps. Eliminating any weapons of mass destruction that a terrorist nation might have falls in with the war on terrorism ideal. Preventing the spread of deadly weapons into terrorist nations is key to stopping terrorism in general and inspections aid in that process. Finally, Saddam Hussein and his regime have been thought to be evil since the first Gulf War in the early 1990’s.

Dick Cheney

Richard Cheney, the Vice-President of the United States, was hard to find after the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. Thus, only two interviews were found that showed Cheney talking about a possible war with Iraq and in both, the interviewer initiated the Iraq conversation. His first appearance was on “Meet the Press” on December 9, 2001. He believed that Iraq was harboring terrorists and was working on the development of weapons of mass destruction (Cheney 2001b). He also spoke about the supposed meetings between an Iraqi official and an al Qaeda member in Prague, demonstrating that the administration did respond to
events publicized in the papers (Cheney 2001b). He confirmed that the meeting took place, though did not expand on the meeting’s meaning (Cheney 2001b). On December 11 on a Fox News show, Cheney declared that Iraq did pose a threat to the U.S.; therefore, Iraq and its leader should pay close attention to what happened in Afghanistan (Cheney 2001a). Like the President, Cheney used the war on terror and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as his rationales for a conflict with Iraq.

Colin Powell

Colin Powell spoke candidly about his feelings toward Saddam Hussein after the terror attacks on the United States, though was more vague about any U.S. plans to deal with the leader of Iraq. Powell made reference to Iraq in eighteen interviews and remarks in Phase One. In September of 2001, Powell took some time to comment on Saddam Hussein without any direct questioning from the media. In a press briefing on September 13, he stated that Saddam Hussein had no kindness in his veins (Powell 2001p). On September 16, Powell called Hussein despicable and commented that the U.S. was looking for links between Hussein and 9-11 while on “CNN Late Edition” (Powell 2001c). That same day, Powell told “Face the Nation” that the U.S. would contain Hussein and do whatever was necessary to attain that goal (Powell 2001f). Moving to the war on terror, Powell spoke with Brit Hume in a special report on Fox on September 20, stating that Afghanistan was the first priority of the United States but that the U.S. was already face to face with Iraq (Powell 2001i). On September 21, Powell spoke with the BBC and reiterated comments about doing what was necessary and added Iraq to the list of potential threats (Powell 2001j). On September 23, in an interview on “Meet the Press,” Powell made a couple of clear statements (upon questioning from others): that the U.S. would make a strategic mistake if it did anything without an international coalition and that military force was
not the only answer (Powell 2001n). Comments such as this one were likely those that sparked the media’s focus on the controversy within the administration. On “This Week” that same day, Powell was asked about a statement that Paul Wolfowitz made, claiming that Wolfowitz wants an attack on Saddam Hussein. Powell responded by noting that an attack could be planned further down the road (Powell 2001r). Thus, more of conflict within the White House that was outlined in the media seems to surface here, as there is an obvious disagreement between Powell and Wolfowitz. However, this conflict is not explicitly discussed by Powell.

On October 1 in an interview with “CBS Evening News,” Powell declared that there would not be an attack on Iraq during the first phase of the war on terror, as he had indicated earlier, but that nothing was out of the question in the future (Powell 2001a). This comment seems to offer a change on the part of Powell, admitting that there could be a military attack on Iraq in the future. On October 10, Powell spoke with Paula Zahn on CNN, making the same comments as he made on CBS a week earlier and adding that the U.S. had sent a letter to the U.N. about the possibility of future attacks on Iraq (Powell 2001k). On October 21, Powell commented on the anthrax case to Wolf Blitzer on “CNN Late Edition,” stating that he was unsure of any solid Iraqi connection to the letter but would not put it past Saddam Hussein (Powell 2001d). Strengthening his position on the way to handle Iraq, Powell told the press at a joint availability on October 24 that Afghanistan was the first priority, though the U.S. would watch Iraq closely, similar to a comment that President Bush had made a couple of weeks earlier in October (Powell 2001l).

In November, Colin Powell conducted two interviews, both following the comment made by President Bush that Iraq would find out what would happen to it if the nation disobeyed the U.S. On November 26, Powell spoke with Larry King, stating that he did not need to further
explain the President’s words (Powell 2001b). He also spoke of continued sanctions on Iraq (Powell 2001b). Upon questioning by King, Powell declared that the U.S. did what it set out to do during the first Iraq war, though there had been speculation about the outcome (Powell 2001b). Two days later during remarks after a meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Powell again said that he would not expand upon the President’s warning to Iraq (Powell 2001q).

Some new issues emerged in December. On “Face the Nation,” a December 2 interview, Powell said that inspections were necessary in Iraq but would not completely clear Iraq from scrutiny (Powell 2001g). Thus, Powell admitted that there were indications that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (Powell 2001g). Later that day, Powell spoke to Wolf Blitzer on “CNN Late Edition.” In that interview, Powell claimed that Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction, a more certain statement than the one that he made earlier in the day (Powell 2001e). He also stated that the administration was still looking for an Iraq connection to 9-11 and that all options were on the table, regarding Iraq (Powell 2001e). Yet, in a December 5 discussion with reporters after a press conference, Powell would not speak of the future, focusing on the first phase of the war on terror, though Saddam Hussein was labeled a terrorist (Powell 2001m). On December 16, 2001, Powell spoke with Tony Snow on “Fox News Sunday.” There, he again claimed that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (Powell 2001h). Yet, another new concept emerged: that Iraq posed a threat to its region and not a clear and present threat to the U.S. (Powell 2001h). He also explicitly mentioned regime change as a goal of the U.S. (Powell 2001h). That day, Powell also appeared on “Meet the Press.” A few articles about this interview appeared in the Times, as Powell was bombarded by questions about oil imports, unfinished business, and inspections (Powell 2001o).
Colin Powell highlighted the same three rationales that President Bush illustrated in his few remarks on the war with Iraq situation: war on terror, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein is evil. Yet, Powell adds a few more reasons for war to the list: unfinished business, lack of inspections, war for oil, removal of the Hussein regime, and threat to the region. First, Powell indicates that Hussein should have been removed during the first U.S. occupation of Iraq. It is not a far leap to assume that another war would finish what was started more than a decade ago. Next, Iraq’s lack of cooperation with the United Nations’s resolution fuels the U.S. concern that the country is developing weapons of mass destruction and strengthens the notion that Iraq has its own agenda and cannot be trusted, all reasons for a preventative invasion. Also, the topic of U.S. oil consumption enters the picture. If the U.S. was so repulsed by Iraq and its dictator, why did we continue to do business with him? Would not a suspension of oil purchases from Iraq hinder their economy and serve to punish the leader or at least send the message that the U.S. does not support his regime? A military invasion allows the U.S. to dispatch with the regime and continue to purchase the oil. Finally, Powell mentions that Iraq poses a threat to its neighbors, meaning that someone should handle him to save the people around him. Though the possibility of an Iraqi connection to 9-11 appears in Powell’s interviews, he does not assert that Iraq was involved, simply suspects that Iraq would do something like that and may be involved. Again, the connection to 9-11 does not serve as a reason for the war yet.

Condoleezza Rice

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice spoke out about Iraq on seven occasions during this first phase of research, though only four sets of remarks are discussed here as the other three repeat information that is found in these cited interviews. Again, her statements came
after questioning from the media. She announced on September 23, 2001, that the United States planned a broad campaign against terror, one that could possibly include Iraq, on “CNN Late Edition” (Rice 2001b). On October 14, Rice told “60 Minutes” that the U.S. was watching Iraq closely, a comment that the President and Colin Powell made in interviews, as well (Rice 2001a). Seemingly, there is some continuity between what the members of the administration are saying in regard to Iraq. On November 18, while she was on “Meet the Press,” Rice stated that there was no need to prove that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9-11 or that he definitely had weapons of mass destruction (Rice 2001d). All that the U.S. needed to know was that Saddam Hussein was dangerous and wanted weapons of mass destruction; Iraq posed a threat, and no connection to Osama bin Laden was necessary to prove that (Rice 2001d). She stated that the world would be a better place without Saddam Hussein in it (Rice 2001d). The war on terror seems to be secondary to what she is saying; Saddam Hussein was and is a threat still, with or without 9-11. That same day on “CNN Late Edition,” Rice joined Powell and others in her claim that Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction (Rice 2001c). Her other three interviews did not include any new information.

Like her male counterparts, Rice forwards the ideals of a war on terror, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the removal of the Hussein regime, and Saddam Hussein as an evil man as rationales behind an eventual face-off with Iraq. Though she does not try to link Saddam Hussein to 9-11, she recognizes that someone like him is capable of such a crime and wants to prevent that from happening, thus putting Iraq on the list of terrorist states. Her comment about a world without Saddam Hussein being a safer world indicates that she feels his removal from power would benefit his people, the nations in his region, and the world as a whole. Going into Iraq would provide a means to such an end.
Donald Rumsfeld

Don Rumsfeld spoke to the media in fifteen interviews from September 11, 2001, to the end of December, 2001. On September 19, 2001, Rumsfeld appeared on “CNN Live at Daybreak” and received his first question about Saddam Hussein as a possible conspirator in the 9-11 attacks. Rumsfeld replied that there are many states in the world that harbor terrorists and that the fate of those states is unsure (Rumsfeld 2001c). Giving a more ambiguous answer the next day on “Today,” Rumsfeld would not identify Iraq as a conspirator in 9-11 or as a target in the war on terror (Rumsfeld 2001k). On September 30, Rumsfeld appeared on “Meet the Press” and, again, was ambiguous about the specific targets of the war on terror, stating that 50 to 60 states were being scrutinized for terror activity (Rumsfeld 2001h). Finally offering a definite answer, on October 24, Don Rumsfeld told USA Today that Iraq was a threat to the United States and one of the terrorist states that he had been referencing previously (Rumsfeld 2001l). On October 28, Rumsfeld discussed Iraq on “This Week,” calling Iraq a terrorist state and admitting that he was unsure how the situation should be handled (Rumsfeld 2001j). That same day, the possibility that Iraq could have weapons of mass destruction came up during an interview with CNN (Rumsfeld 2001g). Still, Rumsfeld only said that the U.S. would not tolerate Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, never actually saying that Iraq had any such weapons (Rumsfeld 2001g).

On November 11, Rumsfeld referred to Iraq as a member of the “walking wounded” in an interview with “Face the Nation” (Rumsfeld 2001e). He continued to refer to Iraq as a terrorist in that interview, as he often did during discussions about Iraq (Rumsfeld 2001e). Yet, in another move toward definitive statements, Rumsfeld told CNN’s “Novak, Hunt, and Shields” on November 30 that Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction; he had certain knowledge of
that fact (Rumsfeld 2001d). This indicates a progression for Rumsfeld, from not commenting at all to being certain about Iraq’s status. Rumsfeld also answered questions about Richard Perle calling for the U.S. to get of rid of Saddam Hussein, to which Rumsfeld reminded the reporter that Perle did not speak for the President, not offering his opinion on the subject (Rumsfeld 2001d). On December 2, he told “Meet the Press” that the oil for food program was all too important and that halting oil purchases would only hurt the people of Iraq (Rumsfeld 2001i). Rumsfeld also reiterated his certainty that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (Rumsfeld 2001i). In his final three interviews of December, Rumsfeld was evasive about answering questions about Iraq but stated that the administration had no official stance as of then (Rumsfeld 2001a, Rumsfeld 2001b, Rumsfeld 2001f).

Overall, a definite connection can be made between Rumsfeld’s comments about Iraq as a terrorist and President Bush’s comments about eliminating terrorism. It seems likely that Iraq is a target and could be stage two of the war on terror. Though Rumsfeld refused to offer any definitive statement about the future of Iraq, therefore not saying yes to an attack, he was far from saying no to one. There is some degree of separation between the information that Colin Powell was releasing and the information that Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush released. Powell seems to be more willing to admit that Iraq could be a target. However, Rumsfeld and the President speak in veiled threats, saying that terrorism will come to an end and that Iraq is a terrorist state. Rumsfeld indicates there will be an attack while Powell merely anticipates that Iraq may become a target.

Like President Bush and Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld emphasizes the war on terror and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as rationales for a war with Iraq. Yet, he adds another dimension to the reasoning behind an Iraqi invasion: the Iraqi people.
When Rumsfeld reminded those at and those watching “Meet the Press” that the people of Iraq would suffer if more sanctions were placed on the state, he got the ball rolling on another aspect of the problem. Not only is Iraq a terrorist state, it is also a horrible place to live; something should be done about it. Liberating the Iraqi people emerges as another reason for taking action in Iraq.

Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Wolfowitz discussed Iraq on six occasions. To remind the reader about an article in the news, the comment about Iraq as the next target that the media reported in an interview to Colin Powell supposedly came from Paul Wolfowitz in the end of September. This research did not find any interview or remark transcripts containing such a comment, though that certainly does not mean that the comment was not made. The first time Wolfowitz addressed the issue of Iraq was in late October in an interview with the *London Sunday Telegraph*, when he was asked about the possibility that Iraq or Saddam Hussein was involved with the anthrax that were sent to the United States Congress. He indicated that the connection was possible, though produced no evidence to support his claim (Wolfowitz 2001d). On October 31, 2001, Wolfowitz told the BBC that Iraq posed a problem to the United States and that he told President Clinton to attack Iraq during his terms in office (Wolfowitz 2001a). Yet, Afghanistan was the first priority of the current administration (Wolfowitz 2001a). On November 18 on “Face the Nation,” Wolfowitz declared that Iraq did harbor terrorists and should be concerned about what the U.S. reaction would be (Wolfowitz 2001c). He also stated that Iraq may have been involved in the 9-11 attacks (Wolfowitz 2001c). On November 27, in a Roundtable with European Journalists, the reporters flooded him with questions about Iraq. Coming out of the discussion were the following, according to Wolfowitz: the admission that there was a debate in the White House.
about how to handle Iraq, the claim that documentation proving that Iraq harbors terrorists did exist, and the assertion that there was no reason to believe that Europe would oppose a U.S. led preventive attack on Iraq (Wolfowitz 2001e). Interestingly, Wolfowitz has been the only administration member to admit that there was any conflict in the White House over how to deal with Iraq. A week later, Wolfowitz told “This Week,” on December 9, that an attack on Saddam Hussein would follow the mission in Afghanistan, though it was not wise to let the enemy know too much about future plans (Wolfowitz 2001f). In another interview that day with “CNN Late Edition,” he was reminded that there was no evidence linking Hussein to 9-11; Wolfowitz replied that he was still a threat and should pay attention to the warning given to him by President Bush (Wolfowitz 2001b).

Wolfowitz’s statements seem to provide even more indication that an attack on Iraq would come. He flatly admitted that Iraq was next in a December interview and insisted that there was proof to substantiate an attack, though he did not offer any of it for public knowledge. His comments coincide with everything else coming out of the White House, demonstrating an agreement between the words of Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, and President Bush. Wolfowitz draws the conclusion and solidifies the assumption that one would draw from listening to the other members of the administration. He says it bluntly: Iraq is next. He also identifies the assumed tension in the White House between Colin Powell and the others. Paul Wolfowitz does not add any new rationales to the list. He focuses on the war on terror, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the unfinished business in Iraq as reasons to enter a conflict with Saddam Hussein.

Richard Perle
Richard Perle represents a non-administration viewpoint though he is a member of a defense board and was at one time a member of the Presidential administration before Bill Clinton. Perle accepted seven interviews during Phase One. The first came only five days after 9-11, when Perle told CNN that the United States should remove the Saddam Hussein regime as a part of the war on terror (Perle 2001a). He also declared that there was a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden and that Iraq did harbor terrorists (Perle 2001a). On November 6, Perle spoke with Wolf Blitzer and stated that the U.S. could liberate Iraq and therefore it should (Perle 2001b). Following along the lines of the liberation of the Iraqi people, Perle told “This Week” on November 18 that the Iraqis would rejoice when they were freed (Perle 2001e). The next day, November 19, Perle declared to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that Iraq was absolutely the next phase of the war on terror, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that the war would be easier than people might think (Perle 2001c). His next two interviews repeated these sentiments. Adding a new dimension, Perle’s final interview, on December 21, recorded him stating that the U.S. must remove Saddam Hussein from power in order to win the war on terror (Perle 2001e).

Perle seems to say what the other officials, with the exception of Paul Wolfowitz, would like to say but cannot say because of their positions in the government and their need for public approval. The veiled threats of Rumsfeld and President Bush are explicitly detailed in Perle’s comments. Powell’s admission that Iraq could be next is made into fact according to Perle and Wolfowitz. And Rice’s claim that Saddam Hussein’s regime must be removed is echoed in Perle’s remarks. Perle needed less fuel from the media than the others to talk about Iraq. As Perle repeated much of what other members were also saying during the months that followed 9-11, so he also repeated the same rationales for a war with Iraq: war on terror, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, liberate the Iraqi people, and removal of the
Hussein regime. Yet, with Perle, there is the sense of the need to finish unfinished business, as well, considering he has planned for this event since the conclusion of the first Gulf War. Additionally, Perle adds a new rationale to the list: because we can. His use of the word “could” when discussing liberating Iraq indicates that there would be little conflict or struggle, little price to pay for entering the country. He also says that the war would be easy, that people give too much credit to the Hussein regime and military. Indirectly, these utterances signify an ulterior motive, a sense of certainty about the conclusion of a war with Iraq and the ease of expanding the war on terror to Iraq.

**Congress**

The opinions and discussions within the legislative branch of the United States government are also invaluable to understanding the road to war with Iraq in the early stages. An examination of the Congressional Record is useful in gaining insight into the legislation and the concerns around that legislation, as it pertains to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Yet, the individual opinions of the Congressmen are hard to gauge with such a method. Additionally, the media rarely covers the happenings in Congressional sessions, leaving the media out of the analysis completely. Therefore, specific Congressmen were chosen and their statements in the media were evaluated in order to get a sense of the true sentiment of Congress. Four members were chosen from the Senate, since the Senate is the more powerful and most often interviewed section of the legislature. Two Democrats, Tom Daschle and Joe Lieberman, and two Republicans, Trent Lott and John McCain, make up the representation of Congressional views. Their discussions in interviews were subsequently considered.

**Congressional Record**
The mentions of Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the Congressional records were mostly a part of bills. These references do not necessarily indicate the feelings of the members or represent the current sentiments and opinions of Congress. The discussion that was recorded in the Congressional Record includes concern over Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction and lack of cooperation with the United Nations. Some members made claims about the dictatorial regime and the contemptible nature of Saddam Hussein. Others spoke out against a war with Iraq. However, the majority of the discussion centered around oil and Iraq, ranging from energy policy and security to problems with buying oil from an enemy to the war for oil idea. Thus, the rationales for war that emerged in the Congressional Record revolved around the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, concern over the lack of weapons inspections in Iraq, the belief that Saddam Hussein is evil, the need to remove the Hussein regime, the need to liberate the Iraqi people, and the oil situation in Iraq. The concern over the development of weapons of mass destruction and the complaints about the lack of United Nations involvement in the state give support to the proliferation and inspections rationales. The assessment of Hussein’s character and poor record as a leader, especially where citizens’ freedoms are concerned, translate into reasons of war that include Hussein’s evil nature, the need for a regime change, and the merits of freeing his people from his control. Lastly, many of the bills and proposals including Iraq and its leader centered on energy policy and American security. Additionally, questions about the U.S. oil purchases from Iraq were raised. Thus, another reason for entering the state could be the desire to continue oil supplies to the U.S from Iraq without having to buy it from a despot.

Tom Daschle-Democrat
Tom Daschle, of the Congressmen studied here, expressed the least amount of opinion on the inclusion of Saddam Hussein in the war on terror. In the three interviews examined, his only comments concerning Iraq revealed that he felt any action at that time would be premature. On October 31, 2001, Daschle told Larry King exactly that: invading Iraq at that time would be a premature move (Daschle 2001a). On December 6 in an interview on Fox “Hannity and Colmes,” he noted that the reason that there was any Congressional agreement at the time was that the administration warranted agreement, seeming to mean that the way in which President Bush and his advisers were handling 9-11 called for bipartisan support in Congress (Daschle 2001b). Daschle wanted more evidence from the Bush administration before any decision about an offensive in Iraq should be reached, as recorded in a December 19 interview with “Hardball” (Daschle 2001c). Thus, Daschle provides no rationales for a war with Iraq, stressing the need to wait for evidence. In terms of his interaction with the media, journalists are asking the questions about a conflict with Iraq, as the Senator displays no interest in supporting the idea of a war with Saddam Hussein.

Joe Lieberman-Democrat

Senator Joseph Lieberman offered a completely different viewpoint from that of his party colleague, Tom Daschle, in his seven interviews during Phase One. Lieberman stood in support of war with Iraq as a part of the campaign against terror. On October 18, 2001, Lieberman told the “The Early Show” that if the U.S. is to stick to the President’s cause, America must eliminate terror, wherever it hides (Lieberman 2001d). That same day he appeared on “Wolf Blitzer Reports,” speaking about the need to prevent another 9-11 disaster from occurring by working with the opposition groups in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein in phase two of the war on terror (Lieberman 2001c). On October 21, Lieberman told “Meet the Press” that Saddam Hussein and
Iraq should be targeted in the war on terror (Lieberman 2001f). In an interview with Larry King on November 29, Lieberman stated that the U.S. should go into Iraq eventually and spoke of the Iraq Liberation Act, an act passed in 1998 that authorized the overthrow of the Hussein regime (Lieberman 2001a). On December 2, 2001, Lieberman appeared on “CNN Late Edition.” There, he talked about the fact that all would rejoice when Saddam Hussein was gone from Iraq and mentioned that the U.S. should take care of the unfinished business from the first Gulf War (Lieberman 2001b). In his two interviews on December 6, Lieberman continued his campaign against Iraq. On “The O’Reilly Factor,” he said that the proof against Saddam Hussein existed, despite the doubts of some, and that the war on terror would not be complete until Saddam Hussein had been removed from power (Lieberman 2001g). On “Hardball,” Lieberman challenged the reports in the press, saying that the international coalition would go with the United States if it attacked Iraq (Lieberman 2001e). Though he cited that Hussein was a terrorist, Lieberman did not recommend attacking at that time (Lieberman 2001e). Through it all, Lieberman cited that the proof was there, though he did not offer any of the evidence to those listening. To list them directly, the main rationales for war that are put forth by Joe Lieberman include furthering the cause of the war against terrorism, removing the Hussein regime, and cleaning up unfinished business.

Trent Lott-Republican

Senator Trent Lott articulated opinions that are more similar to the dovish Daschle than to the hawkish Lieberman. The three interviews in which Lott participated recorded him advocating a slower, more assured path to conflict with Iraq. His first interview was on October 21 with Tony Snow of “This Week.” There, he said that the United States should take things one step at a time and see what Saddam Hussein does (Lott 2001c). On December 9, Lott appeared
on “CNN Late Edition” and, again, wanted the U.S. to be sure and have all of the facts before moving forward against Iraq (Lott 2001a). He also talked about a letter that a bipartisan group of senators sent to the President, asking that he consider going to war with Iraq and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Lott 2001a). Finally, Lott appeared on “Face the Nation” on December 23, 2001. He referred to Saddam Hussein as a threat to America and mentioned that the U.S. should consider liberating the country, a rather different opinion from his earlier interviews (Lott 2001b). Yet, returning to his cautious stance, Lott also said that there were other places that harbor terrorism so the U.S. should wait and see what develops in Iraq (Lott 2001b). Thus, Lott acts much like Daschle, not indicating that an offensive in Iraq to prevent terrorism would be wrong but that more needs to be done before an attack is launched. If Lott forwards any rationales at all, they only come to matter after his qualifications for an invasion have been fulfilled, meaning that Lott wants to wait for more evidence and more ammunition before heading into a war. Yet, it seems that as long as Lott believes that there is enough evidence to enter Iraq, he is interested in supporting the war on terror, removing the Hussein regime, and liberating the Iraqi people.

John McCain-Republican

Senator McCain is the only Senator reviewed here who brought up Iraq without any prodding from the media during his fourteen interviews over the three and a half months examined here, though not all of the interviews are discussed here as some repeat information available in other interviews. Two days after 9-11, September 13, 2001, McCain appeared on “Today” and spoke of states that harbor terrorism, including Iraq in that list (McCain 2001i). Appearing on “Crossfire” on September 19, McCain stated that nations would have to make choices, whether or not to back the war on terror, and that the U.S. would rule out no options
when it came to that war (McCain 2001a). On September 26, McCain told Larry King that other nations would have to decide what move to make next, considering the fact that the U.S. was responding to terrorism (McCain 2001b). Though he did not talk about Iraq, this statement, much like the one on “Crossfire,” in conjunction with the “Today” interview indicates that terrorist nations such as Iraq should beware of the U.S. On October 7, McCain did an interview on “Dateline”; he explained that the United States would move on after the battles in Afghanistan had come to an end, though he did not reveal any location (McCain 2001d). He did, however, bring up the subject of Iraq as a terrorist state before the journalist could ask about the threat from Iraq (McCain 2001d). On “Good Morning America” on October 9, McCain, speaking ambiguously like Don Rumsfeld, said that the possibility that the U.S. would strike Iraq could not be ruled out; it would depend on what Saddam Hussein does (McCain 2001f). On October 21, 2001, “Meet the Press” invited John McCain to be a guest on the show. Without any questions from the host about the inclusion of Iraq in the war on terror, McCain stated that the United States would go after Iraq, though it may not necessarily be a military intervention (McCain 2001h). He stressed the importance of stopping the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (McCain 2001h). McCain seems to have changed his stance from a cautious, wait and see approach to a definite need to enter Iraq and do something. Eight days later, on October 29, Larry King interviewed McCain on “Larry King Live,” at which time McCain claimed that Iraq would be the next target (McCain 2001c). Again, Larry King did not ask about the status of Iraq in the war on terror, McCain simply admitted that he felt Iraq would be phase two (McCain 2001c). McCain appeared on “Hardball” on December 6, again stating that the U.S. should invade Iraq (McCain 2001g). Yet, he added that the military there was weak, despite the weapons of mass destruction, a comment Perle made, as well (McCain 2001g). Like
his prior two sentiments, McCain told “Hannity and Colmes” on December 18 that Iraq should be the next focus of the war on terrorism (McCain 2001e).

Senator John McCain emphasized many of the rationales for war that have already been discussed: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, liberation of the Iraqi people and “because we can.” Again, when McCain describes Iraq’s military as “weak,” he opened the door for speculation as to why that would merit mentioning without any question about the difficulty of an impending fight. To feel the need to express that the United States is superior to a state is to indirectly express feelings that the U.S. should enter Iraq because it is a country that can be handled easily, as Richard Perle suggested. What is interesting is how one can call a state weak and then claim that it has weapons of mass destruction, something that would empower any nation. What is also interesting about McCain is his connection to media. He stands as the only person examined in this research who introduced Iraq and Saddam Hussein before a reporter asked him a question pertaining to the topic.

Conclusion

To sum up the entire first phase, it is valuable to recapitulate the events of the phase, especially through the media, discuss the interplay between the three groups studied in this research, and describe the rationales that emerged and who was using them.

To start, the media seemed to offer a lot of opinion and speculation, as there had been no formal indication that Iraq would be a target in the war on terror. The media also initiated a lot of the talk around the Iraq situation, bringing the idea that Iraq may be connected to the 9-11 incident to the forefront, asking questions of the officials on the topic and printing articles about the possibility of Iraqi involvement in 9-11 and of a future attack on Iraq. The connection and
attack plans will continue to be questioned throughout the three phases. In September, the media quickly asked about the connection that Saddam Hussein could have to the attacks. In October, again the media uncovered a lot of information about the future of Iraq that the high profile members of the administration were not discussing. In December, the politics of Congress and the Daschle scandal are uncovered and discussed. Additionally, the media began to bring opposition into the public view, creating a forum for debate. Specifically, members of Congress did talk to the media about expanding the campaign to Iraq but not as early as the media reported it. Though no officials from the Pentagon were included here, no other administration official mentioned mobilizing for Iraq, though indications from the Department of Defense and Richard Perle are there. The media is using expert opinions that contradict what the administration obviously wants to prove about Iraq’s potential connection to 9-11. No one had mentioned the meeting in Prague or the increased number of jets. The reactions of the world were covered, along with those feelings about a campaign in Iraq. Overall, the international community supported the war on terror but not the expansion of that war to Iraq. Throughout the months, the media highlighted the foreign opposition not apparent in the words of the officials, with the exception of Powell. The fact that the media bring up damaging information and expert opinion indicates that it wants to show alternative views. Finally, the media does cover the battle in Afghanistan. Thus, the media role is key to understanding the entire story surrounding the debate over a war with Iraq.

In regards to the administration, many of the members were ambiguous about the likelihood of Iraq as the next target, with the exception of Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle who recommend an invasion of Iraq. Powell spoke very clearly about his feelings toward Saddam Hussein as an evil dictator but, like the others, did not speak as clearly about the fate of the
leader. Comments like, “He’ll have to see,” made frequently by President Bush and Don Rumsfeld, make this point more clear. At this point, all of the people researched, including the Congressmen, are not solid on a viewpoint (which is different from later phases when the administration is clear and the Congressmen are debating and uncertain at times). However, it seems safe to say that Iraq was likely to be the next target in the war on terror.

A deeper look at Congress reveals that individual members disagreed over what the course concerning Iraq should be while the opinions of the individuals taken collectively do express many of the feelings within the entire legislature. Though Lott does not rule out invading Iraq as a possibility for the future, he does not agree with McCain that there is a definite need to go into Iraq; Lieberman, a member of the opposite party, is more in line with McCain’s thinking on the next phase of the war on terrorism. Daschle is completely different from Lieberman and somewhat more hesitant than Lott; he advocates no rationales for war at all and seems to agree with others only because he feels that he should. War with Iraq does not make sense to Daschle, as far as one can interpret from what he says to the media. Based on the Congressional Record, there is more focus on the oil policy in Congress and no mention of it at all in the media. This seems to imply that the war for oil motivation might exist, though only behind closed doors. The concern over weapons of mass destruction is obvious in both situations, as is the concern over the liberation of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, evidenced by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. Yet, there was little discussion about Iraq by the members on and off of the Congressional floor.

Despite the fact that there was no solid indication of war, many rationales for a possible war emerged. The first reason, used by virtually every party examined here, was the war on terror. In order to prevent another attack like 9-11, the United States needed to take action
around the globe and stop terrorist groups from spreading and harming innocent people. Another popular rationale was the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This rationale stated that terrorists and rogue nations could not be allowed to make weapons of mass destruction, since they could use or sell them to other terrorists. One way to fight the war on terror was to stop the spread of the weapons that could harm people. More focused on Iraq were the reasonings that labeled Saddam Hussein as evil and that called for the removal of the Hussein regime. Though self-explanatory, these rationales described the violent and demonic actions of the Iraqi dictator, citing his horrific leadership as a reason to go to war, and, related, called for the overthrow of the regime in order to remove this threat and monstrous despot. However, these rationales were less used in the first phase compared to later phases. President Bush, Powell, Rice, the Congressional Record, and the media talked about the evils of Saddam Hussein; Powell, Rice, Perle, Lieberman, Lott, McCain, and the media expressed a desire to see Hussein ousted. A fairly popular rationale was the drive to liberate the Iraqi people, a reason that was first mentioned by Donald Rumsfeld and later mentioned by Perle, Lott, McCain, and the Congressional Record. This line of reasoning wanted to free the people of Iraq from its dictator and bring them the democracy and liberty of America.

The remaining rationales did not appear as frequently as those mentioned above. One such rationale, to become more popular later, was the lack inspections in Iraq. President Bush, Colin Powell, the Congressional Record, and the media were the only sources to talk about the need for weapons inspections in the nation and cite that absence of knowledge about the weapons status in Iraq as a reason to enter the country. The unfinished business rationale had four supporters: Powell, Wolfowitz, Lieberman, and the media. This ideal reminisced about the past and the chance that the U.S. missed during the first Gulf War. These officials and sources
wanted to take care of the situation that was begun more than ten years prior. The war for oil hypothesis emerged in the first phase, as well; this concept focused on America’s interest in the oil reserves of the Middle East and its desire to have a stable energy policy. Colin Powell, the Congressional Record, and the media highlight this rationale as a possibility. Another rationale that garnered little attention was the because we can idea, that the U.S. would go into Iraq because its military is stronger and the job would be easy. This rationale is mentioned by Richard Perle and John McCain. One rationale was only mentioned once by one of the administration officials: threat to the region. Colin Powell briefly stated in one interview that Iraq posed a threat to its neighbors and therefore should be handled. (All of these rationales will appear throughout the three phases of this research, though they will not be explained as thoroughly again until the conclusion of the essay.)

**Phase Two (2002 State of the Union to April 2002)**

As mentioned earlier, the starting point for the second phase of this research charting the path to the Iraq war is the 2002 State of the Union, delivered on January 29, 2002. This marks the next wave of discussion surrounding the future of Iraq and the potential for a U.S. invasion of the nation. In the speech, the President declared that Iraq was a part of the war against terrorism, as it supported terrorists and continued to “flaunt its hostility toward America” (Bush 2002hh). President Bush also cited the fact that Iraq allowed weapons inspectors into the country and then threw them out, fueling the belief that the nation did in fact plan to develop weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2002hh). Finally, the President called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an “axis of evil,” igniting much criticism from other nations and adding to the sense that the U.S. would embark on a war with the Hussein state, obvious from the amount of media coverage the three
words received (Bush 2002hh). In fact, these are the words that the French later referred to as “simplistic.”

This section, beginning with an analysis of the media, details the opinions and statements of the same officials and branches of government as the previous section. Again, comparisons and contrasts are made and rationales for a war with Iraq are spotted. This phase concludes with the month of April, the month in which the shift from a focus on Osama bin Laden to a focus on Saddam Hussein occurred, at least according to this research.

Some things to note about Phase Two are in the differences between it and Phase One. First, the officials talk more openly about Iraq, bringing up the topic without prodding from reporters and making statements on the subject. Additionally, President Bush and Condoleezza Rice speak out more in this section than in the previous one, while Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld continue to be the prominent voices of the White House. There is also more discussion about Iraq in Congress, more than simply energy policy; Congress looked at the terrorism and weapons of mass destruction angles with more interest and zeal. Finally, the media took a more objective approach in the conflict, in that it tried to show all of the sides of the issue by providing the reader with the pros and cons of an invasion of Iraq. The new rationales that emerged in this section were: broken promises, for the sake of history, gain favor with the Middle East, set Iraq as an example, and because Saddam Hussein hates the United States.

The Media

Once again, the initial step in this process is to examine the events of the months between the State of the Union for 2002 and the end of April of the same year. Following events in the media allows us to get a sense of what is most important at the time; later evaluating the
statements of the Bush Administration and members of Congress allows us to compare the
headlines to the actual sentiments of those making the decisions. This section has four
subsections for the four months for which news coverage was studied.

January 30-31, 2002

The day following Bush’s “axis of evil” comment a large story hit the pages of the *New York Times*, reminding its readers of the situation with Iraq as it was in the first month of 2002. The paper spoke of the Bush stance as an “ambitious campaign of diplomatic pressure and potential military action against Iraq and other hostile nations” (Gordon 2002k). Interestingly, of the three named members of the axis, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, only Iraq was highlighted in this article (Gordon 2002k). The story advised its reader of the broadened doctrine of the administration and inserted comments about the fact that there were no definite plans for war and no consensus in the White House about a war with Iraq, offering an announcement of the conflicting opinions of Wolfowitz and Perle and of Powell (Gordon 2002k). The article also claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (Gordon 2002k). Yet, it also took the time to say that an attack on North Korea or Iran would be “far more problematic” than an offensive against Iraq, indicating a good chance of victory for the U.S. against the weak military of Iraq (Gordon 2002k). The next day’s coverage, January 31, contained three articles that were less supportive than on the previous day. One article told of the European reaction, referring to it as “bristled,” since the Europeans took the “axis” comment to imply a willingness on the part of U.S. to go it alone and to indicate an aggressive approach to the war on terror (Daley 2002b). Naturally, the so-called axis members were outraged (Daley 2002b). An editorial called the implication of the speech an “assertive new military doctrine” and warned President Bush not to succumb to the “temptation to use power promiscuously” (The limits of power 2002). A final
article asked who was going to pay for the possible war and questioned the reason why Osama bin Laden had faded from the picture (Phillips 2002).

Overall, the two days brought up some rationales from the year 2001: the war on terror and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet, a new line of reasoning for the media enters the stage: because we can. Though some officials mentioned the weaknesses of Iraq during Phase One, the media did not talk about the poor military of Iraq, only the abuses the people had suffered under Saddam Hussein. The fact that the Gordon article, following up on the State of the Union, mentioned the weakness of Iraq and the problems with taking on Iran or North Korea indicates that the likelihood of victory in Iraq could be a reason to take on Saddam Hussein.

**February 2002**

The month opened with another reference to the weakness of Iraq, with the U.S. planning to train the Iraqi National Congress and civilian Pentagon officials indicating that the U.S. would “pummel” Iraq, as their military is weaker than that of Afghanistan; the Bush administration refrained from commenting about the possibilities of military action in Iraq (Gordon 2002f). Multiple stories appeared discussing the international effects of the American campaign, such as the fact that Russia supported Iraq and its oil contracts with Iraq and that the U.S. decided it would enter Iraq with or without NATO (Wines 2002a, Erlanger 2002). Upon such a decision by the United States, one reporter offered the opinion that President Bush had sided with the “hard-liners in his administration” (Bumiller 2002e). The paper reported a couple of days later, on February 5, that Iraq had requested talks with the U.N. (Schmemann and Tyler 2002). The following day, February 6, an article appeared that questioned the evidence for including Iraq in the war on terror; the C.I.A. released that there had been no Iraqi led attacks on the U.S. since
1993 (the assassination attempt on President George H. W. Bush), that there were no proven links between Iraq and 9-11, and that Iraq would have a hard time trying to develop nuclear weapons (Risen 2002). Despite such declarations, the next day depicted Colin Powell stating that there would be a regime change, potentially without international support, and that all possibilities were being considered, especially the need for weapons inspectors (Purdum 2002c). Throughout all the above-mentioned articles and all of those to follow, numerous references were made to the “axis of evil” comment President Bush made in his State of the Union address. One reaction to that comment came on February 7 from France; officials referred to the Bush plan as “simplistic” (Daley 2002a).

After a week had passed from the date of the “axis” comment, more speculation arose about the very different nature of the three members. Additionally, more concern about the Middle East crisis arose, as well, and officials and journalists recognized the importance that these states would play in a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Questions about the rising expectations for the military budget also started to emerge. Margaret Thatcher took the time to write a column, giving advice to the United States; in her piece, she mentioned how and when Saddam Hussein would be removed, not whether or not he would be removed (Thatcher 2002). Repeating statements made earlier in the month and following Thatcher’s advice, Powell spoke of the plan to remove the Hussein regime, a surprising change in the media’s eyes since Powell was thought to be the “most cautious” of the administration officials (Gordon and Sanger 2002). More praise rained down on the Bush administration, as Al Gore took the time to applaud the Bush administration’s handling of the war on terror (Nagourney 2002). Yet, those accolades were followed by reports of European criticism and continued lack of support. In response, Dick Cheney told those allies that United States will stop Saddam Hussein with the expectation of
their support (Gordon 2002i). In aid in that expectation, the U.S. was reported to have been working on a plan to sway those allies into their favor (Dao and Schmitt 2002). With the increase in comments declaring that Saddam Hussein would be removed, speculation about the future of an Iraq without Saddam Hussein hit the pages on February 17 (Purdum 2002a).

As the month came to a close, more concern about the international reaction to a war with Iraq appeared. One article expressed an opinion that a U.S. invasion of the Middle East would only inflame the hatred that so many people in the region already harbor toward America, reminding readers that the Middle East does not support an invasion (Associated Press 2002b). The disdain with the U.S. plan spread into Asia, as well; President Bush was said to have been doing “damage control” when he visited various states on the continent in an article on February 24 (Bumiller 2002a). Not helping the American cause, Kofi Annan made plans to meet with Iraqi officials sometime in March (Crossette 2002a). At the same time, the United States drew up plans to finance a radio transmitter in Kurdish Iraq that would broadcast rhetoric encouraging the removal of Saddam Hussein (Gordon 2002g). Concerns over the economic state of America continued into the end of February, as well.

The media seem to have taken more time offering up information about those criticizing the U.S. and reasons why there should not be a war in the month of February. Concerns about the economy and the state of affairs in the Middle East take up more space than any depictions of the horrors of Saddam Hussein. Though the media enumerate the opinions of the members of the administration, little support for the reasons behind these opinions is provided. Yet, in a change from the press reports of the previous year, the media included more comments from the members of the Bush administration and the President himself in the articles of the year 2002, with the President, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Don Rumsfeld being quoted most often.
There seem to be only a few rationales emerging from the media: the war on terror, the removal of the Hussein regime, and the because we can idea. There are many references to the removal of Hussein and the early stories of the month take the time to discuss the weakness of Iraq. Additionally, the many references to the “axis” comment indicate that the media recognizes the role of Iraq in the campaign against terrorism. However, the war on terror and removal of the Hussein regime rationales stem more from the coverage of official opinions; the because we can rationale stems from media speculation about the war. Overall, it seems that the media is not displaying a lot of reason for a war with Iraq, taking more time to report the events of the world and the reactions of others.

**March 2002**

The problems between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the Middle East started to enter the forefront in March of 2002. Many articles throughout the entire month were devoted to the topic, only mentioning Iraq to say that the problems there would impede any U.S. invasion of Iraq and that the U.S. would need to gain the support of the Middle East in order to launch an offensive in the region. Vice-President Dick Cheney traveled to the Middle East to talk about the problems there and to try to garner support for the U.S. position; as a result, many stories talked about the events of the trip. In addition, there were still references to the “axis” comment and many articles that indicated that a war with Iraq was possible, in addition to many articles discussing wars and their effects in general. Moving on to the domestic arena, Democrats began complaining about the fact that President Bush was not consulting them about the war or even making a very good case to enter a war (Purdum 2002b). There was also discussion in the paper about the fact that the conflict in Afghanistan was not even over yet (Gordon 2002h). A couple of articles early in the month offered opinions on Iraq’s efforts to work with the U.N. and
possibly allow inspectors into the country; the consensus seemed to be, among officials and reporters alike, that the effort was merely a ploy to buy more time to make more weapons (Gordon 2002c). A reporter also noted that the U.S. needed to show that it tried to go through the U.N. (Gordon 2002c). However, the U.N. referred to their talks with Iraq as “constructive,” indicating that there might be some hope for the country’s future (Crossette 2002b).

One major story broke on March 10, 2002: the United States conducted a Nuclear Posture Review (Gordon 2002o). Colin Powell tried to explain that the review was not a plan but simply options that are available to the President (Schmitt 2002f). Yet, the media covered the leak and reported that the U.S. was working on new weapons that would be better for striking Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya (Gordon 2002o). The media pointed out another problem with the U.S. nuclear posture: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which all of those nations had signed. The treaty was an agreement between the signers and the U.S. that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons against them if the nations met the terms of the agreement (Gordon 2002o). On top of that revelation, a column appeared on the same day that pointed out the convenient word choice by President Bush, saying “regime change” not “overthrow of government,” which would be undiplomatic (Safire 2002e). However, the media did take a shot at Iraq, as well, describing their forces as weaker since the first Gulf War (Gordon 2002a).

Mid-month, on March 12, President Bush gave a speech in which he implied that action was inevitable against nations with weapons of mass destruction and appealed to “governments everywhere” for support, according to the reporter (Bumiller 2002b). Dick Cheney made a similar move in a speech, not mentioning Iraq directly but claiming that the U.S. would stop nations from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (Gordon 2002j). Yet, the words of the President and the Vice-President did not sway the minds of those in Middle East, as coverage
of Cheney’s trip revealed that Jordon and Saudi Arabia did not approve of the U.S. Iraq policy (Gordon 2002j). In an attempt to gain support and downplay the importance of Iraq, Cheney acted as if Iraq was only one issue on the table as he invited the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia to meet with President Bush (Gordon 2002e). Talk continued over the U.S. nuclear posture and a column appeared reporting that the U.S. was ambiguous about a pre-emptive nuclear strike while asserting that America would prevent hostile nations from developing weapons of mass destruction (Sanger 2002b). As the Russians came to the defense of Iraq again, a columnist reiterated that the U.S. needed the Middle East to be on its side of the Iraq question and that there needed to be peace before there could be anything else (Safire 2002a).

The U.N. entered the picture again on March 22, calling its talks with Iraq “useful” and stating that Iraq has no room to negotiate in the process; the U.N. also predicted that inspections could take only one year after the go ahead was given by Iraq (Wren 2002). Additionally, the U.N. displayed its dismay at America’s willingness to take unilateral action (Wren 2002). More questioning of the U.S. policy continued in the United States, as well. One reporter’s column spoke of the real problem of terrorism as being people who hate America; the question should be how to deter people from this behavior, not how to handle Iraq (Friedman 2002a). A contradiction in Bush’s policy was pinpointed by another journalist: inspections versus regime change with force (Daaldler and Harris 2002). The reporter found a discrepancy between wanting to inspect for weapons of mass destruction yet insisting that Saddam Hussein would be removed, with force if necessary (Daaldler and Harris 2002). Why inspect at all? Another journalist quipped that Saddam Hussein should be sued, in typical American fashion (Kristof 2002c). As the U.S. remained skeptical about working with Iraq to uncover the truth about an
M.I.A. pilot from the first Gulf War, Arabs declared their support for Saddam Hussein, meaning that an attack on him would be an attack on all Arabs (Marquis 2002, MacFarquhar 2002a).

Again, the media spend a lot of time showing both sides of the story, the pros and the cons of war. The press also publicizes the opinions of all of the important actors in the decision to launch an offensive against Iraq. The media do seem to support the idea of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by agreeing that the Iraqi talks with the U.N. could be a part of its plot. Additionally, there is mention of removing Saddam Hussein from power. Lastly, the media once again mentions the weakness of the Iraqi military, indicating that it would be a sure win for the United States.

April 2002

Once again the media noticed the wording that President Bush used in his speeches and meetings with foreign officials, noting that his rhetoric did not seem as “scripted” as before, when Bush was speaking in “certainties and contrasts” (Sanger 2002a). In doing so, the press noted that though the President felt that he could handle the problems in the Middle East while dealing with Iraq, he also needed to have the support of the Middle East (Sanger 2002a). Many articles throughout April picked up on the value of having the Arab world on the side of the United States, a trend that began in the early months of 2002. As a result, the New York Times reported on April 1 that President Bush had retracted his focus on Iraq to see the needs of the Israelis and Palestinians (Sanger 2002a). Yet, to connect the Iraq policy with the Middle East crisis, Don Rumsfeld told reporters that Saddam Hussein had been encouraging the Palestinian attacks on Israelis (Sanger and Gordon 2002). In the same article, President Bush was criticized for his handling of the problems in the region, an opinion that remained strong throughout the month in many more articles (Sanger and Gordon 2002). Finally recognizing that action in the
Middle East must be taken, the President made a speech that was reported on April 5 in which he unveiled a plan to help ease the tensions, a step that was praised by the United Nations and Europe but not so well-received by the Arabs (MacFarquhar 2002c). Continuing in the contradictory vein established by a reporter in March, President Bush further insisted that Saddam Hussein be removed while the U.N. took time to prepare for inspections in Iraq (Gordon 2002d).

The media covered a great deal of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s trip to the Middle East, still reporting much of what the administration officials were saying at the time. At the same time, the Kurds issued a statement calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein (Safire 2002d). In the same article on April 8, a story broke citing the attempted use of al Qaeda trained men by Iraq against Kurds in Northern Iraq (Safire 2002d). In stride with the negative coverage of Iraq (though the actions themselves may be negative, not necessarily just the stories’ framing), Iraq halted oil exports, sparking the debate within the U.S. over energy policy once again, a topic covered in several articles, and causing oil prices to increase; the Saudis assured that oil would still be sent to all nations in spite of the Iraqi move (MacFarquhar 2002b, Bloomberg News 2002a).

Following up on the actions of the Iraqis as covered in the news, though in retaliation to Iraqi fire on U.S. planes, the United States bombed Iraqi defenses on April 16 (Shanker 2002). An act possibly associated with the steps towards war, it spurred more comment in the paper about how the U.S. would pay for the war; in fact, a story emerged outlining the debate between Senator Daschle and President Bush over the money inserted in the budget to be used in the case of a war with Iraq (Sanger and Mitchell 2002). Also coming out of Congress was a proposal to allow victims of terrorist acts to collect money from the frozen assets of terror groups and
nations when they won a suit against the terror group (Wald 2002a). This proposal was not supported by the White House, as a law already exists that allows citizens to sue but not to collect (Wald 2002a). Criticism of the Bush handling of the Middle East continued, even after his declared plan to help the region. Additionally, the paper reported a potential troop shortage which would pose a problem for any U.S. plans to enter Iraq and maintain forces throughout the world (Dao 2002a). Pointing to an official who had not been mentioned for a while, the Times dedicated an article on April 22 to the idea of Paul Wolfowitz as a “lightning rod” for the administration (Schmitt 2002a). Turning back to the war plans, reports came out on April 23 indicating that Iraq had been moving in and out of the no-fly zone, presenting another fault on the part of the state (Dao 2002c). And to wrap up the month’s coverage of the Iraq crisis, an article appeared that cited the administration as saying that a coup would not succeed in Iraq, meaning that air strikes and ground troops would be necessary to obtain a victory (Shanker and Sanger 2002). No official plans had been made but the possible strike time had been delayed until early in 2003; however, the media did not fail to include possible strategies for the United States (Shanker and Sanger 2002).

The rationales for the month of April again focus around weapons of mass destruction and removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. There are allusions to the evilness of Saddam Hussein and the threat that he poses to his neighbors, especially in the stories about his plans to murder the Kurds in the north and his support of Palestinian attacks on the Israelis. There are always references to the war on terrorism, throwing that into the realm of potential reasons, as well. Yet, the media continued to show all sides of the story, not hesitating to print criticism of the Bush administration and the strides of the U.N. towards entering Iraq for
The Bush Administration

Similar to the previous phase of research, Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld did a lot of talking on the subject of Iraq. Interestingly though, all of the members, with the exception of Richard Perle, made more comments about Iraq to the media and the public in this phase than in the last, especially Condoleezza Rice and President Bush. Thus, it seems that the topic is becoming more important to the administration, as it is being discussed more by the key players and enters the interviews and speeches without pressure from the media in many instances. This section begins with President Bush and continues down the line of power, as before. The statements here will be compared to the events covered by the media and to one another in order to gain a better sense of the meaning behind the war with Iraq.

President Bush

This research found eleven public statements in which the President discussed the topic of Iraq in relation to its role in the war on terror. The first was the event that launched this section of analysis: the 2002 State of the Union Address. Its contents were covered in the introduction to this section. Little more than a week later, President Bush met with Prime Minister Sharon to discuss the problems in the Middle East. At that time, he responded to a question about Dick Cheney’s travels to the region with a statement expressing his desire to send a strong message that the United States means what it says: “you’re with or you’re against us” (Bush 2002d). He called on other nations to join the U.S. and make the American effort more effective (Bush 2002d). On February 11, the President gave remarks at a gathering supporting Scott McCallum for Governor of Wisconsin, in which he vowed that Iraq and its fellow axis
members would not threaten the U.S. (Bush 2002bb). Two days later, the President met with Pakistani officials to affirm their commitment against terror, at which time he received a question about regime change in Iraq. He responded that the U.S. would do whatever it took to defend itself, leaving all options available (Bush 2002ii). If nations do not make the right choice, the United States will take any measures to ensure the freedom of the U.S. (Bush 2002ii).

Comments such as these reflect the American mindset of which foreign nations disapproved, according to the *New York Times*. On February 18, President Bush said that though he would like to resolve problems peacefully, he would defend America (Bush 2002c). This comment, desiring peace, coincides with the media’s portrayal of President Bush having to tone down his aggressiveness in response to international criticism; in fact, those words were spoken in Japan which was the area that the *Times* mentioned in its article about the change in the President’s tone.

On March 13, shortly after the Nuclear Posture Review story broke, President Bush gave a press conference, which was partially reprinted in papers, in which he was asked about the modernization and buildup of U.S. nuclear weapons. He claimed that the weapons review was not a new policy, though he defended the review by stating the U.S. needed to be able to defend itself (Bush 2002b). He also mentioned that America did want to reduce its arsenal (Bush 2002b). More questions which were related to concerns in the news followed, such as: the possibility of the U.S. entering Iraq without the support of its allies, the absence of Osama bin Laden from the picture, and the M.I.A. pilot from Gulf War I who may still be alive. Bush told reporters that the U.S. would “consult” nations as the first step but would not answer whether or not the U.S. would take action if those nations did not see eye to eye with American leaders (Bush 2002b). The President declared that he was not worried about Osama bin Laden and that
the terrorist was not necessarily at the center of his command structure (Bush 2002b). The question about the pilot received little attention. However, the President took time to remind people of the cold nature of Saddam Hussein, among other negative descriptions (Bush 2002b). In fact, President Bush stated that he felt that Saddam Hussein’s poor character was cause for concern among people everywhere and therefore the U.S. would continue to remind them (Bush 2002b). A few days later, on March 18, at a roundtable in Missouri, President Bush received another question that was prevalent in the media concerning the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians as more important than commencing a war with Iraq. Bush disagreed, saying he would not be threatened by a dangerous man (Bush 2002aa). However, he also claimed that he would work on the problems throughout the region, though he does not discuss such a plan until mid-April, according to the press (Bush 2002aa).

President Bush and Vice-President Cheney spoke together three days later, on March 21, upon Cheney’s return from the Middle East. Cheney told reporters that the U.S. had a lot of allies in the Middle East who discussed with him the dangers of Iraq (Bush 2002ff). He claimed that the region was concerned about Iraq and he went there to get their advice on the subject (Bush 2002ff). These statements seem contradictory to other reports, considering that the media printed an article placing the support of the Arab world behind Iraq about a week after this interview. The following day, President Bush held a press conference with President Fox of Mexico. More questions about Cheney’s trip to the Middle East emerged; one question focused on a specific comment Cheney made to the region: an attack on Iraq is not imminent but a regime change will occur. President Bush answered that the U.S. would like to see regime change, as it has been the policy of the U.S. from the start, because he will not allow a terror link to form there (Bush 2002h). Statements like these combined with past commentary spurred the
media to point out contradictions in the President’s language, like the article that called inspections with regime change contradictory. Again referring to the desire not to allow a terrorist organization to take root in Iraq, President Bush spoke in South Carolina at the end of the month of March and explained his “axis” comment by asserting that ensuring freedom in the U.S. meant preventing nations like Iraq from mating with terror groups (Bush 2002cc).

On April 6, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Bush declared that it was the policy of the United States to remove Saddam Hussein from power with any possible options (Bush 2002k). The President answered a question about the nonexistent link between Iraq and al Qaeda (Europe’s problem with the war idea) with surprise that any nation could not see the link between killing one’s own people and developing weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2002k). He warned that Saddam Hussein could point those weapons at Europe if he could use chemical weapons on his own people (Bush 2002k). This question, like others before it, keys into the international concern not often addressed directly by American leaders. President Bush also held Iraq accountable for broken promises to the world community (Bush 2002k). This comment came as the U.N. was making preparations with Iraq for inspections. Like other conferences, this exchange was printed in the New York Times the day following.

In this stage of the path to war, President Bush has taken a solid stand against Iraq and Saddam Hussein. The completely ambiguous comments are gone, though there is still some uncertainty and ambiguity in the answers that the President gives to direct questions about the use of force. Now, the President is not making comments such as, “he’ll find out.” He links Saddam Hussein to terrorism and calls on other nations to see the threat of Iraq and support the U.S. in its stand against terrorist states such as Iraq. The President declares that Saddam Hussein will be removed from power, clearly positing that as a rationale for an invasion of the country.
He also refers to weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, the evil nature of Saddam Hussein, the war on terror, and the danger Hussein poses to nations near him. A new rationale emerges, as well: broken promises. Though it is related to the idea of stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and Iraq’s refusal to allow in inspectors, this reasoning is related more to the failures of the nation in the past and not their present actions alone. Iraq made commitments to the world when it agreed to U.N. resolutions; yet, the standards and requirements of those resolutions have not been met.

Dick Cheney

This research only found one day of media interviews involving the Vice-President, aside from the press conference with both the President and the Vice-President. Cheney appeared on “Face the Nation,” “Meet the Press,” and “Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer” to talk about his trip and the problems in the Middle East, including Iraq. On that particular day, March 24, Dick Cheney responded to questions about his trip to the Middle East, a likely cause for his absence from the network and cable news programs. He told reporters that the U.S. had a lot of allies in the Middle East with whom he discussed the dangers of Iraq, as mentioned earlier. On “Face the Nation,” Cheney hypothesized that the Arab world would not oppose a U.S. led invasion of Iraq, as they all shared the concern of the United States (Cheney 2002c). He added that the nations wanted to involve the United Nations in the process and felt that attention needed to be paid to the conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Cheney 2002c). On “Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer,” Cheney commented on the complicated situation in the Middle East, stating that the Arab nations did share concern with the U.S., a phrase used in the other interview (Cheney 2002a). When questioned about the need for inspectors, Cheney quipped that it was not about inspectors; the fact of the matter was that Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons, used them on
his people, and was developing other weapons of mass destruction (Cheney 2002a). The Vice-President referred to the U.S. as deadly serious about the dangers of Iraq but offered no timeline for future events (Cheney 2002a). Cheney did mention that America should worry about the fighting between Israel and Palestine but placed the problem of Iraq in the same realm of worry (Cheney 2002a). During his “Meet the Press” interview, Cheney took the time to lay out a lot of reasons for having “grave concern” surrounding Iraq, a phrase Cheney used to describe the U.S. sentiment toward Iraq (Cheney 2002d). Though the Vice-President admitted that there was no proven link between Saddam Hussein and 9-11, he claimed that there were devastating facts about the horror of Saddam Hussein (Cheney 2002d). Though he could not predict when Iraq would actually develop nuclear weapons, he declared that the U.S. would never allow it to happen anyway (Cheney 2002d). As in his other interviews of the day, Cheney commented on the concern of the Middle East regarding the dangers of Saddam Hussein and Iraq (Cheney 2002d). Yet, when asked about the contrast between what the Arab officials were saying publicly (that they did not support an American invasion of Iraq) and what they had said to Dick Cheney privately (that they did support the U.S., according to Cheney himself), he replied that the papers cannot be believed (Cheney 2002d). He would not answer questions about the United States entering Iraq alone. Cheney did however say that the U.S. would deal with the threat of Iraq, when asked about Saddam Hussein’s evil character and need to be removed from power (Cheney 2002d).

Without ever saying that the U.S. would remove Saddam Hussein from power or enter Iraq, Cheney gave reason as to why America should do something about the situation. He discussed the weapons problems of Iraq, the “grave concern” surrounding Iraq, and the horrors of Saddam Hussein. Thus, the rationales to which he alluded were: prevent the proliferation of

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weapons of mass destruction, remove Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, threat to neighbors, and the war on terror (though this rationale is not mentioned explicitly, it is one reason for Cheney’s trip to the Middle East and the underlying motivation for all talk about Iraq). Unlike President Bush, Cheney does not talk about the necessity of inspections. Cheney also contradicts himself with his depiction of U.S.-Arab relations concerning the U.S. policy on Iraq. His comments do not line up with what the media prints and he has little defense for the contrast other than calling the media a bunch of liars. Thus, how the media perceive the events involving these political players does not always mirror the events as the players describe them; in fact, sometimes it seems that they are describing different events altogether.

Colin Powell

Powell began speaking out against Saddam Hussein on February 1, a couple of days after the nation of Iraq was targeted in the State of the Union Address. These first remarks, of the eleven found on his website, spoke of the evil regime of Saddam Hussein, his sponsorship of terrorism and the work he had been doing to develop weapons of mass destruction (Powell 2002n). Yet, Powell also asserted that there were no war plans at the time (Powell 2002n). On February 3, the Secretary of State told “Face the Nation” that the U.S. would act alone if necessary (Powell 2002i). This comment, including the need for regime change in Iraq, was covered in the news in early February. By mid-month, the press was talking about the significance of Powell’s statements and positions considering his previous, more dovish stance. Thus, the media definitely picked up on the new tone of Powell and the messages that he was sending. After all of this coverage, however, on February 17, in an interview with CNN’s “Late Edition,” he stated that the U.S. was not planning on acting unilaterally, after receiving a question about European concern, calling them “strong words from allies” (Powell 2002g).
When asked about regime change, he replied that there were a lot of options to be pursued, a statement Powell made in a couple of other interviews (Powell 2002g). To highlight one of those other interviews, Powell included the U.S. policy of regime change in Iraq in his statement concerning the budget request, though he also mentioned smart sanctions which could be part of the options he discussed on “Late Edition” (Powell 2002dd). Returning to the CNN interview, the reporter quoted a former Pentagon official as saying that a strike in Iraq would be simple, actually a cakewalk from last time, because Iraq is weaker and the U.S. is stronger, now playing for keeps. Powell responded that the military would have to decide if it would be easy, not pundits (Powell 2002g). On the same day as the CNN interview, February 17, Powell appeared on “Meet the Press.” On the show he admitted that there was no link between Iraq and 9-11 and that Saddam Hussein was somewhat “bottled up” (Powell 2002p). He also gave reasons for wanting a regime change in Iraq including the safety of the U.S. and Iraq’s neighbors (Powell 2002p). Finally, Powell claimed that it would be possible for the U.S. to go it alone, though it would be more difficult (Powell 2002p). This opinion seems to fall in between the other two assertions that Powell made on the topic in the month of February. At times he talked about going it alone, at others about the dangers of acting unilaterally, and now he thinks that unilateral action is possible but more difficult. As he did in remarks with the Spanish Foreign Minister, Powell continued to mention the need for inspections, based on the probability that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction, in almost every interview (Powell 2002bb).

Powell made fewer comments in March, only discussing Iraq on three occasions. In an interview with CNN on March 2, Powell brought up the possibility that inspections could simply drive Iraqi weapons production underground (Powell 2002m). He followed up by commenting that the inspectors would simply have to find the covert operations, as well, a task of which he
thought they were capable (Powell 2002m). Interestingly, a few days later a story appeared in the *Times* citing a senior official as the source and claiming that U.N. inspections could be a trap to allow more time for weapons production. More stories and opinions on the rumor followed.

On the same day as the breaking of the Nuclear Posture Review, March 10, Powell did an interview on “Face the Nation” in which he dispelled the talk that the U.S. was planning to use nuclear weapons against Iraq or other countries (Powell 2002j). Powell told the show that the U.S. had no such plans but is required to update stockpiles and strategies (Powell 2002j). The United States has a full range of possibilities available but that is not a new policy (Powell 2002j). Powell also took time to mention the need for inspectors in Iraq (Powell 2002j). These comments were also covered in the news the following day. At the end of the month, March 27, Powell spoke to the National Public Radio. He outlined the evils of Iraq, mentioning that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction, had gassed its own people, and had already invaded Kuwait once (Powell 2002o). Yet, he also stated that there were other nations that posed a threat to America, as well (Powell 2002o). Commenting on the debates within the administration, Powell said that debate was healthy and that they were all trying to find the right answer to the problem in Iraq (Powell 2002o).

Powell made two more references to the Iraq situation in early April. The first was in an appearance on “60 Minutes II.” After Cheney’s trip to the Middle East and the concerns surrounding the lack of support for the U.S. from Arabs, Powell told the interviewer that it would not be impossible to enter Iraq without Arab approval, continuing his opinion that the U.S. would act unilaterally if necessary (Powell 2002a). The Middle East problems did have an effect on the policy but the U.S. could not let terrorism spread (Powell 2002a). On April 7 in an interview with CNN, Powell reiterated his feelings on the subject, adding that the Middle East would not
weep if Saddam Hussein was removed from power (Powell 2002q). He stated that the U.S. was working on other means (inspections and smart sanctions), too (Powell 2002q). Shortly after, Powell took a trip to the Middle East to discuss the situation, providing an explanation for the absence of any comments from him towards the end of the month.

Powell forwarded rationales similar to those of his fellow officials: the war on terror, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, lack of inspections, and, the newer rationale, protecting Iraq’s neighbors. There are also references to the “because we can” idea in the mention of the Pentagon official’s opinion. Though Powell did not resoundingly agree, he did not discount the idea that Iraq was weak and the U.S. is strong; he simply appealed to the judgment of the military. Powell seems to contradict himself, as well. First he seems to waver on the idea of the United States acting alone against Iraq. Interestingly, the media did not cover this discrepancy, though it did cover the conflicting opinions of President Bush around regime change and inspections and Cheney’s unsupported reports of his trip to the Middle East. Powell also shares that contradiction with the President: wanting inspections and wanting a regime change.

Condoleezza Rice

The National Security Advisor did about as much talking in this phase as her colleague in the State Department. Ten interviews and speeches were found to contain references to Iraq. The first was in a conference on February 1, in which Rice responded to questions about the “axis of evil” by saying that Iraq was dangerous, wanted weapons of mass destruction, and therefore posed a threat to all people (Rice 2002k). She included that the U.S. would protect itself (Rice 2002k). This ambiguous answer to questions about whether or not the U.S. would remove Saddam Hussein or enter Iraq with force came up in many of her interviews for this
phase. On February 3, Rice did two interviews. In her discussion with Wolf Blitzer on CNN’s “Late Edition,” Rice failed to offer an answer to questions about regime change but did say that Iraq was a threat (Rice 2002a). She also stated that the U.S. would try to strengthen the sanctions against Iraq, aligning her with Powell in that regard (Rice 2002a). “Fox News Sunday” brought up a comment by Madeline Albright that declared the “axis” reference to be a bad idea. Rice disagreed, calling the move an excellent way for the U.S. to rally the world (Rice 2002e). She again mentioned that Saddam Hussein was evil but this time agreed with some others in the administration by saying that the Hussein regime should be removed (Rice 2002e). Thus, though Rice is in favor of regime change, she does not indicate one way or another the U.S. plan to follow through with that opinion.

Rice spoke on “Face the Nation” on February 17. Again, she claimed that the United States had a broad policy regarding Iraq but had made no decision about the use of force (Rice 2002d). Rice told the show that the U.S. would want more U.N. sanctions but it was hard to know if the inspections would work, aligning Rice this time with Cheney in her apprehension about inspections (Rice 2002d). She also indicated that the Cheney trip had more reasons than simply the Iraq policy (Rice 2002d). Like the other officials, Rice took the time to lay out reasons for a war with Iraq without ever declaring that war would take place; she reminded viewers that Iraq was a threat to all people, including its neighbors in the Middle East, it had flaunted its obligations to the world and the U.N., and was trying to develop weapons of mass destruction (Rice 2002d). In a press briefing on February 21 and an interview on “Meet the Press” on March 10, Rice made similar comments about not reaching a decision on a plan of action but listed problems with and the violations of Iraq (Rice 2002i, Rice 2002h). A March 16 interview with Tim Russert on CNBC revealed the continuity in Rice’s comments to the press.
She again mentioned her concern over inspections, the need for sanctions, the threat Iraq posed to its neighbors, the danger of Iraq’s plans for weapons of mass destruction, and the fact that no decision had been made yet (Rice 2002m). Rice also spoke about Osama bin Laden as a small part of the story because he was on the run, much like a comment President Bush had made (Rice 2002m). She claimed that Iraqis would choose freedom (Rice 2002m). Rice also defended the President’s use of good and evil to describe nations, saying that the nations he called evil are in fact evil (Rice 2002m).

Condoleezza Rice discussed Iraq three times in April. On April 7, in an interview with Wolf Blitzer on CNN, Rice continued to discuss that there are other means besides force to remove the Hussein regime and reminded viewers once again of the dangers of Iraq (Rice 2002b). On April 8, she spoke to Texas A & M University, saying that the world’s most dangerous cannot have weapons of mass destruction (Rice 2002j). She referred to the President’s message about the “axis of evil” as “crystal clear” and took time to compare the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the 9-11 attacks on the United States (Rice 2002j). She reminded the students that the United States was still the guardian of freedom and democracy (Rice 2002j). Her comments at the end of the month to Johns Hopkins University did not mention Iraq specifically, but spoke about the war on terror and the U.S. plan to rid the world of terrorists by stopping nations from sponsoring terror in whatever ways America sees fit (Rice 2002l).

Condoleezza Rice’s rationales for war also expanded to include the threat that Iraq poses to its neighbors. In addition to that line of reasoning, Rice offered the following rationales: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, liberating the Iraqi people, Saddam Hussein as evil, and removal of the Hussein regime. Rice did not receive as much news coverage as the President and Cheney and Powell. Yet, her comments are more
continuous throughout this phase of research. She stands behind her convictions about the dangers of Iraq but does not reveal any solid U.S. plans to attack the state. She remained skeptical about inspections, relieving her of the contradiction problem the that President and Powell faced, but offered that and sanctions as a non-violent means to solving the Iraq problem.

Don Rumsfeld

The Secretary of Defense spoke out quite a lot about the Iraq situation, referring to Iraq sixteen times in February and April compared to only one comment in each of the months of January and March. In a Department of Defense news briefing on January 30, Rumsfeld set the tone for his statements on the subject of Iraq. When asked about the President’s comment about the “axis of evil,” Rumsfeld said that Iraq was a terrorist, that the U.S. would prefer a new regime, and that, therefore, the President’s statement was clear (Rumsfeld 2002c). Mostly, he answered that the President’s words did not require an explanation when asked about the “axis of evil” (Rumsfeld 2002c). This habit persisted throughout the months covered in this research. In two of his interviews in the beginning of February, Rumsfeld answered questions about an impending war with Iraq by claiming that he cannot answer the question. However, in both of those interviews he took the time to list many of problems associated with Iraq, such as its possession of weapons of mass destruction, its support of terrorism, the threat it posed to its neighbors, and its oppressed people (Rumsfeld 2002ii, Rumsfeld 2002y). In a Department of Defense News Briefing on February 12, Rumsfeld, again, would not answer questions about a war with Iraq (Rumsfeld 2002d). Upon a reporter commenting that there was no proven link between Iraq and terror networks, Rumsfeld began a discussion about “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns,” that latter under which Iraq falls; this means that there are things that we know that we do not know about Iraq so we cannot take the chance of non-action (Rumsfeld
2002d). Also early in February, Don Rumsfeld appeared before the Senate and the House of Representatives to testify about the Defense Budget. Before the Senate, Rumsfeld responded to questions about America’s war strategy with reminders of the potential for weapons development in Iraq (Rumsfeld 2002m). In the House, Republicans were concerned about the “axis” comment; Rumsfeld replied that the concern should be about the weapons of mass destruction and that the President showed “clarity” with the statement, making an important observation about a new risk to the world (Rumsfeld 2002l).

By mid-month, in a February 14 interview with the National Public Radio, Rumsfeld was answering questions about the possibility of a war with Iraq by saying that the President must make that decision (though he did admit that the President had not ruled out that option) (Rumsfeld 2002w). On February 20, Rumsfeld spoke in a town hall meeting and held a media availability, at which times he again would not answer questions about a war or the timing of an attack (Rumsfeld 2002v, Rumsfeld 2002z). On February 23, Rumsfeld did an interview with a newspaper in which he pointed out that Iraq was weaker then than it was ten years ago (Rumsfeld 2002ff). He also stated that he did not want to make Iraq seem too important on the agenda, as that was President Bush’s role (Rumsfeld 2002ff). The next day Rumsfeld appeared on “Face the Nation.” There, he indicated that inspections would be hard to manage and spoke of the “axis” comment as an accomplished goal for the President, the statement made the huge impact that was intended of it (Rumsfeld 2002k). Rumsfeld had one interview concerning Iraq in the month of March; he talked with “CNN Live Today” on March 8. However, he would not comment on the status of any war plans (Rumsfeld 2002b).

At the Department of Defense press briefing on April 1, Rumsfeld mentioned that Iraq was a terrorist in his opening, calling it a “culture of murder” (Rumsfeld 2002e). He also
reported that Iraq had been giving money to people to act as suicide bombers (Rumsfeld 2002e). When asked if this indicated a stronger message against Iraq, Rumsfeld replied, “I’m just telling the truth” (Rumsfeld 2002e). He also said that the message was no stronger then than it was the previous day (Rumsfeld 2002e). At the Department of Defense briefing two days later, he mentioned the story again (Rumsfeld 2002f). Again, in an interview with “Fox News Live” on April 12, Rumsfeld discussed the Iraqi bribery, saying that Saddam Hussein was doing it to gain the support of the Arabs (Rumsfeld 2002n). Yet, Rumsfeld claimed, the Middle East knows that Hussein is evil (Rumsfeld 2002n). That same day on MSNC, Rumsfeld seemed to follow up this sentiment by putting Saddam Hussein on a list of terrorists but concluding with his usual line about the decision belonging to the President (Rumsfeld 2002t). He did add the U.S. should be aggressive but conceded that there were means other than an attack (Rumsfeld 2002t). On April 12, Rumsfeld spoke with Larry King again on his show. Rumsfeld admitted that war with Iraq was not inevitable though a regime change was needed (Rumsfeld 2002a). He referred to Saddam Hussein as evil and outlined all of the atrocities Iraq had committed and the concerns with the state (Rumsfeld 2002a). Finally, he declared that the presence of weapons of mass destruction required action on the part of the United States, but that action could be diplomatic, economic, or military (Rumsfeld 2002a).

Overall, Rumsfeld enumerated almost all of the rationales uncovered thus far: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein is evil, removal of the Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, the threat Iraq posed to its neighbors, and “because we can.” Rumsfeld explicitly stated many of these reasons and indirectly referred to others. Though he did not mention liberating the people of Iraq, he discussed the oppression that they faced under Saddam Hussein, leaving one to assume that their well-being and freedom
were part of his concern. Also, Rumsfeld mentioned the weakness of Iraq, indicating that he thought that an offensive there would not be difficult. He joined the Rice and Cheney camp by not mentioning much about the merits of weapons inspections. The media did not cover much of what Don Rumsfeld had to say, either, and he did not seem to contradict himself in any obvious ways. Rumsfeld did not seem eager to reveal the fate of Iraq or to offer an opinion on behalf of the President, always leaving the decisions to Mr. Bush. He also seemed to mention a lot of reasons for war but would not declare that any action would take place in Iraq, leaving him as the most ambiguous of the administration officials.

Paul Wolfowitz

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, made references to Iraq on eight different occasions during this phase of research. Wolfowitz received his first question about Iraq during a media availability in Munich. The question centered on the “axis” comment made by President Bush; Wolfowitz answered by saying that the President identified a problem when he made the comment and that no other details had been discussed (Wolfowitz 2002e). A couple of weeks later, on February 17, Wolfowitz appeared on “Fox News Sunday” and reiterated that the President had put the world on notice (Wolfowitz 2002c). He asserted that Saddam Hussein needed to prove himself and that the U.S. would have to deal with the situation, whether that meant diplomatic, economic, or military pressure (Wolfowitz 2002c). He also responded to concerns about the United States entering Iraq without the world’s support by replying that the U.S. was not a unilateralist (Wolfowitz 2002c). In a newspaper interview later in February, Wolfowitz made similar comments about the danger of terrorism and the lack of definite answers to questions about the U.S. policy toward Iraq (Wolfowitz 2002h).
On March 13, Paul Wolfowitz attended the Turgut Ozal Memorial Lecture and praised the man for his dealings with Iraq and the fact that the northern watch still existed (Wolfowitz 2002i). Ozal, of Turkey, helped stop Saddam Hussein before and had helped the United States (Wolfowitz 2002i). Wolfowitz also made a point to repeat a comment made by Ozal about the Gulf War in 1991; he had predicted that the war would be “quick, cheap, and easy” since there were so many Iraqi deserters and the army was so poor (Wolfowitz 2002i). On March 18 at the American-Turkish Council, Wolfowitz talked about the same topic again (Wolfowitz 2002a). Around the same time in an interview with CNN’s Novak and Shields, Wolfowitz sounded like Rumsfeld when he stated that the President would have to decide what to do about Iraq (Wolfowitz 2002b). In response to the concerns over the U.S. nuclear position, as covered in the Times, Wolfowitz declared that there was no nuclear threat to Iraq (Wolfowitz 2002b). Yet, Wolfowitz felt that the capabilities of Saddam Hussein had grown. There was also a reference to the fact that President Bush had called Saddam Hussein “Hitler” (Wolfowitz 2002b). On March 21, Wolfowitz spoke with Jim Lehrer on his television show. The topic of Cheney’s trip to the Middle East emerged, the version as told by the media that the Middle East did not want anything more than the weapons of mass destruction to be removed from Iraq. Wolfowitz replied only that the United States wanted to know how other nations felt (Wolfowitz 2002g). Almost a month later, the New York Times conducted an interview with Paul Wolfowitz. In it, he said that the Iraqis lived in a horrible regime and that Saddam Hussein had caused problems throughout the entire Middle East (Wolfowitz 2002f).

Wolfowitz mentioned the following as possible rationales for a possible war with Iraq: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the removal of the Hussein regime, the liberation of the Iraqi people, and “because we can.” Again, the liberation
of the people of Iraq rationale comes out of the statement that the Iraqis live under a horrible regime, indicating that something should be done to help the situation. This rationale seems to be gaining strength in this phase, as Wolfowitz is the third administration official to reference it, along with Rice and Rumsfeld. That statement also implies that the regime should be removed in order to alleviate the tragic situation. Additionally, the “because we can” rationale emerges out of the Ozal comments that Wolfowitz chose to repeat; reminding people of the weaknesses of Iraq indicates that a war would be easily won again. Wolfowitz speaks about the Iraq crisis much like Rumsfeld does, not directly saying anything about the potential for an invasion. This makes the media’s reference to Wolfowitz as a “lightning-rod” for the administration seem odd, at least when thought of in the context of Iraq. Wolfowitz made fewer certain statements about America’s plans than President Bush and Colin Powell did.

Richard Perle

This research found four occasions on which Richard Perle discussed Iraq. On February 19, Perle appeared on “Hardball.” There he stated that the only way to remove the Hussein regime was to use military action, as inspections would be a waste (Perle 2002b). Almost a month later on an episode of “Lou Dobbs Moneyline,” Perle cited Saddam Hussein as the greatest threat in the world because of his weapons of mass destruction (Perle 2002e). He also told viewers and the host that people should listen to what the President says; a regime change is needed in Iraq (Perle 2002e). On March 17, Perle spoke to “This Week,” saying that the greater cost to the U.S. would be to not take action in Iraq, mentioning the weapons of mass destruction (Perle 2002h). He also claimed that America could act alone (Perle 2002h). Finally, he stated that, if anything, armed inspectors would be necessary in Iraq but that they would not find anything there (Perle 2002h). Again appearing on “Hardball” on March 28, Perle spoke of the
need for regime change once again (Perle 2002c). This time he added that upon their liberation, the celebration of the Iraqi people could transform the mood of the entire region (Perle 2002c). The last interview found here was with “Hardball” once again and took place on April 18. Facing questions and concerns about the broad strategy of the United States, Perle replied that going after Saddam Hussein, as the U.S. should, would send a message to others, showing them what happens to terrorists (Perle 2002d). Perle also declared that the President did not need to consult with Congress before making any decision (Perle 2002d).

Perle adds two new rationales to the list: gaining favor with the Middle East and making an example for others. Perle mentioned that eliminating the tension in Iraq would eliminate the hostility many in the Middle East feel toward the United States, which could lead to a decline in terrorism overall. He also feels that other states could learn a lesson vicariously through the U.S. handling of the Iraq situation. Perle reiterates some of the other rationales, such as prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, and Saddam Hussein is evil. Perle does not mention terrorism much in his conversations, though his references to the words of President Bush do indicate that the war on terror is involved here. Perle is not mentioned by the media nor does he compare well with the members of the administration. Again, it seems that he tells the story as it really is: inspections are useless, Saddam Hussein must be removed and that removal must be by force.

Congress

The section on Congress once again analyzes the Congressional Record, to determine what types of legislation involved the situation in Iraq and what the plans of Congress were concerning the situation, and the comments made in interviews by a few Senators who are leaders in the Congress and are well-known public figures. The discussions and rationales that
were found are compared within Congress to examine possible party conflicts, to the members of
the administration to determine the level of congruence between the branches of government,
and to the reports in the news in order to evaluate how much media content reflects the
happenings in Congress.

Congressional Record

Some of the comments in this section are discussed in more general terms, as they appear
more frequently in the records, while others are more specific comments about the Iraq situation.
Overall, there were many more references to Iraq in this phase than there were in the previous
phase. Throughout the month of February, a great deal of discussion centered around the policy
debate over energy and oil plans, deciding whether to focus on fuel and efficiency or new
locations for drilling. There was also policy discussion in the form of legislation about missile
defense, economic stimulation, and cyber security research. Specifically, there was debate in
each house of Congress about the necessity for a war with Iraq. In the Senate, plans were made
for hearing testimony on the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Early in
February, a member of the House declared that the people of Iraq did not support Saddam
Hussein (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 145). To complicate that assertion,
later in the month another House member recalled the plans that had been made to assassinate
and overthrow Saddam Hussein but pointed out that such plans could further destabilize the
Middle East (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 537-38). The Representative called
the U.S. justification “flimsy,” mentioning that Iraq was not involved in 9-11 and had not acted
aggressively toward the United States in the recent past (U.S. Congress, House of
Representatives 2002, 537-38). Therefore, he concluded, America had no authority to wage war
(U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 537-38). A similar debate occurred in the
Senate, with one Senator declaring that the U.S. had to remove Saddam Hussein (for reasons such as his weapons of mass destruction, the lack of peace in Iraq, and Iraq’s former invasion of Kuwait) and strongly supporting the U.S. policy while another Senator agreed with the notion that Iraq posed a problem but felt that more proof was needed before any action could be taken (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 708-09, 730-31). Interestingly, all of these highlighted incidents involved members of the Republican Party, indicating that party loyalty was not at play here.

The media did cover some of the events that were discussed in the Congress, especially the economic debates and the fact that there had not been any aggression toward the U.S. from Iraq in over a decade, though this comment in Congress came after it had been made in the newspapers. However, there is no mention of the disagreement among the members, especially among the members of the Republican Party. Unlike the administration, the Republicans do not stand together on the issue of Iraq. Though some members do seem to disagree about the degree of action to be taken, inspections or military intervention, there is no demand for more proof, as is done in the Congress. Additionally, there is little or no discussion about the role of Congress in the scheme of things. Specifically, Don Rumsfeld constantly states that the decision to go to war belongs to the President when, constitutionally, it belongs to Congress. The members recognize this fact and bring it into the discussion.

In March, there was talk of the nuclear posture review, committee meetings on the problem of Iraq were held, and both houses had members assert that the “axis of evil” was, in fact, evil (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 690). Debates over the energy policy and the import of oil from Iraq continued in the Senate. Again, opinions on the reasons for and against a war with Iraq flooded the floor in both houses. In the Senate, one Republican member in particular voiced his opinion several times throughout the month. He emphasized the need to
stop America’s dependence on Iraq for oil (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 1412-14). He admitted that Iraq was unstable, posed a threat due to weapons of mass destruction, and had gassed its own people; as a result, he supported the use of inspectors (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 1776, 1740-42). In the House, Democrats finally spoke up about the situation in Iraq. One Democratic member reminded his fellow members that the President should ask Congress before he took any action against Iraq (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 1077-78). Another brought up the budget problems associated with a war in Iraq (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 942-43). The Republican members, many of whom spoke out in February, continued to offer support for the President or to request more evidence for an attack on Iraq. On March 5, a Republican Representative gave his support to the U.S. cause, stating that Iraq posed the greatest threat to the United States and listing the following as reasons for his opinion: weapons of mass destruction, the lack of democracy, the previous Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the assassination attempt on the first President Bush, and the fact that Iraq had killed millions of people (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 661). On the contrary, another Republican in the House offered an opposite view of the situation. He felt that war would be a bad idea because there was no Congressional agreement, there had been no Iraqi aggression toward the U.S., it was not morally justified, war could antagonize the situation in the Middle East by spreading outside of Iraq, and the cost was prohibited (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 1075-76). Thus, like this Congressman said, there was disagreement in Congress about how to deal with Iraq, even within the parties.

As a reminder, on March 1, the media reported a story revealing that members of the Democratic Party were upset that President Bush did not consult them about war or even make a case for why the United States should go to war. Concerns about the U.S. oil dependence
continued to make the news, along with other energy and economic policy debates that were ongoing in Congress. Overall, the status of disagreement remained the same, still not making any headway in the media.

Through April, energy policy and oil concerns entered into the conversations and legislation in Congress. A couple of topics that emerged specifically were the possibility of an oil embargo by Iraq and need for a domestic energy policy (U.S. Congress, Senate, 2376-77). The Democrats began to show signs that the party was somewhat split when one Democratic Senator chose to speak about the dangers of the Iraqi weapons program (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 2481). Another concern in the Senate, though raised by a Republican, was the fact that the crisis in the Middle East, between the Israelis and the Palestinians, paralyzed the United States in regards to taking action in Iraq (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 2608-09). Related issues in the news centered on the rising oil prices and the energy debate. One story of particular interest was the budget war between Democratic Senator Daschle and President Bush; the President had stashed away money in the budget to pay for a possible war with Iraq, to the Senator’s dismay. Thus, the media uncovered more than what was in the records, though this information may appear when Senator Daschle is examined individually. Again, there is debate between the two parties and within the parties themselves as to whether or not military action in Iraq is necessary and beneficial.

The rationales that emerge in Congress are: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, war for oil, Saddam Hussein is evil, removal of the Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, and lack of inspections. All of these reasons are easily found in the words of the Congressmen. Yet, another rationale seems to be involved, as well: a rationale related to unfinished business but more specific to the attempt on the life of the former President
Bush. One Congressman recalls the event specifically when he is enumerating the reasons why he stands behind the President. This reference would lead one to believe that that past action my Iraq influenced his decision to support an American policy to use military force against Iraq.

Tom Daschle-Democrat

Senator Daschle spoke out about Iraq in five interviews, at least as were found through this research method. Daschle started the month of February with an appearance on “CNN Late Edition,” at which time he talked about the “axis of evil” (Daschle 2002a). He agreed that the “axis” did pose a danger to the U.S. and even went so far as to say that the United States should act unilaterally if the security of the nation is involved (Daschle 2002a). However, he did not reveal any timeline of events for the United States, saying that things should be taken one step at a time (Daschle 2002a). Later in the month, on February 26, the Senator talked with “Hannity and Colmes” on Fox. Somewhat prior to the discussion in the media about the energy policy and problems of America, Daschle received questions about the energy bill in Congress. He reminded the hosts that the energy bill was tied to the security bill that was supported by the President (Daschle 2002d). Coinciding with that statement was his emphasis on needing to consider any American dependence on foreign nations when national security is involved (Daschle 2002d). This conversation does match up with talks in Congress, though, as much of the discussion around legislation and the U.S.’s dealings with Iraq focused on the fact that the United States purchased oil from Iraq and a new policy may be necessary. His lone interview in March, on the 3rd, with “Meet the Press” pitted Senator Daschle against Senator Trent Lott, a Republican. There, Daschle began mentioning the need for the U.S. to finish the battles and reconstruction in Afghanistan before embarking on any new wars with other states (Daschle 2002g). He also stated that the President would need a resolution from Congress in order to
initiate a war with any state (Daschle 2002g). As a member of the Democratic Party, this public move correlates to the reported concerns in Congress about the lack of interaction between the President and the Democrats on the issue of Iraq. Strangely, this story made the news prior to any discussion of it in Congress and before Daschle talked about it on Fox. Another point of the discussion was found in the news before Senator Daschle voiced it as an opinion: that there were many differences between the three members of the “axis of evil” though there were all dangerous (Daschle 2002g). With Trent Lott on the show, there were points of disagreement between the two senators. In fact, Lott accused Daschle of supporting Saddam Hussein as a result of the Democratic opinion that there needed to be stability and a completed job in Afghanistan before there was another war front, as the Democrats also were accused of not supporting the President due to their criticism of the unfinished work in Afghanistan (Lott 2002h). Thus, there was tension between the two, a tension that was somewhat reported as a tension between the President and Daschle over a budget issue. Yet, much unlike the reasons for Daschle bashing from the first phase, Daschle and Lott did agree that a new energy policy was needed.

In April, Daschle did two interviews late in the month. On April 21, Daschle again appeared on “Late Edition” with Wolf Blitzer and again issued a statement calling for a wrap-up in Afghanistan before any moves were made toward any other state (Daschle 2002b). Included in this request, however, was the need to take care of the problems in Israel, as well (Daschle 2002b). In his final interview of the month, Daschle spoke with “This Week.” Agreeing more with the President and the administration this time, he stated that there was bipartisan agreement that a regime change in Iraq should take place, though this statement was not fully supported by the research done here (Daschle 2002i). However, he still felt that there needed to be finality to
the offensive in Afghanistan first (Daschle 2002i). Overall, Daschle seems to support a war with Iraq on limited terms. The rationales he does offer include the need for regime change and the need for more energy security for the United States, which translates into the war for oil ideal.

**Joseph Lieberman-Democrat**

Senator Lieberman participated in six interviews in this second phase of research, according to the results turned up through the chosen research method. His first interview took place on March 3 on the CBS show “Face the Nation.” He did not answer many questions about the fate of Iraq as he quickly told the reporter that the President did not have to consult Congress prior to taking action in order to reserve the right to surprise the enemy (Lieberman 2002f). Much unlike his Democrat counterpart, Tom Daschle, Lieberman here demonstrates that there may be bipartisan support for a removal of the Hussein regime but there is not even intra-party support for the means for such an action. Already it is apparent that the relationships among members of Congress are quite similar to the relationships of members of the administration, in that they see different approaches as being the best solution to the Iraq problem. On March 10, Lieberman spoke with Wolf Blitzer on “CNN Late Edition.” In agreement with many other officials studied in this essay, he stated that Saddam Hussein was the most dangerous terrorist, one who had weapons of mass destruction, hated the United States, and had connections to terror groups (Lieberman 2002d). He also agreed with the notion that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power in order to ensure the safety of the United States (Lieberman 2002d). Yet, he did mentioned inspections, though only to say that they must be “real” inspections if they are to take place (Lieberman 2002d). On March 14, in an appearance on Fox’s “Hannity and Colmes,” Lieberman made a direct statement about the future of Iraq; though the when and how was up to the President, the whether was inevitable (Lieberman 2002h). This statement mimics a
comment made in a column by Margaret Thatcher in mid-February, which describes the scenario in exactly the same manner, minus the mention of the President. Along with this bold statement, the Senator said that the U.S. should go after Saddam Hussein, despite the fact that he was not connected to 9-11 (Lieberman 2002h). He was an enemy, bitter about the first Gulf War, had weapons of mass destruction, and tried to assassinate the first President Bush (Lieberman 2002h).

On April 1, Lieberman furthered this view that the United States must handle Saddam Hussein when he talked with “Business Center” on CNBC (Lieberman 2002a). He declared that American security depended on taking Saddam Hussein, again stressing that he was the most dangerous threat to the U.S. (Lieberman 2002a). He added his hopes that the U.S. had already begun planning the invasion (Lieberman 2002a). In an April 17 appearance on “Hardball,” Joe Lieberman repeated his desire for regime change, “the sooner the better,” in fact (Lieberman 2002j). And finally, Lieberman informed “Fox News Sunday” that Vice-President Cheney was in the Middle East to discuss the Iraqi threat to that region with the region’s leaders (Lieberman 2002i).

Lieberman separates himself from other Democrats in Congress, at least those studied here and those that were mentioned in the news, by not requiring that the President relay more information to him or even inform the legislature of his future plans for Iraq. Thus, not all of the feelings in Congress are in line with one another. Lieberman seems very in favor of a war with Iraq, listing several rationales: the war on terror, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the removal of the Hussein regime, and the newer rationale of revenge for his past attempt on the former President’s life. He also inserts a new idea into the realm of reason: Saddam Hussein hates the United States. Twice, Lieberman mentioned something about
how Hussein felt about America, as if it bears some relevance on how America should then deal with him.

**Trent Lott-Republican**

Senator Lott only accepted two interviews during this second phase of research. The first was an appearance on “Meet the Press” on March 3, the same date as Senator Tom Daschle’s appearance on the show. Their interactions have already been discussed in the section covering Senator Daschle. However, the opinions of Senator Lott in his portion of the interview can be contrasted to those of Senator Daschle. While Daschle spoke about the need to finish the job in Afghanistan and the importance of the President conferring with Congress about war plans with Iraq, Lott spoke about the Iraqi National Congress, inspections, and the need to secure safety in the region. He felt that utilizing the Iraqi National Congress and sending supplies to the opposition group could be a way to deal with the Iraq problem. He also expressed an interest in sending weapons inspectors into Iraq. Overall, he claimed that Iraq was a problem. He continued that opinion into his next interview, which took place on April 16 with “Hannity and Colmes” of Fox. In the discussion, he declared that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction and the United States needed to be prepared to take action (Lott 2002f). Turning to a topic popular in Congress, he spoke about the energy policy of America (Lott 2002f).

Lott expresses several rationales, mostly indirectly: prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of inspections, the Iraqi threat to its neighbors, the removal of the Hussein regime, and war for oil. The threat that Iraq posed to its neighbors comes from his mention of the need for safety in the region, indicating that Iraq is causing unrest in more states than just his own. Lott’s comment about the Iraqi National Congress implies an overthrow of the government, an obvious desire to remove the Hussein regime. And the war for...
oil stems out of his concern over the energy policy of the United States. Many of his rationales coincide with the rationales supported by the entire Congress. Interestingly, with Lott there is no mention of the war terror.

**John McCain-Republican**

Senator McCain participated in five interviews during the span of time examined here. His first interview was the same day as the State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002. He spoke with Chris Matthews on “Hardball,” giving a first impression of the speech. At that time, McCain stated that he did not think that the “axis of evil” comment would be heard around the world, meaning that it was not likely to receive a lot of attention worldwide (McCain 2002h). He also said that the message was meant to be a warning (McCain 2002h). It is clear now, however, that McCain’s prediction was wrong, as the comment was scrutinized not only internationally but also domestically, as many reporters discussed the phrase and often reported the feelings of those abroad. McCain’s next interview was also with “Hardball,” on February 12. Agreeing with Senator Daschle, McCain declared that the President should consult with Congress before taking any action in Iraq (McCain 2002i). He also stated that the U.S. should use “meaningful” inspections and the Iraqi National Congress before risking any American lives in Iraq, a topic on which Senator Lott would agree (McCain 2002i). Five days later, February 17, McCain appeared on “Meet the Press,” furthering his idea about the need to prevent the loss of American lives in Iraq (McCain 2002k). Pointing to the Iraq Liberation Act, McCain said that sanctions and work with the Iraqi National Congress should be utilized first (McCain 2002k). However, he did agree with many in the Congress and the administration that Saddam Hussein should be removed from power (McCain 2002k). On March 3, a day on which all four senators examined here took part in interviews, McCain spoke with Wolf Blitzer on “CNN Late Edition.”
He again mentioned the Iraqi National Congress and the need for a regime change (McCain 2002c). Yet, he added that Iraq posed a “clear and present danger” and that all options were on the table (McCain 2002c). Thus, it seems that he favors more diplomatic and economic actions to be taken first but will not discount the value of other means for achieving the end goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power. The Senator appeared one last time on “Hardball” on March 5. He seemed to change another opinion in this interview, similar to how he altered his view of the means to be used in Iraq in the previous interview. He told Chris Matthews that the President did not need to consult Congress before taking action in Iraq as a result of a resolution passed right after 9-11 (McCain 2002j).

The only rationales that McCain hinted at or mentioned directly were the lack of inspections, therefore the need to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the removal of the Hussein regime. Though the war on terror is at the heart of all of these discussions, McCain does not mention the war on terror at any time, other than to say that he felt that the “axis” comment was a warning to nations. He changed his position on a couple of issues in the month of March, though the reasons for this are unclear. There is no major event in the news, other than the talk about the Democrats not supporting the President. McCain may have tried to align more with his party, as he was previously more aligned with Democrat Tom Daschle, in order to remain loyal to the party. However, Democrat Joe Lieberman espoused many of the same views as the later revelations made by McCain.

Conclusion

This phase had many similarities and differences from the one before it. Those connections and divisions, along with the events of the phase, will be enumerated below.
Additionally, the rationales for this phase will be revisited, addressing the new rationales and then outlining all of the rationales that were heard in Phase Two.

In this phase, many of the same trends from Phase One continued. For example, a lot of the talk in the media centered on the international reaction to America’s comments about Iraq and the war on terror. Additionally, many of the same rationales came up in both phases, though there were a few new rationales that will be discussed further down the page. Again, the Congressional Record and the members of Congress addressed many of the same rationales, showing some continuity between what takes place on the floor and what is said to the public. The concern over weapons of mass destruction, the lack of inspections, and the desire to remove the Hussein regime were common elements in the arguments of Congress, individually and collectively. Like the first phase, Daschle refrained from offering any support for the idea of a war with Iraq.

Yet, many things changed over time, as well. For instance, the media took more time to present both sides of the argument, printing criticism and the downsides to engaging in conflict with Iraq. Though many of the media interviews consisted of the reporters asking questions about Iraq, as in Phase One, many of the officials talked about Iraq without any encouragement from the media or other sources. The war with Iraq became more of a reality, as more members of the administration and Congress gave reasons for a war and talked more openly about its possibilities. The comments were not as ambiguous as Phase One, with references to plans for war and discussion about how well the U.S. would fare if it had to go into Iraq without the support of the international community. Congress began to debate the topic of war and insert Iraq into conversations that were not about energy policy. The houses set up committee hearings
on issues pertaining to Iraq. Thus, the movement toward an actual war with Iraq seems to emerge in this phase.

As far as actual events are concerned, this phase was rather quiet, like the previous one. Of course, the State of the Union garnered a lot of attention, from the media and from the world, creating a phrase that was often repeated and cited. Besides reporting opinions and international concerns, the media highlighted the enduring conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, a topic that spurred the Vice-President and the Secretary of State to visit the region and try to gain support for an offensive in Iraq in spite of the problems from which the Middle East already suffered. International support grew as a more important issue in light of this troubled time in the area. Additionally, the United Nations began to get involved, talking with Iraq and looking at inspection policies. The Nuclear Posture Review took place in the United States, raising more issues about America’s motivations for war. Some argued that if America was so concerned with nuclear proliferation, it would slow its own development. Others talked about the significance of the positioning of the weapons, making many terror states, including Iraq, targets, though officials denied that anything was out of the ordinary, as the review is a standard procedure to prepare the U.S. for whatever may happen. More controversy arose as the Democrats began to battle with President Bush, feeling left out of the Iraq policy process. This conflict would continue and worsen, as the pressure increased to support the war effort.

Turning to the rationales, six new reasons for war emerged in Phase Two. All of the new rationales were only mentioned by one member of the government, though some became more important in the final phase. One such rationale was broken promises. Iraq had not complied with the U.N. resolutions imposed upon it and, therefore, should be punished for its continued violation. President Bush initiated this reason, along with another idea: the sake of history.
President Bush stated, on two occasions, that history had called America into action; thus, the U.S. needed to act in order to serve some greater purpose, to fulfill some historical obligation. Revenge was a rationale that was brought up by Senator Joe Lieberman, when he referred to the assassination attempt on the former President Bush. His mention of this event leads to an idea that the U.S. should punish Iraq for this transgression and take revenge on the country. Senator Lieberman also introduced the possibility that the U.S. should go after Saddam Hussein because of his hatred toward the U.S. Because he hates us, we should stop him before he has a chance to do us harm. Finally, Richard Perle brought two more new ideas to the forefront: gaining favor with the Middle East and making an example of Iraq. He felt that taking care of Iraq would please the Middle East and make the region more likely to support the U.S. He also thought that if the United States went into Iraq, other terror nations would take note and save themselves from a similar fate. Of these new rationales, Saddam’s hatred of the U.S., gaining favor with the Middle East, and making an example of Iraq did not appear in any other phase of research.

All of the rationales from Phase One, except unfinished business, appear in Phase Two, as well. To list them, they were: war for terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, liberate the Iraqis, threat to the region, because we can, and war for oil. The first five rationales named (war on terror, weapons of mass destruction, removal of regime, inspections, and the evil of Saddam) were the most popular, once again. The war on terror, the weapons, and the regime change were mentioned in at least nine of the twelve possible sources examined here. The evil of Saddam appeared in seven sources while the lack of inspections rationale appeared in five. Liberating the Iraqis was discussed in Congress and by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Rice. The concept that Iraq posed a threat to the entire region and should therefore be handled, in a way
decreasing the already heightened anxiety in the Middle East, was discussed by President Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Don Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Lott commented on the because we can line of reasoning. And the war for oil ideal surfaced in interviews with Tom Daschle and Trent Lott. Overall, the same rationales that carried weight in the first phase carried weight in this phase, as well, even with the new rationales, which were not very dispersed among the members.

**Phase Three (September 12, 2002 to October 11, 2002)**

The third and final phase of this project opens with the speech that President Bush gave to the United Nations on September 12, 2002, one year and one day after the terror attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. Throughout the summer months, the media picked up on the administration’s focus on Saddam Hussein and Iraq and quickly followed suit. Congress also made the definite switch to centering more debate around the dangers of Iraq than on the missing al Qaeda leader. Yet, once the memories of 9-11 were fresh again, President Bush took the opportunity to address another threat to the world and added that threat to his war on terror in the most official way, short of declaring war, which he could. The President laid out a long list of past Iraqi transgressions and violations of U.N. resolutions in the early moments of his remarks to the U.N. General Assembly in New York (Bush 2002l). He warned against the dangers of allowing “outlaw regimes,” such as Iraq, free reign to develop and sell weapons of mass destruction to terrorists (Bush 2002l). The President reminded the United Nations that it had been four years since there had been any inspectors inside of Iraq; thus, Saddam Hussein had had much time to develop “weapons of mass murder” (Bush 2002l). He called Iraq a “grave and gathering danger” and insisted that the world could not risk succumbing to the failed means used in the past, such as sanctions, the oil-for-food program, and air strikes (Bush 2002l). This threat
extended to the U.N. because it was a threat to peace (Bush 2002l). President Bush asked the U.N. if it wanted to remain relevant to the world and then enumerated a number of things that Iraq could do to save itself (Bush 2002l). Explaining that the U.S. had no quarrel with the people of Iraq, President Bush declared that Iraq had two futures to face based on whether it chose to cooperate or defy the world once again (Bush 2002l). If Iraq chose to cooperate, there would be peace; if Iraq chose to defy, the nation would be held to account (Bush 2002l).

With that, the nation and the world moved into action, and many events, opinions, and debates occurred in the weeks that followed. By October 11, 2002, one year and one month after the attacks on America, both houses of Congress passed the resolution authorizing force against Iraq. With that, the nation braced for what was to come.

Some things of note in this section are the new rationales that emerged, mostly out of President Bush’s address to the United Nations: disarmament, safety of the world, commitment to the children, imminent threat, preservation of peace, threat to freedom, connection to al Qaeda, the uniqueness of Iraq, the relevance of the U.N., and international law (a new rationale formulated by Colin Powell). As time progressed, President Bush spoke out more and more about the dangers of Iraq and the need for action; by this phase, he speaks as much as anyone about the perils of Iraq and the issues that the nation faces in regards to the potential for military conflict. Also talking to reporters and making many statements about the situation are Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld, though this is not uncommon. The Congressional Record contains more debate around the Iraq issue, most likely because of the resolution on which they must vote. Still, this is a marked difference from the first two phases. One final difference from the previous phases lies in the media coverage. There is some amount of action taking place and more events to cover. Thus, the media focus on the progress at the U.N. and the statements from
international leaders as much as it discusses the opinions surrounding the debate. Additionally, there are now more topics for the media to debate, leading to continued opinion articles and speculations on both sides of the debate.

The Media

Though only one month of time elapsed from the beginning of Phase Three until the passage of the Congressional resolution, more than 400 articles appeared in the Times from mid-September to mid-October, when searching for “Iraq” and “war” in the headlines, terms, or lead paragraphs of articles; nearly 700 articles surfaced when searching for those keywords in an entire article. Thus, the media had a lot to say about the debate over the war with Iraq and a lot to cover, considering the volume of speeches and interviews given by administration members and President Bush, the events at the United Nations, and the debate in Congress. As a result, the articles in this section differ from previous months in that the media is doing less speculation about the war and offering more factual information about the actions that were being taken in the U.N. and Congress. Opinions and rationales still emerged from the reporters but much time was spent on relaying the events and words of others, as well. This section separates the months of September and October, though only part of each month was researched.

September 13-30, 2002

September 13, 2002, was a huge media day, as there was frenzied coverage of President Bush’s speech to the United Nations about the need for U.N. intervention in the Iraqi weapons program if the U.N. was to remain relevant to the world. Several articles reviewed the speech, offering up opinions on its ramifications, and a transcript of the address appeared, as well. One editorial claimed that the speech gave coherence to the mumblings of the administration that took place throughout the summer, calling it a “welcome and important” move by the White House
that put the pressure on Iraq, and not the U.S., to make a move (The Iraq test 2002). Taking a
different stance, Madeline Albright, as a guest editorialist, agreed that Hussein was evil but felt
that the speech was “neither specific or compelling” in linking Hussein to an imminent threat,
urging the continuation of action against al Qaeda and the value of inspections and disarmament
(Albright 2002). Another article cited the speech as the formal transition from Osama bin Laden
to Saddam Hussein and also called the administration on its lack of evidence or intelligence
about 9-11 or the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (Tyler 2002a). Interestingly, initial
research for this paper found that, based on numerical mentions, the shift officially occurred
during Phase Two. Opinions from Congressional leaders were reported: McCain declared that
the war would be easy; Lott offered support; Daschle said that there needed to be more evidence
and that the international reaction needed to be considered (Tyler 2002a). These cited positions
correspond with the statements made by these officials throughout this research. The
international reaction that Daschle mentioned, overall, was one of support for action taken
against Iraq but of concern over the U.S. ambition and plan to topple the Hussein regime; Arabs
feared more violence in the region (Preston 2002e, MacFarquhar 2002d). And the evidence that
Daschle wanted came somewhat out of an intelligence report that discussed the Iraqi attempts at
developing nuclear weapons (Miller and Gordon 2002). Turning to the economy, one column
talked about the idea of stimulating the economy through war, a proposal that, he claimed, added
to the changing rationales of the administration; the column also discussed the problems
surrounding the oil market (Krugman 2002). Thus, several topics emerge on this first day that
carry through the entire one-month span studied here: the economy and its decline (including the
drops in the stock market), the rise of oil prices, international reactions to the situation (mostly
those opposed to U.S. military action with the exception of England and Israel), and the
Congressional debate over the war. Letters to the editor on the subject of Iraq also appeared in large numbers rather frequently, arguing for and against the administration’s policy. Though these topics may be mentioned again when new or interesting material about them arises, there is little need to articulate every mention of these topics, for the sake of preventing the inclusion of too much detail. Thus, there were numerous articles about the international reaction, the debate, etc., but they are not covered in detail here.

Coverage of the action in the United Nations Security Council began on September 14, 2002, with an article about the discussions taking place within the U.N. and the U.S. position that the failure of the inspections was a security threat; Iraq countered that it wanted the sanctions imposed on it lifted if inspections were to take place again (Preston and Purdum 2002c). The Israelis came out in support of the United States, though the rest of the world added skepticism to their offerings of support. Within the U.S., the Democrats spoke of their concern over the war and the politics of the campaign for regime change in Iraq, as it was so close to election time (Mitchell 2002). A column in agreement with that sentiment was printed, declaring the “arrogance of the CEO administration” to call those who did not support the war idea unpatriotic (Rich 2002). The author added that President Bush would not turn back, even if he had no allies in the war, and questioned the possibility that there were hidden motives for the war, such as oil and revenge for the assassination attempt of President Bush’s father (Rich 2002). As the reader knows, these rationales have already emerged within the administration and Congress, though rarely mentioned and only mentioned by a few officials. Advice from the reporters also surfaced, as one editorial warned against hasty decisions and called for debate (A measured pace on Iraq 2002). By September 15, 2002, the war debate, and the coverage of it, was underway. One reporter visited a small, Republican town and asked the people how they felt about the war;
what he found was that the number of people in favor of war was nowhere near the two-thirds support for war that surveys were reporting (Purdy 2002). Back to the inspection and resolution debate, Iraq agreed to allow inspections if the United States promised not to invade and if the sanctions on Iraq were lifted, much like the request made on the previous day (Reuters 2002a).

Another topic to hit the pages was the German election, in which opposition to the U.S. war was used as a topic for debate among the candidates. This, too, appeared frequently in the news as the election debates continued until the election was held, showing German opposition to the war. French opposition also appeared often, starting on September 15 with reports that France was encouraging Iraq to allow the inspectors into the country and avoid war (Sciolino 2002b).

Also on September 15, the debate over the term pre-emption began, a debate which later encompassed the meanings of preventive and self defense, as well.

On September 16, discussion about the number of resolutions needed to initiate military action in Iraq began: two resolutions in the U.N. and two in Congress, according to one columnist (Safire 2002b). Though this discussion of the number of resolutions was more tongue-in-cheek, the importance of the number of resolutions did come up in many interviews and articles throughout this phase. Also in the column, an opinion about the diplomatic strategy of America emerged, citing that the entire plan was to rely on the non-compliance of Saddam Hussein, an action on which to be counted because of his history (Safire 2002a). Mention of the possibility that domestic issues had been overlooked for some time began, as well. Another debate started in the Times on September 16: whether or not inspections would work. The article on this day claimed that they would not, though more articles on each side of the debate would appear over time (Milhollin and Moltz 2002). An article about the fact that President George W. Bush talked about the assassination attempt on his father appeared, questioning the reason and
the amount of conferencing between father and son (Bumiller 2002c). Thus, more topics that can be found throughout the latter half of September and into the early part of October have surfaced: the lack of attention to domestic issues and the debate over the value of inspections.

More event coverage began on September 17. American and British air strikes moved to targets such as Iraqi air defense sites to prepare for a future attack by clearing “air lanes,” though strikes in Iraq were not new; it was also reported that these planes were often shot at by the Iraqis (Schmitt 2002b). Iraq sent a letter to the U.N., which was printed in the newspaper, offering to allow unconditional inspections and planning to discuss plans with the U.N. after receiving pressure from Arab states; the U.S. and Britain announced their skepticism of the tactic in response (Preston and Purdum 2002b). U.S. Representatives went to Iraq and spoke with the people, urging them to allow the inspectors access in order to prevent war (Hulse 2002).

Concern over the cost of the war emerged in the U.S., another topic covered much in the weeks that followed. On September 18, 2002 a split occurred in the United Nations over the need for a new resolution against Iraq because of the Iraqi letter to the U.N. This action by Iraq was reported by one journalist as a move to turn the tables on America and make the nation once again appear to be unilateralist; while the U.S. pushed, the U.N. wanted to wait (Purdum 2002d). Plans were made to move U.S. troops to a base in Qatar (in the Middle East) in order to prepare for possible military action in Iraq (Perlez 2002). More questioning of the actual number of people who support the idea for the war came up in another article talking to citizens about their reactions to the Iraq situation (Friedman 2002b). Quite damaging, a columnist quoted European and Arab allies as being more afraid of President Bush than of Saddam Hussein because of the empire-building aspirations of the United States (Dowd 2002).
The next couple of days contained much coverage and reprinting of testimony and pleas for support for the war from Don Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, and President Bush. Rumsfeld and Powell both appeared before the House and Senate in attempts to offer reasons for a Congressional resolution to allow “all means” for dealing with Iraq (Purdum and Bumiller 2002b). President Bush also spoke to the Congress and American people, requesting such a resolution. Iraq also sent another letter to the U.N., partially reprinted in the newspaper, accusing President Bush of trying to control the Middle Eastern oil reserves; future talks with Iraq were planned and Hans Blix, the lead weapons inspector, initiated work on a timeline for the inspections (Preston 2002c). On September 21, the Pentagon released information that it had created attack options in case the United States went to war with Iraq (Schmitt and Sanger 2002). On September 22, Iraq stated that it would not accept any agreement other than the agreement that the nation made with Kofi Annan (Reuters 2002b). In turn, the United States voiced its disapproval of the Iraqi decision (Preston and Purdum 2002a). Speculation was made about the timing of the war, which could possibly begin in early 2003 (Schmitt 2002g). By September 23, Congressional Democrats wanted to change the language of the resolution, limiting the scope of authority given to the President (Wald 2002b). This debate continued throughout the haggling over the resolution. Additionally, it was released that the drafting of the White House resolution for force began during the summer months (Bumiller 2002d).

On September 24, three retired generals testified that military action without the United Nations would be a bad move on the part of the U.S. (Schmitt 2002d). Al Gore also criticized the U.S. policy, stating that a war with Iraq would weaken the war on terror, yet another idea that became the subject of debate (Murphy 2002). Speculation about the possibility that the Ukraine sold radar equipment to Iraq surfaced, though no solid proof existed; still, this coverage, along
with the following article, offered support for the administration’s policy amidst the other negative commentary (Wines 2002b). Iraq declared that it would not accept a new U.N. resolution, following suit with its previous assertions on the subject, while Britain released a report that Iraqi arms plans were up and running and that Iraq had chemical weapons capabilities (Bloomberg News 2002b). U.N. inspectors announced on September 25 that inspections would resume in mid-October with “unfettered access” (Reuters 2002c). Yet, on September 26, the U.S. and Britain were still drafting a new U.N. resolution that would require Iraq to have complied fully with inspectors in two months or else face possible military action (Tyler 2002b). The following day, reports were released describing the results of a computer practice “war game”; it revealed that the United States could launch an offensive in Iraq while maintaining missions elsewhere (namely Afghanistan), had fixed some problems with a game played earlier in the year, and had uncovered some new problems that the military needed to solve (Schmitt and Shanker 2002). Also on September 27, President Bush took the time to comment on the Iraq Resolution in Congress, a resolution that was still under debate. It was with that speech (covered in detail in the section on President Bush) that the controversy between the Senate Democrats and the President began, with a continued debate between Senator Daschle and President Bush over the efforts of Democrats to ensure American security (Purdum and Bumiller 2002a). One column appeared discussing the fact that Iraq knows the weakness of America (its unwillingness to strike civilian regions), making the war more difficult than many had predicted (Kristof 2002a). Also criticizing some of the officials’ opinions, Senator Gephardt wrote an editorial accusing President Bush of playing politics with American security and warning that such a move would weaken efforts to resolve the situation in Iraq (Gephardt 2002).
September 28 was the debut day for the U.S.-Britain U.N. resolution, which required full access and reports on all attempts made by the Iraqis to acquire weapons, cited that the Iraqis were in breach of past resolutions and had to comply this time, and if there was no compliance the U.N. would authorize all means necessary to bring about security; however, this proposed resolution faced much opposition in the Security Council (Gordon 2002l). One day after the announcement of the new U.N. resolution, Iraq rejected the proposal and declared that it would fight hard, as more military readiness on the part of the U.S. was reported, as well (Preston and Tyler 2002). The U.S. policy met more opposition, as church leaders and citizens joined the international community in urging a peaceful resolution to the problem. In addition to the claim that Iraq was in breach of U.N. resolutions, Don Rumsfeld was reported to have solid proof of a link between Iraq and al Qaeda (Schmitt 2002e). On the Congressional debate, an article reported that there would be little more change to the resolution and that it would pass despite opposition from liberal Democrats (Firestone 2002). As September came to a close on the 30th, two Democrats from the House visited Iraq and questioned the motives of the President, causing an up-roar among the Republicans in the House (Cushman 2002b). Additionally, reports were released that countered the proposition that there was a link between Iraq and al Qaeda (Benjamin 2002).

As a reminder, many topics were discussed throughout the month of September (and October, as well, though it is not in the focus yet). Those topics include: the slipping economy and stock market, the cost of the war, the price of oil, the value of inspections, the conflict between a war with Iraq and the war on terror, the international opposition to the U.S. policy, the meaning of pre-emption, prevention, and self defense, the debate in Congress, and the politicization of the war with Iraq.
October 1-11, 2002

On October 1, the Pentagon released footage of Iraqis firing on U.S. and British planes (Schmitt 2002c). Congress continued to debate the language of the resolution authorizing force. Overseas, the U.N. inspectors met with Iraqi officials to work out the details of the inspections and agreed to turn over reports of past attempts at weapons development (Landler 2002b). Reflecting on the reasons for war offered over the past couple of weeks in remarks by the President and testimony before Congress, all of which were reported and/or printed in the news, one reporter spoke of the many rationales for war as broad but unclear (Purdum 2002e). On October 2, to add to the agreement made between U.N. inspectors and Iraq, it was released that there would be no unannounced inspections of royal palaces and that the inspections would begin in two weeks (Landler 2002a). In reply, the President requested that the inspectors hold off on inspections until the new U.N. resolution had a chance to pass through the Security Council, which was printed in the paper that same day (Purdum and Preston 2002). Presidential remarks on the Iraq situation also were reprinted in the newspaper on October 2. Almost as a side note, an article appeared that reminded readers that regime change was still the policy of the United States, though they were looking for a resolution with the U.N. (Sanger and Hulse 2002). The following day, October 3, the White House announced that the President and the House had reached an agreement on the Iraq Resolution, though the Senate was still working on language; remarks of the announcement were printed in the Times (Bumiller and Mitchell 2002). Yet, the U.S. plan lost international support, as France and Germany agreed that there should not be any military intervention (Tagliabue 2002). Former President Bill Clinton also issued a warning against military action, though agreeing with the White House desire for tough inspections (Hoge 2002).
Good news for the Bush administration graced the pages on October 4, as China seemed closer to backing the U.S.-Britain resolution and the U.N. inspectors agreed to stall inspections until it received word from the U.N. Security Council (Dao 2002b, Preston 2002d). The problems within the Democratic Party were highlighted, as well; this topic was covered much all throughout Phase Three, with the Party afraid to oppose the war for fear of retaliation at the polls but also unable to bring up the domestic issues on which they had wanted to campaign. Around this time the Times began printing transcripts of the debates in Congress almost daily, throwing the debate into the public’s eyes. On October 5, Hans Blix expressed his desire for diplomacy but added later he felt that tough inspections were necessary per the United States’ request, putting pressure on the Security Council and Iraq (Preston 2002a, Purdum and Firestone 2002). The C.I.A. released a report on the same day, citing that Iraq had continued to work on weapons of mass destruction after U.N. inspectors left (Gordon 2002m). Two days later, the paper reported that Senator Daschle was predicting broad support for the Iraq Resolution (Cushman 2002a). A columnist praised Don Rumsfeld for making a good case for the war and mentioned that there cannot be disarmament without regime change, a point often made by Rumsfeld, along with many other officials (Safire 2002c). However, not everyone favored the reasons for the war, as there was an anti-war rally in Central Park, New York, that was reported in the news on October 7, as well (Wilson 2002). And the AP indicated that Iraq would allow totally open inspections, lessening the need to talk about war (Associated Press 2002a).

As a transcript of President Bush’s remarks to the nation on September 7, 2002, was released along with coverage of the statements made, a guest columnist criticized the imperialism of the U.S. and feared the unrest in the Middle East (Telhami 2002). Along those lines was a C.I.A. report, released on October 9, 2002, that stated that any decision to go to war
with Iraq would cause more terror attacks than if the U.S. chose to back down on military use (Mitchell and Hulse 2002a). The five permanent members of the Security Council began discussing the new resolution, as many international leaders were focusing on the fact that the President referred, in his October 7 address, to the war with Iraq as avoidable and not imminent (Preston 2002f, Sciolino 2002a). The following day, the C.I.A. sent a letter stating that the Iraqi threat was not imminent and that there was no reason to believe that Iraq would ally itself with al Qaeda (Gordon 2002n). More bad news for the administration surfaced with news of a bipartisan task force that planned to release a statement confirming that America had lost its influence over the United Nations due to American neglect of and mixed signals to the international body (Preston 2002b). On October 11, the resolution authorizing force passed the Senate, having passed in the House on the previous day (Mitchell 2002b). Post-war plans were already in the works and America had the support of Iraqi refugees living in the United States. However, a column appeared cautioning the U.S. despite its apparent domestic agreement on the use of force in Iraq (Byrd 2002). Interestingly, this phase of the media came to a close with a columnist commenting about Halliburton and Iraq; he questioned how Iraq could have so quickly become a rogue state when just a couple years prior the company, with which Vice-President Cheney is associated, had contracts with Iraq (Kristof 2002b).

The rationales highlighted in the media consisted mostly of reprints of administration and Congressional reasons for war: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, Saddam Hussein is evil, regime change, liberate the Iraqi people, threat to the region, because we can, and broken promises (developed more fully in this phase as the President and others laid out the U.N. resolution violations). New rationales emerge in this phase, as well: disarmament (different from preventing the spread of weapons in that the plan is
to remove all dangerous weapons not simply put an end to further developments), the safety of
the world (explained as the possibility raised that Iraq could sell weapons to terrorists who could
attack anywhere), preservation of peace, imminent threat (mostly emerging from reprints of
official comments), and the relevance of the U.N. Also part of the official rationales but very
much discussed by the media are the rationales pertaining to the war for oil and revenge, as
highlighted in a number of editorials and columns asking about underlying reasons for a war.
Additionally, the continued debate over the connection to al Qaeda makes it a part of the
rationales. Yet, another new rationale emerges: to stimulate the economy. Though this rationale
only comes up through media sources, not official statements, and may have been more sarcastic
than realistic, it stands as another potential underlying reason for the war.

The Bush Administration

Only a few key players had much to say over the one-month time span covered here.
President Bush spoke out about Iraq and the resolution in Congress nearly everyday, which may
partly be related to the campaign season. Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld testified in
Congress and took the time to speak out in many interviews. However, Dick Cheney, Paul
Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, and Richard Perle did not comment much on the events (at least
in the research used here). Thus, President Bush got the ball rolling on September 12 and kept it
rolling throughout the next month.

President Bush

As mentioned, President Bush spoke out almost every day after his address to the United
Nations, though some of those speeches resulted from the campaign season. The day after his
address to the United Nations, September 13, the President held a meeting with Central African
Leaders and took some time to answer questions from the press. There, he confessed his doubt
that Saddam Hussein would comply with the past U.N. resolutions (Bush 2002w). He also responded to questions about the amount of time that would be allowed before action was taken; President Bush stated that he wanted a quick resolution in the U.N., with which Iraq would have days or weeks to comply (Bush 2002w). He felt that Congress needed to act quickly, as well, with debate and consultation (Bush 2002w). On September 14, President Bush gave a radio address to the nation. Very similar to his address to the U.N., the President pointed out Iraq’s U.N. violations, outlined the terror and oppression within the country, and spoke of their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and of their chemical and biological capabilities (Bush 2002i). Again, the President asked if the United Nations would be relevant in the future and called on Congress for support (Bush 2002i). He told the American people that they must “choose between a world of fear or a world of progress” (Bush 2002i). Also on September 14, 2002, the President met with the Italian Prime Minister and took a few questions from reporters. One reporter asked why Saddam Hussein and Iraq were being given any more chances, considering that they had ignored the United Nations sixteen times. The President replied that the United Nations needed to have a chance to work; but if it failed, the United States would deal with the situation (Bush 2002z). The President gave remarks on the budget on September 16, during which he highlighted his comments to the U.N. (Bush 2002m). He also said that the U.S. did not want to find out that Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons after he already had one, offering a reason for the need for inspections now (Bush 2002m). President Bush felt that the U.S. was vulnerable (after 9-11) and needed to take all measures in order to remain safe (Bush 2002m). Using an array of speech topics to discuss the threat of Iraq, President Bush spoke about teaching U.S. history and civics on September 17 in Nashville, TN. He used Iraq as an example of a place where ideals were different from American ideals, a place where there was no liberty and justice
(Bush 2002dd). He claimed that the world needed to be more peaceful, as history teaches peace (Bush 2002dd).

Finally speaking to Congress, President Bush met with Congressional leaders on September 18. He told them that Saddam Hussein had defied the U.N. for eleven years; thus, his pledge to cooperate was just another lie in order to buy more time, a path often taken by Iraq (Bush 2002x). The President was referring to the letter sent by Iraq to the U.N. offering to allow the inspectors back into the country; as covered in the news and as his remarks indicate, the President was skeptical (Bush 2002x). As a result, the President wanted Congress to pass a resolution while the White House worked on making the case to international allies (Bush 2002x). Therefore, it seems that the administration had noticed the lack of allies it had at the time. The following day, September 19, the President and Colin Powell held a photo opportunity at the White House. The fact that the credibility of the U.N. was at stake was reiterated, along with the promise that the United States and its allies would deal with the situation if the United Nations would not (Bush 2002y). However, the two conceded that “time would tell” who those allies would be (Bush 2002y). In reference to the recent requests from Iraq for certain stipulations on the inspections, reported in the Times, the President said that Iraq was not to be trusted and would not be allowed to negotiate (Bush 2002y). Reprinted in the newspapers was the suggested resolution for Congress, announced by President Bush to have been distributed that day. It consisted of an authorization of force and the U.S. policy of regime change.

On September 23 and 24, the President reiterated his comments to the U.N. as a part of campaign support speeches he gave; one new addition to those comments was his statement that the U.S. owed it to the children to take action against Iraq (Bush 2002n, Bush 2002t). His use of Iraq to gain support for Republicans running for Congress was evidence of the complaints in the
media about the politicization of the security of the American people. Also on those two days, the President called on Congress to act (September 23) and gave remarks asking Congress to act quickly (September 24). In his address asking for Congress to act, President Bush proclaimed his efforts within the United Nations, its relevance at stake (Bush 2002e). Once again, he listed many of the defiant and evil actions of Saddam Hussein and called him a threat to all people (Bush 2002e). The President asserted that the United States would act and needed a strong resolution out of the U.N., as well (Bush 2002e). Again, the President told Congress that they owed it to their children and the children of America to act (Bush 2002e). The following day, September 24, President Bush spoke to Congress again. In this address, he made a comment that sparked much debate in the Senate and made the pages of the newspapers. He claimed that the Senate was more interested in special interests and should pay more attention to the interests of the American people (Bush 2002g). He predicted that Congressional Democrats would see the threat of Saddam Hussein and pass the resolution (Bush 2002g). On September 26, 2002, President Bush gave more remarks on Iraq in a discussion with Congress. He revealed that there was a good debate in Congress, a fact reported in the news, and that many in Congress were united with administration in their fight against the Iraqi threat (Bush 2002r). He enumerated many of the concerns surrounding Iraq (weapons, al Qaeda connections, violence against women and Iraqi citizens, the evil of Saddam Hussein) and stated that if the world waited, it could be too late (Bush 2002r). Thus, he wanted the U.N. resolutions to be enforced and wanted Iraq to disarm (Bush 2002r).

Moving into October, on the first day of the month, the President again asked Congress to pass a resolution quickly (Bush 2002a). He said that he could not understand why Congress wanted to weaken the resolution (even weaker than the resolution passed in 1998) by changing
the language or creating a new resolution (Bush 2002a). As the *Times* reported, Democrats wanted to limit the resolution’s scope somewhat by altering the language. Yet, he felt that they could work together to achieve their goal of disarmament, with military action only being used if necessary (Bush 2002a). President Bush declared that he would not accept a weak U.N. resolution like the ones of the past, an opinion that is substantiated by the efforts of the U.S. in the U.N. to garner support from the Security Council for a new resolution rather than reliance on the old resolutions and allowing Iraq to simply let inspectors into the country (Bush 2002a). The next day, October 2, the House and the President came to an agreement on a resolution, and the President gave remarks much like his past words on Iraq (Bush 2002f). He added that Congress should decide carefully (Bush 2002f). On October 3, the President met with Hispanic leaders and again stressed that the goal was disarmament and peace and that military action was not the first choice of America (Bush 2002o). He also spoke of the war on terror as more than a war on al Qaeda (Bush 2002o). Over the next two days, President Bush spoke at three campaign rallies, using Iraq as a campaign tool for those he supported (Bush 2002v, Bush 2002s, Bush 2002u).

On October 5, the President gave a radio address, an address not unlike his other public statements. The horrors of Iraq were outlined and President Bush made comments like “weapons of mass death” and “the world’s most brutal dictator” (Bush 2002j). He asked the American people to call on their Congressmen and urge them to pass the resolution (Bush 2002j). On October 7, the President gave remarks on Iraq in Ohio in a live television event. Once again, Iraqi violations were explained and the President declared that the U.N. agreed that Iraq was a threat and should disarm, a statement that was evidenced by the international reactions printed in the *Times* (nations did agree with the violations but not with the use of force) (Bush 2002q). He also took the time to give answers to questions that he knew many people had (Bush 2002q).
He said that because of Iraq’s past and present actions, its capabilities, and its evil dictator, Iraq was unique from other threats in the world; the danger of Iraq would grow with time (Bush 2002q). He spoke of their weapons capabilities, the safe haven that Iraq offers to terrorists, and Iraq’s link to al Qaeda training as reasons for action (Bush 2002q). Since Iraq harbored terrorists, it was a part of the war on terror (Bush 2002q). The U.S. did not know how close Iraq was to having a nuclear weapon, which was the problem (describing satellite photos and attempts at materials purchases); the U.S. could not wait for a smoking gun after the events of 9-11 (Bush 2002q). Other options had been tried, such as sanctions, inspections, containment, and air strikes, but something better, even tougher inspections, were necessary (Bush 2002q). The Middle East situation could not be any worse and the world should not live in fear (Bush 2002q). President Bush again named things that Iraq could do to save itself. He concluded by asking Congress to send a “historic” message (Bush 2002q). The President gave a couple more remarks at a campaign stop and at a reception for Hispanic Heritage Month (Bush 2002ee, Bush 2002gg). On October 10, he gave his last remarks of this phase, stating that Congress had sent a clear message to the U.N., the world, and Iraq and that the days of Iraqi defiance were coming to an end (Bush 2002p).

President Bush reiterates a number of rationales in his many speeches and press discussions in this phase: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, broken promises, liberate the Iraqi people, Saddam Hussein is evil, regime change, threat to the region, and revenge. Some of these reasons are more fully explained, as well. The President makes a case for the connection between al Qaeda and Iraq and offers up reasons for why Iraq is a part of the war on terror, such as its potential to supply terror groups with weapons. He also details the broken promises rationale with a list of U.N.
resolutions that Iraq had violated over an eleven year time span. The President adds disarmament, the safety of the world, the commitment to the children, imminent threat, preservation of peace, threat to freedom, connection to al Qaeda, the uniqueness of Iraq, and the relevance of the U.N. to this list. Again, disarmament emerges as the major goal of the U.S., different from stopping the spread of nuclear weapons in that the U.S. wants to go in and destroy the entire arsenal. Once a threat to the U.S., then a threat to the Middle East, now Iraq becomes a threat to the world because of its potential for terror. Additionally, the children of the world deserve a more peaceful place to live. Speaking about the immediacy of the threat from Iraq, an idea that action must be soon emerges in the concept of the imminent threat. In his talk on education, the President talks about the lesson that history teaches about the need for peace; he also mentions the need for world peace in many other speeches. The President refers to the threat that Saddam Hussein and Iraq pose to freedom, as well. He also attempts to make a case that Iraq and al Qaeda are connected, implying a connection to 9-11 and strengthening the connection to terrorism. The President also takes the time to separate the threat that Iraq posed from that of other terror nations. Finally, the United Nations can prove its worth to the world by making Iraq live up to certain expectations or face the consequences.

Dick Cheney

The Vice-President only made a couple of public statements, at least as found in this research, both of which took place at campaign stops in support of Republican candidates. One was on September 18, 2002, covered in a CNN Live Special Event. He declared that the U.S. would work with the U.N. but that the resolution, past resolutions or a new resolution, would be enforced or action would be inevitable (Cheney 2002b). The United States must defend “freedom and security” (Cheney 2002b). Also reacting to the letters and promises of Iraq,
Cheney claimed that Iraq’s current statements do not change its history (Cheney 2002b). On October 2, Cheney spoke at another Republican campaign event, referring to the President’s speech to the United Nations and the Iraqi violations. He made remarks almost identical to those of the previous campaign speech (Cheney 2002e). Dick Cheney does not mention many rationales on his own, merely bringing up Iraq’s U.N. violations. However, he did mention and support the President’s address to the U.N., indicating that he agreed with the rationales stemming from that speech. Overall, the Vice-President contributes little in this phase of the research.

Colin Powell

Secretary of State Colin Powell was as active as President Bush was during this final phase; he commented on Iraq on twenty occasions over the month time-span. The first was on the same day as the President’s U.N. speech, September 12, when Powell accepted the National Committee on American Foreign Policy’s Hans J. Morgenthau Award. He referred to the President’s speech and used much of the material from the speech in his remarks (Powell 2002aa). He spoke about the threat that Iraq posed to the world because of its potential to sell weapons to terrorists (Powell 2002aa). He also described the U.N. resolutions that Iraq had defied, called Saddam Hussein a tyrant, and linked Iraq to terrorists (Powell 2002aa). With his intent on developing weapons of mass destruction, Hussein broke international law, according to Powell (Powell 2002aa). He felt that is was time to act, though carefully added that this was not a declaration of war (Powell 2002aa). If the U.N. wanted to be relevant, it would help, as would other international allies who would come to the aid of the U.S. (Powell 2002aa). The next day, September 13, Powell appeared on three morning talk shows. On “Good Morning America,” Powell stated that there should be a tough resolution with a deadline of weeks, not months, a
comment that President Bush made on the 13th, as well (Powell 2002l). Powell explained that the point of the speech to the U.N. was to show the world that America was a multilateral state (Powell 2002l). However, Powell seemed uncertain of how the discrepancy of goals for Iraq would be resolved by the U.S. (ultimately wanting regime change) and the U.N. (prepared for disarmament) (Powell 2002l). It is interesting that President Bush does call disarmament a goal of the United States in later speeches but here Powell seems to see it only as a step in the right direction. As one reporter said, the two ideals (disarmament and regime change) go hand-in-hand, which seems to be Powell’s opinion. On “This Morning” Powell responded to some different questions. Congress’ role came up and Powell assured the viewers that Congress would support the U.S. policy (Powell 2002ee). Bringing up a topic from previous phases, Powell denied any claims that there was a split in the administration, namely himself and Don Rumsfeld (Powell 2002ee). On “American Morning” Powell reminded viewers that “war is never inevitable” and that the White House had put the issue of Iraq where it belonged: the United Nations (Powell 2002e). Powell would not predict what Saddam Hussein’s next action would be but was certain that inspections would only be a tool in the process (Powell 2002e). He reaffirmed the notion of a tough U.N. resolution with deadlines, as well (Powell 2002e). Also on September 13, Powell was asked questions while leaving the U.N. headquarters in New York City. He simply said that things were off to a good start and that the Middle Eastern representatives wanted to see Iraq comply with U.N. resolutions (Powell 2002w).

On September 15, Powell did three more television interviews. On “Face the Nation” and “Meet the Press,” Colin Powell addressed questions about the nature and number of resolutions. Overall, Powell felt that there may be more than one resolution in the U.N., one asserting what Iraq must do and another citing consequences if those guidelines are not met, and
that the timeline and deadlines would be short (Powell 2002k, Powell 2002r). However, Powell did not believe that disarmament would prevent regime change regardless of what the U.N. resolution contained (Powell 2002k, Powell 2002r). In his “Face the Nation” interview, Powell mentioned that he would not respond to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, who had offered promises of compliance with inspections according to news sources (Powell 2002k). In the “Meet the Press” interview, Powell stated that there would be no negotiations with Iraq (Powell 2002r). He also denied that there was any correlation between the timing of the call for action and the Congressional election season (Powell 2002r). Once again, as in past phases, Powell told the interviewer to leave it to the military to decide the ease of a mission in Iraq (Powell 2002r). Later that day, on “Late Edition,” Powell spoke with Wolf Blitzer about many of the same issues; the U.N. resolution was the most prominent. Powell stated that there was more danger, meaning danger that Iraq would have more time to stall and not cooperate, in more than one resolution (Powell 2002h). He also discussed the three parts to the resolution: identifying the Iraqi breach, what must be done in order to comply, and the consequences for non-compliance (Powell 2002h). Powell stressed the need for action from Congress, as well (Powell 2002h). Finally, Powell asserted that there was a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda (Powell 2002h).

On September 16 and 17, Powell spoke to reporters at the U.N. headquarters. He stated that he was pleased with the international response but had not yet talked about the possibility of attacks on Iraq (Powell 2002x). He also spoke out about the letter from Iraq, saying that it was not an acknowledgement of a wrong and that a better resolution was still necessary in spite of the letter (Powell 2002v). On September 19, Powell did an interview with the National Public Radio and testified before the House Committee on International Relations. In his interview, he declared that there had been progress in the U.N. and that he would keep the pressure on the
members, confident in their support (Powell 2002s). Again, he felt that one resolution would be the most successful but was open to more than one resolution (Powell 2002s). Adding more to his comments on the letter from Iraq, Powell said that it came only because Iraq knew that it could not “wiggle out” of this situation (Powell 2002s). He remained skeptical of the value of inspections but felt that they were important (a middle ground position in the debate that played out in the media) (Powell 2002s). Despite his multilateral claims, Powell did say that the U.S. had the right to act on its own behalf, though he felt that the U.N. should handle the situation (Powell 2002s). His testimony to the House reiterated these sentiments above: the dangers and threats of Iraq (listed in a longer paper that was submitted to the committee), the need for more than disarmament, the need for a coalition, the need for a Congressional resolution, and the importance of not falling for any Iraqi ploys (Powell 2002c). He concluded by saying that there could be a debate about a lot of things, but Iraq’s violations were not debatable (Powell 2002c).

A week later, on September 26, Colin Powell testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The testimony consisted of the same material as did his testimony to the House. Yet, Powell spoke about the need for a new strategy to fight the war on terror; containment and deterrence were still useful, but pre-emption has emerged as that new strategy (Powell 2002b). These terms had been thrown around and argued about in the news; Powell took the time here to explain what their value to the administration was (Powell 2002b). In his last interview of the month on the last day of the month, Powell appeared on “The Newshour with Jim Lehrer.” As reported in the news, Hans Blix was ready to do inspections in two weeks, but Powell, in this interview, stated that he should wait for new instructions before proceeding, a request that was made formally to Blix, as well (Powell 2002t). Powell claimed to be pleased with the U.N. talks, though to that point the media was still reporting that there was significant
disagreement among the Security Council about the need for a new resolution and the terms of that resolution (Powell 2002t). Powell admitted some of this by stating that the most difficult part of the resolution would be the consequences section, a necessary section as far as America was concerned (Powell 2002t). Powell spoke of inspections as needing to be unlimited, though he also said that all options were still on the table (Powell 2002t). Like all of his interviews, Powell indicated the need for a resolution out of Congress, as well (Powell 2002t).

In an October 1st briefing, Powell again pressed the need for a new resolution in the U.N. with the strictest inspections, not the inspections of the old resolutions (Powell 2002u). He meant to keep the pressure on the U.N. In statements on October 3 and 4, Powell continued talk about the need for a new resolution and his uncertainty of when the resolution would come (Powell 2002y, Powell 2002cc). Again, the media reported that there had been little support for the resolution except for the U.S. and British backing of their draft. On October 8, Powell and some senators spoke to the press about the resolution in Congress and the good debate that it created (Powell 2002z). He still stressed the U.S. policy of regime change, though, and said that though he wanted peace, there had to be consequences for Iraqi non-compliance (Powell 2002z). On October 9, Powell spoke to Larry King on his show and, among his usual comments about the situation, he added that the capabilities of Iraq were nowhere near where they were twelve years ago, indicating the weakness of the nation (Powell 2002f). Finally, Powell did an interview with NPR in which he stated that the reason that the U.S. went to the U.N. was to disarm a “dangerous regime” (Powell 2002d).

Powell gave many of the same reasons for war as the President gave throughout his remarks. However, Powell seemed to focus less on disarmament and more on the final goal of regime change. Powell also added the because we can rationale to his list by speaking of the
deteriorating military power of Iraq. Powell created a new rationale that cited Iraqi actions and
defiance of the U.N. resolutions as illegal, making international law an aspect of the reasoning
and not simply the idea of broken promises. Additionally, Powell gives more substance to the
imminent threat by speaking about pre-emption and its usefulness in this situation. Overall, the
rationales espoused by Colin Powell in this section were: war on terror, prevention of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is
evil, disarmament, safety of the world, because we can, relevance of the U.N., broken promises,
lack of inspections, imminent threat and international law.

Condoleezza Rice

The National Security Advisor only spoke out on two occasions in this section, giving
one interview and one speech. The interview took place on September 15 on “Fox News
Sunday.” As some in the administration did and would do, Rice tied Iraq to al Qaeda, though
she mentioned that the connection did not extend to an Iraqi link to 9-11 (Rice 2002f). She
agreed with Powell and President Bush that the U.N. resolution needed deadlines and that there
had to be consequences if Iraq failed to comply (Rice 2002f). However, she added, “we will see
how those are expressed” (Rice 2002f). This also ties in with what President Bush and Colin
Powell indicated: if the U.N. does not act then the U.S. will. Rice felt that the growing threat
should be addressed sooner rather than later and reminded viewers that the American policy of
regime change in Iraq had existed since 1998 (Rice 2002f). She agreed with Powell in her
assertion that regime change was the objective; however, this comment conflicts with President
Bush’s statements that disarmament would come before any military action. Yet, Rice did
concede that military action may not be necessary (Rice 2002f). She, like Powell, stated that all
options were available but that allies would be consulted and Congress would need to back the
administration (Rice 2002f). Finally, Rice warned that the U.S. did not want to realize things that should have been done after Saddam Hussein had launched a nuclear attack (Rice 2002f). This statement also lines up with the President’s notion of not wanting to find a smoking gun.

On October 1, Rice discussed the President’s National Security Strategy, a relevant issue in this case. She first outlined the three parts: defending peace by fighting terrorism, preserving peace by building good relationships with world powers, and extending peace by bringing freedom to all people around the world (Rice 2002c). She then began to talk about the dangers of Iraq and how the state had defied the world by breaking U.N. resolutions (Rice 2002c). Though the U.S. would continue to try containment and deterrence, pre-emption, not a new concept to the U.S. considering the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, may be necessary to ready the U.S. for imminent danger (Rice 2002c). However, she agreed that the U.S. must be cautious with such a strategy, using it only after many attempts, much diplomacy, and in cases of “grave” danger (Rice 2002c). According to Rice, history will judge harshly those who did nothing in the face of danger; thus the U.N., N.A.T.O., and the W.T.O. had the chance to prove their worth (Rice 2002c).

Condoleezza Rice shares the same opinions as her counterpart in the State Department, Colin Powell. Their arguments and reasonings are nearly identical, despite the fact that Powell spoke ten times more than Rice did. Rice’s rationales were: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Iraq regime, relevance of the U.N., lack of inspections, safety of the world, disarmament, imminent threat, broken promises, connection to al Qaeda, for the sake of history, and preserving peace.

Donald Rumsfeld
Like Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld spoke about Iraq on twenty occasions between September 12 and October 11, 2002. The first was on September 12, 2002, in an interview with ABC. There, Rumsfeld differentiated between pre-emption and self-defense, claiming that the plans of the United States would be made in self-defense (Rumsfeld 2002r). Rumsfeld’s view seems different from that of Rice and Powell, who spoke about pre-emption as a U.S. policy.

The reporter commented about the fact that terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were not new, questioning the sudden threat Iraq posed on those grounds, and asked about an international coalition; Rumsfeld’s only response was that the U.S. had yet to make its case to the public (Rumsfeld 2002r). In a Department of Defense news briefing on September 16, Rumsfeld talked some about the President’s speech to the United Nations and reminded those present that time was on the side of the people who were developing weapons so time must be kept in mind (Rumsfeld 2002g). Also on the 16th, Rumsfeld did a roundtable with the BBC and Voice of America. He told the journalists that he did not know whether or not the President had to go through the U.N. but that was the decision that the President made (Rumsfeld 2002bb). Rumsfeld again said that the U.S. was making its case and “connecting the dots” before an attack occurred (Rumsfeld 2002bb). Also noting the difference between regime change (the Iraq resolution from 1998) and the work to be done with the U.N., Rumsfeld felt that both could be used (Rumsfeld 2002bb). When asked about being ready for a conflict with Iraq, in typical fashion Rumsfeld replied that the decision belonged to the President, the U.N. and Congress (Rumsfeld 2002bb). On the 18th, Rumsfeld talked with Jim Lehrer on “Newshour.” Rumsfeld again mentioned connecting the dots and added that the military was ready whenever the President ordered them into action, since deterrence would be difficult considering the nature of
Saddam Hussein and his possession of weapons of mass destruction (Rumsfeld 2002x).

Rumsfeld mentioned disarmament and the war on terror, as well (Rumsfeld 2002x).

On September 19, Rumsfeld testified before the House Armed Services Committee, a testimony that one reporter later referred to as stating broad and unclear rationales for war while another was impressed by the scope of the argument for war that Rumsfeld made. In the opening moments of his testimony, a member of the audience yelled out “Inspections not war!” and asked about oil (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Rumsfeld responded that Iraq stopped the inspections, not the U.S. or U.N. (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Rumsfeld declared that the U.S. had to prevent attacks like 9-11 from happening again by keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the wrong hands (Rumsfeld 2002gg). The goal of the administration was disarmament (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Rumsfeld then listed a number of facts about the horrors of the Hussein regime (Rumsfeld 2002gg). He stated that, though the U.S. wanted to use the U.N., America will stop Iraq, a sentiment espoused by all members of the administration (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Iraq was a part of the war on terror, and Congress needed to send a message (Rumsfeld 2002gg). There was no smoking gun because the U.S. planned to stop the gun from ever firing (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Rumsfeld admitted that intelligence can be wrong so the administration cannot be sure that the threat is imminent (Rumsfeld 2002gg). But it may be and the U.S. knew that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons and was working to obtain nuclear weapons (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Containment was not working and there were pros and cons to inspections (Rumsfeld 2002gg). But Iraq posed a unique threat because of Saddam Hussein, and the U.S. had international support to disarm and remove him from power (Rumsfeld 2002gg). There was a chance to send a message to the world and to correct the mistakes made with Hitler in World War II by stopping Saddam Hussein before he could attack (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Rumsfeld then
took questions from the Representatives, the answers to which are listed here without the questions provided. Iraq was a threat to the region, and the Iraqi people wanted to be free (Rumsfeld 2002gg). The U.S. would work to create a coalition; yet, the military in Iraq was weaker then than in years prior (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Iraq did have relations with terrorists and, in fact, paid suicide bombers (Rumsfeld 2002gg). And, finally, one would be wrong to assume a cause and effect relationship between the U.S. attacking Iraq and there being more terror attacks on the U.S. because there had already been an effect (9-11) without the cause (Rumsfeld 2002gg). Rumsfeld’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee sounded very similar, with one interesting question arising: did the U.S. help Iraq with biological weapons during the Iraq-Iran War? Rumsfeld said that he doubted that that had happened (Rumsfeld 2002hh).

On September 21, 2002, Rumsfeld spoke with CNN, once again denying any U.S. aid to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War and claiming that the goal was disarmament, not inspections (Rumsfeld 2002q). That same day, Rumsfeld criticized the use of the phrase “go it alone” considering that there were more than ninety nations that supported the war on terror in an interview with the Sunday London Times (Rumsfeld 2002ee). On September 22, Rumsfeld called those who were talking to the media about war disgraceful as he was en route to Poland (Rumsfeld 2002u). In Poland from September 23 to 25, he made remarks about Iraq on four occasions. Significantly, on September 24 and 25, Rumsfeld linked Iraq to al Qaeda (Rumsfeld 2002cc, Rumsfeld 2002dd). Back in the United States, Rumsfeld gave the Department of Defense press briefing on September 26. He mentioned that the C.I.A. was presenting the Iraqi threat to the members of N.A.T.O. (Rumsfeld 2002h). He also mentioned the link between Iraq and al Qaeda many times, a move that others in the administration had made, as well (Rumsfeld 2002hh).
When asked about evidence, Rumsfeld would not give out any specifics and also stated that it was hard to have evidence of something before it had happened (Rumsfeld 2002h). The differences between prevention, pre-emption, and self-defense were discussed, with Rumsfeld denying the notion that pre-emption was a new American strategy, like Rice did later in her speech on the U.S. National Security Strategy (Rumsfeld 2002h). Now, it seems that pre-emption is a part of the American policy, unlike Rumsfeld’s earliest statements about pre-emption.

On September 27, Rumsfeld spoke to the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. He told the members that the U.S. wanted to work with the U.N., Congress, and the people of America (Rumsfeld 2002aa). Though Saddam Hussein posed a threat, and that threat was detailed to the members, no decision on the use of force had been made (Rumsfeld 2002aa). Recalling the things he had talked about in his address to the House, Rumsfeld answered some of the questions that people may have, similar to a move made by President Bush in answering the questions he assumed that people had (Rumsfeld 2002aa). He said that a conflict with Iraq would not disrupt the war on terror, there should not be a smoking gun, deterrence would not work, and inspections were not the goal (Rumsfeld 2002aa). Yet, he felt that debate on the subject was a good thing (Rumsfeld 2002aa). But he asked the people there, “how will the history of this era be recorded?” (Rumsfeld 2002aa). Such a comment sounds much like Rice’s assertion that history will criticize those who did not act and the President’s charge that history teaches peace. When asked about the possibility of military action, Rumsfeld said that the President made that decision (Rumsfeld 2002aa). He also told the Chamber that coalition-building efforts were going well, though the media indicated otherwise (Rumsfeld 2002aa). Rumsfeld also appeared on three affiliate stations (for three of the major networks-ABC, NBC, and Fox) while in Atlanta.
Little new information came out of the ABC and Fox interviews (Rumsfeld 2002o, Rumsfeld 2002p). One interesting question came out of his discussion with a news anchor from NBC, though; he was asked if the President had personal motivations for going to war, since he had mentioned the attempt on his father’s life made by Iraq. Rumsfeld answered with a resounding “no” (Rumsfeld 2002s).

Rumsfeld talked about Iraq in two more Department of Defense news briefings. On September 30, footage from 2001 of Iraqis firing at U.S. and British planes was released, though the media were curious why the footage was just released. Rumsfeld touched on the letter to the U.N. from Iraq and reminded reporters that Iraq had not complied with past resolutions (Rumsfeld 2002i). Becoming a standard of discourse for Rumsfeld, he included that there was a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda (Rumsfeld 2002i). He said that the U.S. plan was to disarm Iraq; he also cast doubt on the worth of sanctions (Rumsfeld 2002i). Disarmament came up again in the October 7 briefing. Rumsfeld talked about the need to determine if disarmament was possible without regime change, a policy that Rumsfeld, along with the administration, espoused (Rumsfeld 2002j). However, Rumsfeld deferred to the President, citing his as the only opinion that matters (Rumsfeld 2002j). A reporter stated that a U.N. resolution seemed futile, though Rumsfeld disagreed (contradicting what the media had been indicating in its reports of international opinion) (Rumsfeld 2002j).

Rumsfeld, like President Bush, spoke a lot about disarmament and not as much about regime change. In his final interview, Rumsfeld confronted the idea that the two ideals may be inseparable. Yet, he does not talk as openly about regime change as Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell do. However, he does share many of their rationales: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is
evil, safety of the world, liberate the Iraqi people, broken promises, lack of inspections, relevance of the U.N., because we can, uniqueness of Iraq, connection to al Qaeda, and for the sake of history. Interestingly, Rumsfeld seems to want to use imminent threat as a rationale but shies away from it in some of his remarks, wanting to leave the imminence of the threat uncertain.

Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Wolfowitz only spoke on two occasions about the situation with Iraq. The first was on September 19, at which time he referred to Don Rumsfeld’s comments to Congress and spoke about the value of intelligence in the war on terror (Wolfowitz 2002d). On October 9, in an interview with *US News and World Report*, Wolfowitz talked about the weapons capabilities of Iraq and its defiance of the U.N. for the past eleven years (Wolfowitz 2002j). When asked about the timing of the move against Iraq, he answered that time was not on America’s side and that the sooner the action, the lower the risk (Wolfowitz 2002j). He added that terror attacks do not have to be inevitable in order to give the U.S. the right to take action (Wolfowitz 2002j). He also declared that the unrest in the Middle East would not increase if the U.S. invaded Iraq and concluded that any war would not be with the Iraqi people but rather an action to free them (Wolfowitz 2002j). Though speaking very little, Wolfowitz offered many rationales for a war with Iraq: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, broken promises, lack of inspections, liberate the Iraqi people, and imminent threat.

Richard Perle

Perle appeared on television talk shows on three occasions to discuss the Iraq conflict. The first was on September 26 when he visited CNN’s “Moneyline.” Perle attempted to predict many of the events to come by stating that there would be strong support in Congress,
inspections would not be effective, and the U.N. would be ineffective, as well, if it took no action
(Perle 2002f). Perle believed that time was not on the side of the United States, force should be
used, if necessary, and that the goal should be disarmament (Perle 2002f). On October 6, in an
appearance on “Meet the Press,” Perle spoke again about the imminent threat of Iraq, the risk
being that Saddam Hussein could develop a nuclear weapon or receive one any day, and said that
the “evidence of imminence comes too late” (Perle 2002g). Adding to his goal of disarmament,
Perle declared that there could not be disarmament without regime change (Perle 2002g). Perle
stated that inspections would not work and that Saddam Hussein could not be trusted nor would
he cooperate; yet, Perle asserted that the people of Iraq were not loyal to Saddam Hussein (Perle
2002g). Perle claimed that Iraq harbored al Qaeda terrorists, as well (Perle 2002g). Talking
about the terminology associated with the use of force, Perle felt that self-defense was a right
(Perle 2002g). He finished the interview with the notion that the threat should have been
handled during the first Gulf War (Perle 2002g). In his final interview of this phase, an October
7 appearance on “Crossfire,” Perle claimed that there was compelling evidence of a link
(meetings) between Iraq and 9-11, an Iraqi role in 9-11 (Perle 2002a). When the reporter called
him on a discrepancy between his remarks and those of the Security Adviser, he simply said that
it depended on the meaning of the word “role” (Perle 2002a).

Perle’s rationales are much like those of the administration officials: war on terror,
prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, broken promises, removal of the
Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, disarmament, connection to al Qaeda, and unfinished
business (not mentioned by anyone else in the administration).
Once again, Congress plays a valuable role in the road to war with Iraq. In this final phase, Congress plays an invaluable role in that Congress held a debate and voted to allow President Bush the authority to use military force against Iraq. The Congressional Record displays the debate, though not all of the debate can be highlighted here. Additionally, four senators offer their opinions in media interviews and are covered here, as well.

As in the past discussion of the Congressional Record, topics related to Iraq are frequently debated and presented on the floor, such as energy policy, the economy, the Homeland Security Act, and oil. Though not mentioned specifically, as this section covers more of the debate over the resolution, these issues are prevalent in the records. Yet, even before the President asked Congress for a resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq, many members were expressing their opinions on the Iraq policy, especially after the President’s address to the United Nations. On September 12 and 13, many Democrats and Republicans in both houses of Congress offered up their feelings on the situation. One Senate Democrat said that the Iraq policy was about national security and that there needed to be a “broader strategy to strengthen American security around the world” (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 8553-54). Saddam Hussein was a clear threat to the U.S., the region, and freedom, was a brutal leader, and must be removed from power (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 8553-54). He had violated the U.N. and all means necessary should be used to handle the problem (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 8553-54).

Another Senate Democrat, Senator Lieberman, expressed similar views, adding that the world would likely respond and that Saddam Hussein must be stopped because of 9-11 (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 8594-95). Yet, another Democrat in the Senate took a different view, seeing the
problem as larger than Iraq (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 8590-92). He claimed that the spread of nuclear weapons should be the focus and that one start would be for the U.S. to be more open to arms reduction for itself (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 8590-92). The Republicans offered support for the President. One House Republican declared that President Bush had made the case for military action and that the U.N. had to join in the efforts against Iraq (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6242). A Senate Republican mentioned the Iraqi attempt on President George H. W. Bush’s life, listed supporters of the U.S. plan, and called on Congress to take action (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 8609-10). All of the members talked about the weapons of mass destruction that Iraq had and was developing.

On September 18, a lot of debate over the need for force in Iraq began. One House Republican stated that there should be inspections, as the U.N. resolutions needed to be enforced (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6306). Yet another Republican in the House announced that the U.S. should use the words “declare war” and take the action (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6307). Six House Democrats offered the opposite view to the previous opinion, one member calling the plan a “needless, senseless, dangerous war” (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6348-49). A couple talked about the fact that there was no connection between Iraq and al Qaeda and saw no evidence that Iraq planned to use weapons of mass destruction or had any involvement in 9-11 (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6351-52). One talked about the need for a rationale and a strategy for the war (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6351). Others felt that a first strike was a dangerous move and wanted more reasons for this desire to launch the first U.S. pre-emptive strike, a strike that was called “illegitimate” (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6350). One Democrat talked about the politics of the issue, since the announcement of the policy

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came so close to the elections (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6348-49). And
another claimed that the issue around the war was simply oil (U.S. Congress, House of
Representatives 2002, 6359-66). On September 19, the debate continued in the House, with
more Democrats declaring their opposition to the war. New issues came up, such as the cost of
the war and the concern over unilateral action, and many of the same complaints arose, such as
the election season, the lack of evidence, and the fact that the first Gulf War destroyed all of
Iraq’s weapons capabilities (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6413, 6410-12).
Ironically, on September 20, one Senator talked about how the United States helped to create
Saddam Hussein, a point that had been brought up in the media on more than one occasion (U.S.

On September 23, a Senate Democrat cited that there was no public swell for a war with
Iraq, something that the media discussed, as well (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 9009-10). He
also mentioned that unilateral action by the U.S. would “sow the seeds of terrorism,” a sentiment
shared the following day when a House Democrat revealed statistics that showed that 80% of the
population felt that there would be an increased chance of terror attacks if the U.S. invaded Iraq
Democrats also began talking about how the Congress needed to focus on more than Iraq, unlike
the administration’s handling of the issues (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 9010-11). This, too,
was a criticism found in the news. Two House Democrats, on September 25, spoke of the impact
that sanctions had had on Iraq and called for more economic actions to be taken against Iraq,
wanting to end U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives
2002, 6687-88, 6688). Another Democrat in the House listed the Iraqi U.N. resolution
violations, called for the removal of the Hussein regime in order to eliminate the weapons threat.
from Iraq, and warned that future attacks drew closer with every moment wasted on inaction (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6686-87). A Democrat in the Senate asked for a careful debate on this important decision and stated that if there was a war, it should be to disarm Iraq only (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 9219-21). Senator Daschle spoke out, as well, highlighting the politics of the war effort and denying Republican claims that the Democrats were soft on national security (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 9216-18). After receiving the proposed language for a resolution from the White House, one Democrat in the Senate said that there needed to be a more thoughtful proposal from the Bush administration (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 9412-13). This seems odd, as the *Times* reported that the Bush administration had been working on the resolution since the summer. On September 26, 2002, Senate Joint Resolution 45 was read for the first time; its second reading was on September 30, 2002. The Senate added an amendment to the resolution, then reading the new SJ Res. 46 on October 2, 2002. The House version of the resolution was called House Joint Resolution 114.

After the resolution was proposed, much debate took place over the wording and the wide discretion given to the President, hence the amended resolution. Many opposing opinions still rang out, despite the tremendous bipartisan support for the plan. One House Democrat asked that the vote be suspended until after the elections, the politics problem arising once again (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 6785-86). A Senate Democrat, like the media, talked about the difference between preventive and pre-emptive, condemning the doctrine of the administration by any name (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 10001-04). A independent Senator spoke out about the forgotten agenda: education; this argument occurred often from Democrats in Congress and was covered heavily in the news (U.S. Congress, Senate 2002, 9779-80). A House Republican also got involved in the dissent, citing the fact that the resolution strayed from
the intent of the Constitution, which gave war powers to Congress, not the President (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2002, 7009-10). Yet, when the vote came down on October 10, 2002, in the House, the verdict was 402 in favor and 133 opposed, 126 of which were Democrats and 6 of which were Republican. In the Senate, the vote occurred on October 11, 2002, and the resolution passed with 77 votes for the resolution and 23 against it. The Senate Democrats split in the following manner: 29 for and 21 against.

Obviously, there are as many rationales opposing the war as there are reasons for a war in this Congressional debate; yet, the only rationales that are counted here are those in favor. And those reasons are: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, broken promises, safety of the world, imminent threat, threat to freedom, war for oil, disarmament, lack of inspections, and revenge.

Tom Daschle-Democrat

Senator Daschle spoke out about the Iraq situation and the resolution to authorize force on five occasions between September 12, 2002 and October 11, 2002. The first was on September 12, in a CNN Live Event after the President’s speech to the United Nations. Daschle believed that the President made a strong presentation and had made the case for inspections but not conclusively explained why an attack would be necessary (Daschle 2002). The Senator clarified that no resolution about force had been brought to Congress at that time (Daschle 2002). Additionally, he expressed his concern about the potential politicization of the conflict due to the fact that the Congressional elections were approaching (Daschle 2002). These statements, along with those of other members of Congress, were covered in the news the following day.

The remainder of Senator Daschle’s interviews took place in October, after the resolution had been proposed and was under debate. On October 5, Daschle appeared on “CNN Novak,
Hunt, and Shields.” He stated that he wanted there to be broad support for the resolution, with some amendments to limit the scope of the authorization (Daschle 2002c). One amendment had been made, citing the 16 U.N. resolution violations as reasons for force rather than anything that the President felt should give him the power to authorize force (Daschle 2002c). Yet, Daschle claimed that there was no consensus on the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to the United States (Daschle 2002c). The following day, October 6, Daschle spoke with Tim Russert on “Meet the Press.” There he declared that the resolution would pass but the breadth of the support would depend on the amendments; he himself wanted to support the resolution but would make efforts to fix the language so that the authorization was tied to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, even narrower than the amendment to limit the authorization to the U.N. violations (Daschle 2002h). He spoke of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act as the precedent for this resolution (Daschle 2002h). Though he supported regime change, he felt that the U.S. needed to go through the U.N. before making decisions about going it alone; yet, he seemed confident that the international community would stand behind the U.S. (Daschle 2002h). He expressed uncertainty about the imminence of the threat but anticipated that someday the threat would be imminent (Daschle 2002h). He, like many others in the administration, was skeptical of any Iraqi compliance with inspections (Daschle 2002h). On a different note, the two discussed the controversy between the Senator and President Bush, after Bush’s comments about the Democrats not caring about the security of the nation and focusing on special interests, a topic covered in the news (Daschle 2002h).

On October 11, Daschle did his final two interviews of this phase. He talked with “Fox Special Report with Brit Hume” about his voting in favor of the resolution, saying that it could have been improved by tying it to weapons of mass destruction but he supported the resolution
anyway (Daschle 2002e, Daschle 2002f). When he appeared on Fox “Hannity and Colmes” he also answered questions about why he voted for the resolution when he had displayed so much concern in the Senate. He answered that the legislature “had to speak with one voice” to Iraq and Saddam Hussein, though the wording could have been improved (Daschle 2002e). He still urged the utilization of the U.N. in the process (Daschle 2002e). The interviewers asked if the weapons of mass destruction concern was a front for regime change, to which Daschle replied that though they all support regime change, the imminent threat is from the weapons (Daschle 2002e, Daschle 2002f).

Though he showed much hesitance and uncertainty towards the resolution, his final interviews and backing of the legislation demonstrates that he did have some rationales for a conflict with Iraq: prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, imminent threat, and lack of inspections. Yet, even these can seem ambiguous. For example, Daschle does not admit that the threat is imminent, only says that someday it could be imminent, in one interview; in an October 11 interview, he calls the Iraqi weapons program an imminent threat.

Joe Lieberman-Democrat

Senator Lieberman took part in four interviews during this phase of the research. The first was on September 17, talking with CNN’s “Inside Politics.” He claimed that he did not feel any pressure to be on board with the resolution in Congress, despite many complaints by Democrats in Congress and by the media that the political aspect of the resolution was forcing Democrats to stand behind the resolution for fear of being identified as unpatriotic (Lieberman 2002c). He felt that there would be “vigorous debate” and stated that he was in favor of the broad language in the original White House proposal (Lieberman 2002c). He also talked about the impact of Iraq disarming on its own, something he said would change the goals of the U.S.
but was unlikely to happen, the opinion of everyone asked about this topic thus far (Lieberman 2002c). On September 26, 2002, Lieberman appeared on “CNN American Morning with Paula Zahn.” Commenting on the battle between Senator Daschle and President Bush, Lieberman sided with Daschle, supporting the speech that he made in Congress rebutting the President’s depiction of the Senate Democrats as uninterested in security issues (Lieberman 2002b). Thus, there is some party loyalty despite the fact that the two senators disagreed about the Iraq policy.

On October 6, the Senator was interviewed on “Face the Nation” and declared that the resolution would pass Congress, much like Senator Daschle’s remarks on that same day (Lieberman 2002g). He, like Daschle, said that he did not know that the threat was imminent but did know about Saddam’s weapons program and about the U.N. inspections violations, questioning why this problem had not been handled in the past (Lieberman 2002g). He called Hussein a terrorist and linked Iraq with al Qaeda (Lieberman 2002g). Finally, he mentioned that Saddam Hussein could disarm and save himself from war (Lieberman 2002g). In his last interview of the phase, Lieberman spoke with Wolf Blitzer on “Wolf Blitzer Reports.” Similar to the previous interview, Lieberman was asked about the timing of the effort to disarm Iraq. Lieberman replied that it should have been done a long time ago (Lieberman 2002e). He also displayed his support for President Bush, stating that he had been concerned about Saddam Hussein for eleven years (Lieberman 2002e).

Lieberman offers more rationales to the research because of his continued support for a confrontation with Saddam Hussein. Thus, one of his rationales is unfinished business, a reason he shared with Richard Perle. The other rationales are: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, imminent threat, broken promises, disarmament, connection to al Qaeda, and lack of inspections.
Trent Lott-Republican

Senator Lott discussed Iraq and the resolution for force on six different occasions during the third phase of this research. The first was in a CNN Live Event after the President gave his address to the United Nations on September 12, an interview with Senator John McCain. Both expressed their support for the President’s words and mentioned plans to begin working on language for a resolution (Lott 2002b). On September 28, Lott appeared on CNN’s “Novak, Hunt, and Shields,” at which time there were many questions about the Democratic reaction to President Bush’s comment about their lack of concern for American security. Lott felt that the comment was not a political stunt but a very serious issue and that the Democrats overreacted, asking who was the enemy in the situation, the President or Saddam Hussein? (Lott 2002d). Turning to the resolution, he did not offer any numbers on how the vote would turn out but he took the time to use the President’s reaching out to Democrats as proof that there were no politics in the Iraq issue (Lott 2002d). One of the journalists asked him about American condemnation of Iraq’s actions against Iraq during their war, a war in which the U.S. supported Iraq. Lott’s reply was that he did not know the history but that there was more than one side (Lott 2002d). He also stated that the idea that Iraq posed an imminent threat depended on the definition of imminent (Lott 2002d). Finally, Lott assured the hosts that the U.S. would take action to not destabilize the Middle East (Lott 2002d). The next day, September 29, Lott went on “Face the Nation.” There, he told the show that the resolution would pass, though they were still working on language to please both parties (Lott 2002e). He told the panel that the U.S. would have to act because of Iraq’s weapons programs and the fact that uranium had been caught on its way from Turkey to Iraq, though this was not mentioned in the news (Lott 2002e). He, again, offered his support to President Bush in his conflict with Senator Daschle and other Senate
Democrats (Lott 2002e). Yet, Lott said that he thought that it was a good strategy to use the President’s words a part of a Republican campaign and to raise money, as he felt that Democrats were holding up the Homeland Security Bill (Lott 2002e). He believed that war was likely and, like all of the others covered here, spoke of contact between Iraq and al Qaeda (Lott 2002e).

About a week later, on October 6, Lott spoke with “Fox News Sunday,” again taking a stance against the Democrats. He challenged Senator Daschle’s plea for more evidence, citing that Daschle had supported the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act (Lott 2002g). He also gave reasons for needing to face Iraq, such as their weapons programs and delivery capabilities and the war on terror (Lott 2002g). On October 8, Lott talked with Aaron Brown on “CNN Newsnight.” There, he said that the resolution should pass on October 10, though it passed on the 11th, and discussed the importance of the Iraq mission to protecting the peace and freedom of the people (Lott 2002c). However, he felt that he would be unable to comment on the effect of a war on the economy (Lott 2002c). In his final interview of this section, Lott appeared on “Larry King Live” on October 9, 2002. He offered a guess on how the voting numbers would look, in regards to the resolution, and spoke of the resolution as not necessarily making war inevitable, as inspections could work (according to President Bush) (Lott 2002a). He talked about the war on terror and the evils of Saddam Hussein, whom he compared to Hitler, and compared this situation to that of World War II (Lott 2002a). Showing his support for Powell, Lott said that the U.S. would try to go through the U.N. but would go it alone (Lott 2002a). King closed the interview by asking about the fairness of using Iraq in election campaigns. Lott responded that national security was a topic that should be discussed during the election season (Lott 2002a).

The friction between the parties comes alive with Trent Lott, openly showing his discontent with the actions of the Democrats, and specifically Tom Daschle, concerning national
security and Iraq. The Republican defends the moves of other Republicans, including those running for office and the President. He also speaks more about rationales for the war, demonstrating his support for the war. His rationales are: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein is evil, imminent threat, connection to al Qaeda, threat to freedom, and protection of peace.

**John McCain-Republican**

John McCain spoke out on eleven occasions in this phase, one of which was discussed in the section on Trent Lott. His next interview of this phase was also on September 12, 2002, when he appeared on CNN’s “Wolf Blitzer Reports.” McCain spoke in support of the President’s decision to give Iraq one more chance and to go through the United Nations (McCain 2002e). Yet, McCain talked about the outcome of a possible war, saying that there was poor morale in Iraq, thus the army was weak and the people would not die for Saddam; in essence, it would be an easy war (McCain 2002e). He also stated that Congress would vote on a resolution, which did not exist at that time, before the end of the session (McCain 2002e). On September 15, McCain talked with “Face the Nation,” again calling attention to the weakness of Saddam Hussein (McCain 2002f). He felt that it would not affect the mission if there was not an international coalition since this mission would not be of the size or scope of the war in 1991 (McCain 2002f). He did not link Hussein to al Qaeda, though he stressed their weapons program and its dangers (McCain 2002f). He called the Iraq threat a threat “over time” (McCain 2002f). McCain spoke to Tim Russert on “Meet the Press” on September 22, calling the threat a “clear and present danger” and claiming that war would result (McCain 2002l). Yet, he felt that inspections were necessary to eliminating the weapons program (McCain 2002l). Other things he mentioned included his belief that the U.N. would support the U.S., though the U.S. would go
it alone, that there would be an overwhelming vote in favor of the resolution in Congress, and that the war would be easy (McCain 2002l).

McCain did two interviews on September 24. One was on the “Today Show,” in which McCain responded to comments made by Al Gore, quoted in the news, by saying that the U.S. maybe should have gone into Iraq in 1998 with the resolution passed then (McCain 2002o). He also looked back to 1991, stating that regime change should have happened the first time that the U.S. was in Iraq (McCain 2002o). He again talked about the vote in Congress. Yet, this time he did not seem certain that there would be military action against Iraq (McCain 2002o). Later that day, McCain appeared on “Larry King Live.” He talked about the fact that America had the support of the world, though the U.S. would go alone, and that Iraq would have to allow total inspections in order to avoid a war (McCain 2002b). Though he felt that the resolution for force would pass with 75-80% of the vote, he thought that debate was necessary (McCain 2002b). As he did earlier in the day, McCain expressed regret that the U.S. had not removed Saddam Hussein during the first conflict (McCain 2002b). On September 29, McCain spoke with Wolf Blitzer of CNN. The two talked about the story that uranium had been caught en route to Iraq from Turkey, to which McCain referred to Hussein as more than surviving but trying to obtain nuclear weapons (McCain 2002d). He, like others and the media, expressed concern that inspections would give Iraq time to develop more weapons (McCain 2002d). Like usual, McCain talked about the weakness of the Iraqi army (McCain 2002d). Unlike Lott, McCain addressed the Bush-Daschle issue by simply saying that politics should stay out of it (McCain 2002d). He felt that there would be a debate but that the resolution would pass by a large margin (McCain 2002d). Again, not committing himself to a position, he said that he would not be surprised if Iraq was connected to al Qaeda (McCain 2002d).
On October 1, 2002, McCain spoke with Paula Zahn on “CNN American Morning.” According to McCain, it was a “likely scenario” that the U.S. would be at war early in 2003, as he felt that Saddam Hussein would not allow the inspectors into Iraq (McCain 2002a). He also talked about the language as the sticking point in the resolution (McCain 2002a). Zahn brought up the recent trip of some Democrats in the House to Iraq, actions that McCain saw as inappropriate (McCain 2002a). Also on that day, McCain appeared on “The O’Reilly Factor” and offered more disappointment in the words of the Congressmen (McCain 2002n). On October 2, McCain had a discussion with Fox’s Hannity and Colmes about the same topic, the fact the Democrats had gone to Iraq to bad-mouth President Bush and the war (McCain 2002g). He also stated that war should be the last option in the scenario, different from his previous assertions that war was inevitable (McCain 2002g). Finally, on October 9, McCain did the show “The News with Brian Williams” on CNBC. He again talked about the vote and recognized that the stakes were high but the weapons programs in Iraq needed to be stopped (McCain 2002m).

Overall, McCain’s view remained consistent with his previous opinions about the war. He had always talked about the likelihood that there would be a military conflict, and he always talked about the ease of the war. McCain’s rationales for the war have been consistent, as well: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, unfinished business, because we can, and lack of inspections.

Conclusion

To sum up the events and opinions of Phase Three requires some division of the topics. First, the main events of the phase will be reiterated. Then, the debate over the Iraq resolution will be summarized. Finally, the rationales of the phase will be discussed.
Obviously, the phase opened with the speech that President Bush gave to the United Nations. These remarks kicked off the coverage of international reactions, domestic reactions, Congressional debates over a resolution that would be proposed, and struggles within the U.N. by the U.S. and Britain to obtain a new resolution requiring Iraq to allow inspectors into the nation. On September 13, Colin Powell was at the U.N. Headquarters in New York, making the case for a new U.N. resolution. Iraq began its pleas to the U.N. by requesting that the sanctions imposed on its people be lifted; over time, Iraq stated that it would allow full access to the U.N. inspectors, upon the terms of an agreement made with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Throughout all of this, the U.S. and Britain formulated language for a new resolution and brought it to the Security Council, asking for and receiving a hold on inspections until the Security Council had time to vote on the new terms of the resolution. Yet, no international support came the way of America, with the exception of Britain and Israel.

At home, the President presented proposed language for a Congressional resolution authorizing force in Iraq in the second to last week of September. By the end of the month, members of Congress were already predicting that the measure would pass by a large margin. Yet, debate and controversy arose, with President Bush supposedly politicizing the issue with comments about Democratic disinterest in national security. Thus, debates about the politics of the Iraq issue arose as the election season began. Democrats in Congress asked for more evidence of the weapons threat and of the imminent threat that Iraq supposedly posed to the U.S. Republicans used the issue to their advantage in campaigns and stood behind their President, reiterating his arguments on the floor: the war on terror, the weapons programs, the imminent threat, the evils of the regime, and more. In the end, Democrats conceded to the Republicans and voted in favor of the resolution.
In regards to the rationales used in this section, several new reasons were projected to the people. One was the value of disarmament, called the real goal of the conflict with Iraq. Though the administration continued to insist that the U.S. policy was regime change, disarmament became the goal for which the U.S. fought in the U.N. This idea was first mentioned by President Bush but also by the media, Powell, Rice, Perle, and Lieberman and in the Congressional Record. Another new rationale was the safety of the world, the idea that Iraq posed a threat to people everywhere, based on the concept that it could sell weapons to terrorists and they could strike wherever they chose. This rationale appears in the words of President Bush, Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld, in the media, and in the Congressional Record. The idea that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the world became a huge reason for the U.S., as it offered an answer to the question “Why now?”. President Bush, Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld (usually), Wolfowitz, Daschle, Lieberman, and Lott talk about imminent threat, along with the media and the Congressional Record. Interestingly, though, none of the officials (except Daschle) actually use the words “imminent threat” when discussing the idea of the imminent threat. Some say that it could be imminent or that it depends on the meaning of the word, while others use different phrases such “grave and gathering danger” and refer to the uncertainty of the level of the threat. Yet another new rationale was the idea that stopping Iraq would help to preserve the peace around the world; President Bush, Rice, and Lott talked about the peace of the world, as did the media (which basically echoed every rationale, as the pattern is already demonstrating). A rationale that emerged in this phase and was used by virtually every member of this research was the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda that was supposedly proven to exist. President Bush, Rice, Rumsfeld, Perle, Lieberman, and Lott all discussed Iraq in relation to al Qaeda. Another issue that many brought up was the relevance of the United Nations as a part of this process in
the road to war; those involved were President Bush, Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld, and the media. President Bush also began to mention the threat that Iraq posed to the freedom of the world in this phase. Joining him were the media, the Congressional Record, and Senator Lott.

Some of the new rationales were only used by one or a few people or bodies, while some of the older rationales came up sparingly, as well. One new rationale was only mentioned by Colin Powell: international law. In addition to the idea of broken promises, Powell mentioned the fact that Iraq breaking its promises to the U.N. and the world also entailed a violation of international law. President Bush took the time to mention the commitment the U.S. had to its children in a couple of speeches as connected to preserving the peace and safety of the world and stopping the threat to freedom. Condoleezza Rice mentioned the concept of handling Iraq for the sake of history, a rationale used by President Bush in Phase Two. Additionally, unfinished business was only discussed by Richard Perle, Joe Lieberman, and John McCain. Another rationale receiving little mention was revenge, with only President Bush, the media, and the Congressional Record highlighting it as a rationale. The media and the Congressional Record are the only documents that contain references to a war for oil ideal. One final, little discussed rationale was the because we can mentality; the media, Powell, Rumsfeld, and McCain bring up the concept.

Many rationales from the previous two stages come up repeatedly in this stage. They are: the war on terror, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of inspections, broken promises, Saddam Hussein is evil, the removal of the Hussein regime, the liberation of the Iraqi people, and the threat that Iraq poses to its region. The majority of these rationales appear in the comments of all of the sources for this research, with Senator Daschle being the exception as he did not favor the war so only provided a few rationales in support of a
conflict with Iraq (the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, imminent threat, and the lack of inspections). The President and the media espouse or print nearly every possible rationale for the war, not a surprising fact considering the media is supposed to portray the events and opinions of the nation and the President should have a well-rounded take on the situation at hand. Notice that Dick Cheney was not mentioned here at all; the only rationale that he actually stated was the fact that Iraq had broken its commitment to the U.N. by violating so many U.N. resolutions. He then offered support for the President. Thus, his rationales are assumed to be similar to those of President Bush.

Overall, this phase reminded the reader of all of the rationales for the war that emerged out of Phase One and Phase Two and also added a large list of new rationales as the possibility of war became more likely. The resolution for force was passed; therefore, the decision was made that the U.S. could and would use military power in Iraq to accomplish its goals of disarmament and regime change based on all of the reasons enumerated throughout this essay.

**Conclusions about the Official and Media Roles in the Rationales**

Many of the questions asked at the beginning of this essay have been answered. This research has uncovered the rationales for the war with Iraq, as they emerged from selected administration officials, Congress, and the media, as reported in the *New York Times*. Statistics cited early on demonstrated the change from a focus on Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein. Yet, more questions need to be answered. For example, who offered the most reasons for a war with Iraq? Who led and who followed? How did the media interpret these statements from Congress and the administration? How consistent was the media in its depiction of official commentary and how much initiative did the media take in producing rationales and forcing officials to provide their rationales?
Without a doubt, the Bush administration, and the President himself, established the majority of the rationales and all of those rationales that make up the most prominent reasons for war (which will be discussed in a later section). The administration built throughout the phases toward its final position on Iraq. Initially, the media introduced Iraq to officials and they responded accordingly; by Phase Two, the officials were introducing Iraq, and by Phase Three almost all of their public statements were about Iraq. This changing focus of the administration lines up with the statistics cited earlier in the paper that showed February 2002 as the month in which President Bush began addressing Saddam Hussein and Iraq more than Osama bin Laden, at least numerically, with a solid change made by April of 2002. It was in Phase Two, which began in February and ended in April, that the administration began to talk about Iraq without being asked about Iraq first. Thus, the statistics and the rationale study correspond as far as the timing of the focus on Iraq is concerned. Additionally, much of what the administration said was covered in the news and quickly appeared in the words of members of Congress and in the Congressional Record. Again, the statistics can be brought to bear on the rationales. The statistics show Congress changing its focus in early 2002, focusing on Iraq by January of 2002, and pretty solidly set on Saddam Hussein and Iraq by the summer. In the rationale analysis, Congressmen and the Congressional Record brought up the war more and talked more openly about the prospect of war, without prodding from the media, in Phases Two and Three. As for those Congressmen, Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman can be said to have created a few rationales, though they proved to be either secondary or almost completely arbitrary to the major motivations for a war with Iraq. Much debate occurred in Congress, which allowed many of the rationales to be discussed in greater detail than the one-liners from administration speeches. Yet, Congress mostly followed the lead of the administration.
The media, as the statistics show, switched to a focus on Iraq and Saddam Hussein in July of 2002. However, the media seemed to be open to the idea of Hussein as a conspirator and terrorist long before it chose to give more attention to that prospect. Additionally, the media provide the most interesting source by which to investigate the relation between the portrayal of rationales because it reports what the other two groups for this research stated. As a reference, a short discussion of political reporting will be helpful. Lance Bennet discusses some methods of political reporting in his article “An Introduction to Journalism Norms and Representations of Politics.” Bennet talks about the fact that official sources tend to dominate political articles and gives a number of reasons why this is so. Two of those rules are especially important here. “The first and most extensively researched rule of political reporting…is the imperative to build a story line—whenever possible—upon official or at least authoritative viewpoints” (Bennet 1996). In some ways, that is what this research has done: looked to official viewpoints for the rationales behind the Iraq war. It is also what many of the articles cited in this paper have done: used those officials or those close to the officials as sources for articles. “The second rule of political reporting is that sources and viewpoints are ‘indexed’…according to the magnitude and content of conflicts among key government decision makers or other players with power…” (Bennet 1996). Thus, stories make the pages of the news based on the viability of their topics at the time, how important those topics are to the officials discussing them and how much discussion they are receiving. Thus, whatever the officials are saying is what makes the news.

Looking at the statistics, then, it seems odd that the media waited as long as it did to focus on Saddam Hussein and Iraq, especially since the official sources changed so early in 2002. However, it does make sense that the media would wait to shift its sights until after the official sources had made their move. Moving to the action in the phases, indexing remains as
unclear. In Phase One, much of the discussion around Iraq was initiated by questions from the media, with the exception of Senator John McCain, who brought up the topic of Iraq on multiple occasions. Thus, it seems that there is not much of an indexing effect, unless the media got all of their information on background or from other sources and then asked the questions. Also likely, as the reporters did not mention when asking the questions that they had heard something from a White House official, the media introduced Iraq out of its own notions about the status of the Iraq-U.S. relationship. Most likely, though, is some combination of the two hypotheses. The information from the timeline provided in this paper also supports the media’s role in introducing the concept of an Iraq war to the public and forcing officials to talk about this possibility, though the officials may have already been preparing for such an event and not mentioning it themselves. However, the media did comment on interrelations in the administration, as the paper printed stories about the conflicts on Iraq policy within the White House. Yet, by Phase Two, most of the officials were talking about Iraq without much prodding and certainly by Phase Three there was no need to ask questions and introduce the topic first. Thus, the media did index more in the later phases, which is evidenced by the fact that the paper printed a lot more of the comments of the officials and more of the controversy between the Democrats and the administration. Overall, the media highlighted all of the identified main and secondary rationales, meaning that it did follow the lead of the administration. However, it only covered threat to the region, war for oil, the preservation of peace, and the relevance of the United Nations out of the fourteen remaining rationales. One of those remaining rationales was initiated by the media itself. The idea that war would stimulate the economy came out of a column on the subject. So, the media did take initiative and offered its own views on the reasons for the war.
Overall, though, the media was in tune to the major arguments of the administration and Congress but not every detail that emerged from the official sources.

**Changing and Emerging Rationales: September 12, 2001 to October 11, 2002**

At the conclusion of the research presentation, a recapitulation of the rationales set forth by the administration, Congress, and the media seems warranted, as locating the rationales for the war is the main objective of this paper. Thus, this section names all of the rationales, one more time, describes their meanings, and lists all of those members who used that rationale (also see Table 4 in Appendix C). Keeping in the tradition of the format of this essay, each set of rationales will be introduced according to the phase in which they first appeared, but rationales that appear in more than one phase will be listed as a part of each phase in which they occurred. To add a sense of conclusion to the rationales, the final piece of this section is a discussion of the movement of, consistency of, and change in the rationales.

Phase One set the stage for the rationales for the war with Iraq; the phase included ten rationales: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, liberation of the Iraqi people, because we can, unfinished business, threat to the region, and war for oil. The war on terror rationale, obviously, stems directly from the 9-11 attacks on the U.S. Going to war with Iraq would be a part of the larger campaign on terror. Many members of the administration and of Congress and the media made that point often, that Iraq posed a terror threat to the United States and needed to be included among the list of terror states. Among those who mentioned this rationale were President Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, Joe Lieberman, Trent Lott, John McCain, and the media. The desire to prevent more nations, and especially terrorist nations, from developing weapons of
mass destruction is linked to the war on terror rationale. Many people did not want a rogue nation such as Iraq to obtain weapons that could be used by the state or sold to terrorists. Those supporting this rationale were all of the administration officials discussed in this paper, John McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media. The lack of inspections also relates to these previous rationales. U.N. inspections had been halted for a few years, meaning that Iraq had had time to develop more weapons without anyone knowing about the progress. This posed a threat to the weapons of mass destruction rationale and the war on terror ideal. President Bush, Colin Powell, the Congressional Record, and the media highlighted this fact in their comments on Iraq.

Moving in a new direction, the removal of the Hussein regime emerged as another way to prevent the spread of weapons and terror. Removing the dictator who exacerbated all of those other problems would solve everything. Powell, Rice, Perle, Lieberman, Lott, McCain, and the media pointed to this fact in their statements or articles. Related to that rationale was another reason for wanting to remove Hussein from power: his evil character. Many listed atrocities he had committed and the oppression under which he forced his people to live. Among those announcing Hussein’s evilness as a rationale were President Bush, Powell, Rice, the Congressional Record, and the media. The liberation of the Iraqi people emerged as another result to be achieved by removing the Hussein regime. Again talking about the oppression that they faced, many officials talked about the joy of the Iraqis upon their attaining their freedom and the gratitude that they would show to the U.S. Rumsfeld, Perle, Lott, McCain, and the Congressional Record all mentioned this rationale in Phase One. The threat that Iraq posed to its neighbors was also brought up in this phase and is related to wanting to remove Hussein from power. Because of the increased tensions in the Middle East, especially between the Israelis and
Palestinians, Powell mentioned this rationale, though it would receive greater support in the next two phases.

Three other rationales emerged in this first phase. One was the unfinished business ideal. A few people talked about the failure of the U.S. in the first Gulf War to remove the Hussein regime; they felt that the problem could have been solved over a decade ago. Thus, they saw this as an opportunity to right the wrong and eliminate the thorn in the side of the U.S. that had been festering for so long. Powell, Wolfowitz, Lieberman, and the media give support to this rationale. Another rationale was the war for oil hypothesis. Mostly coming from the Congressional Record, Powell and the media also mention this possible reasoning. It came from discussions around energy policy and usefulness of the Middle East’s, and Iraq’s, oil supply to the United States. The final rationale was because we can. This indirect referencing is likely the most controversial. No one ever comes out and says those words. Yet, some talk about the weakness of the Iraqi military and the lack of loyalty among the Iraqi people. Commenting on the dire circumstances in the state and the lack of military might implies that such a liability is a factor in the equation in some way.

In Phase Two, six new rationales emerged. They were: broken promises, revenge, for the sake of history, gain favor with the Middle East, set Iraq as an example, and because Saddam Hussein hates the United States. With those new rationales were all but one of the rationales from Phase One; thus, war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, liberation of the Iraqis, because we can, and war for oil also appeared as lines of reasoning for war with Iraq in Phase Two (unfinished business is the missing rationale). A total of fifteen rationales can be found in Phase Two.
One of the new rationales was broken promises. This rationale was used to mean that Iraq had made commitments to the United Nations and the world, in the form of U.N. resolutions, and had not followed through on those agreements. In fact, Iraq had done this not once or twice but fourteen times over the past decade. President Bush was the only person to discuss this rationale, though it would appear again in the final phase. Another reason new to Phase Two was revenge, meaning revenge for Iraq’s attempt on the life of President Bush (Number 41). Again, only one person talked about this as a rationale (Joe Lieberman), but it would be mentioned again in Phase Three. President Bush initiated the for the sake of history rationale by claiming in two different speeches that history had called the U.S. to take action against Iraq. This rationale shares some issues in common with the unfinished business rationale but differs in that it is not directed at a specific event in history but to history as a whole, to History as an ideal and directive of law in itself (like Nature, for example). Again, he was the only one to declare this as a rationale in this phase but it would be used by Condoleezza Rice in Phase Three.

Three rationales emerge in this phase that were only used by one person and that did not appear in any other phase. One was the concept that invading Iraq would allow the U.S. to gain the favor of the Middle East; this rationale seems to branch off of the threat to the region rationale. Since Iraq posed a threat to its neighbors, America’s rescue of the Middle East would make the region appreciate the U.S. more than it did prior. Richard Perle was the one member who talked about the possibility of gaining allies in the Arab world. Perle also stated that using military force in Iraq would make Iraq an example to other terror nations, sending a message that the U.S. was not going to take the war on terror and terrorists lightly. Joe Lieberman, also involved in the revenge and unfinished business rationales, adds to those similar motivations
with his rationale of engaging with Iraq because of Saddam Hussein’s hatred of the U.S. Since Hussein despised the U.S., he could not be trusted not to attempt to harm the American people. Thus, he should be handled.

Most of the rationales from Phase One also reappeared in Phase Two. The war on terror rationale was used by President Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Lieberman, the Congressional Record, and the media. The weapons of mass destruction rationale was used by the entire administration, Lieberman, Lott, and McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media. Thus, all of the sources, except for Daschle, mentioned the weapons rationale, growing since the first phase. The lack of inspections rationale garnered more support, as well, with President Bush, Powell, Lott, McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media mentioning the rationale. The removal of the Hussein regime rationale was commented on by the entire source list, expanding to become the only rationale to ever be mentioned by all sources in a single phase. Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld, Rice, Perle, the Congressional Record, and the media all espoused the Saddam Hussein is evil rationale in Phase Two. The liberation of the Iraqis was cited by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, and the Congressional Record. The because we can line of reasoning was discussed by different sources than in Phase One, with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Lott, and the media picking up on and using the rationale. President Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Don Rumsfeld used the threat to the region rationale in Phase Two. Finally, the war for oil hypothesis was included among the rationales of Daschle and Lott.

Phase Three brought the largest number of new rationales, with eleven novel motivations for war emerging in the phase. They were: disarmament, the safety of the world, commitment to the children, imminent threat, preservation of peace, threat to freedom, connection to al Qaeda, the uniqueness of Iraq, the relevance of the United Nations, stimulation of the economy, and
Iraq’s violation of international law. In addition, thirteen of the previously used rationales appear in Phase Three: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, liberation of the Iraqis, broken promises, revenge, threat to the region, because we can, unfinished business, war for oil, and for the sake of history. Thus, twenty-three rationales are mentioned in the final phase of this research.

All but three (violation of international law, the uniqueness of Iraq, and the possible stimulation of the economy) of the new rationales for Phase Three were initiated by President Bush in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 (except for the commitment to the children rationale, which came in another speech). Disarmament arose as the main goal of the U.S. in Iraq, as opposed to previous discussions around the lack of inspections and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, though those rationales do appear in this phase, as well. Disarmament means total elimination of all weapons in Iraq, not simply stopping an increase in weapons stores in Iraq or finding what is there already. President Bush, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, the Congressional Record, and the media all spoke about disarmament in this phase. The President also talked about the safety of the world as an issue to consider; Iraq, as a terrorist nation that could sell weapons to other terrorists, posed a threat to the entire world, since anywhere could be a target. Besides him, Powell, Rumsfeld, Rice, Lieberman, the Congressional Record, and the media mentioned this line of reasoning. President Bush was the only official, as previously indicated, to include America’s commitment to its children as a reason for a war with Iraq. In a speech, he talked about the danger that Saddam Hussein posed to the safety of world and how America should give its children, and the children of the world, a better future. The imminent threat from Iraq, that is, the uncertainty of
its weapons power and future plans, was cited by President Bush, Powell, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Daschle, Lieberman, the Congressional Record, and the media. Again, this rationale was never actually called as such by the members using it (except Daschle in one instance); the name of the rationale reflects the manner in which it was most popularly discussed by the media and the public. The preservation of peace rationale meant that Iraq posed a threat to the peace of the world by its continued terrorist involvement and its increased tension in the Middle East. The peace rationale was mentioned by President Bush, Rice, Lott, and the media. Related to preservation of peace was the threat that Iraq posed to freedom. By oppressing its people and threatening the world with possible terror acts, freedom was prevented from spreading through the Middle East and was lessened in those nations that feared terror in their backyards. President Bush, Lieberman, Lott, and the Congressional Record commented on Iraq’s threat to freedom. Supporting all of those rationales about the terror acts of Iraq was the assertion that Iraq was connected to al Qaeda. President Bush, Rumsfeld, Rice, Perle, Lott, and the media added this terror link to their list of reasons for war. Finally, the President introduced the relevance of the U.N. to the equation. Offered as a reason for America’s use of the U.N. in its effort to disarm Iraq, the U.N. was put on notice that it would face illegitimacy if it did not support the cause of the United States. Aside from the President, Powell, Rumsfeld, Rice, and the media covered this topic.

The other new rationales were the uniqueness of Iraq and Iraq’s violation of international law. Don Rumsfeld mentioned the uniqueness of Iraq in response to questions as to why the U.S. wanted to go after Iraq and not the other members of the “axis of evil” or other terrorist nations. Rumsfeld declared that Saddam Hussein in combination with the weapons potential in Iraq was what made the difference. President Bush also used the uniqueness rationale. The final
new reason was that Iraq had broken international law. Though broken promises was a popular rationale, only Colin Powell called the state’s actions illegal, citing that U.N. resolution violations did break the international laws established in the U.N. Charter. Finally, the media created one rationale on its own: to stimulate the economy. A column discussed the possibility that the administration may have seen the war as a way to turn the economy around, as World War II had done.

Many of the older rationales appeared in Phase Three, as well. The war on terror was cited by President Bush, Powell, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Perle, Lieberman, Lott, McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media. The prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was used by every member of the every source except Cheney, though remember that the research findings for Cheney in the third phase were slim. The lack of inspections ideal was furthered by President Bush, Powell, Rumsfeld, Rice, all of the Senators, the Congressional Record, and the media, its mentions growing in number from the previous phases. The removal of the Hussein regime was forwarded by President Bush, Powell, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Perle, McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media. The fact that they saw Saddam Hussein as evil was used as a reason for President, Powell, Rumsfeld, Lott, McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media. The liberation of the Iraqi people appeared in the statements of President Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle, and the media. The concern over broken promises arose in the comments of every administration member, Lieberman, the Congressional Record, and the media. The revenge ideal came up in three sources: President Bush, the Congressional Record, and the media. The threat to the region rationale was only mentioned by President Bush and the media. The because we can hypothesis came out of statements from Powell, Rumsfeld, McCain, and the media. Unfinished business
was a point of contention for Perle, Lieberman, and McCain. The war for oil debate came out in the Congressional Record and the media. And, finally, the use of history as a call for action was described in a speech by Rice.

As is evident from the above paragraphs, there was a broad campaign for the war with Iraq. Twenty-seven rationales for the war were used at one time or another, and, of the sixteen rationales that emerged before the final phase of research, thirteen appeared in later phases. Thus, there seemed to be a great deal of continuity between the phases. To further explain this idea, five rationales were prominent in all three phases: war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, removal of the Hussein regime, and Saddam Hussein is evil. These rationales, collectively, were used by every source investigated here, as well. Additionally, all of those five rationales were used in all three phases by more than one source, meaning that some sources used these rationales over all three phases.

For war on terror, President Bush, Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Joe Lieberman, and the media all cited this rationale in all three phases. For the weapons of mass destruction, President Bush, Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, John McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media all discussed that rationale in all three phases. For the lack of inspections, Colin Powell and the Congressional Record talked about the topic in all phases. For removal of the Hussein regime, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, John McCain, and the media all highlighted the removal rationale in each phase. And for Saddam Hussein is evil, Colin Powell, the Congressional Record, and the media pointed out that reasoning in every phase. In addition to those five, another rationale was used very prominently throughout the phases. Liberation of the Iraqis was a popular rational with Don Rumsfeld, as he mentioned the reason in all three phases. President Bush, Paul Wolfowitz,
Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, John McCain, Trent Lott, the Congressional Record, and the media all focused on this rationale in one phase or another and often in more than one phase. These six rationales, then, seem to establish the case for a military conflict with Iraq and support that case throughout the early stages (the time frame of this research) of the road to war.

Yet, a lot of new ideas arose over time, some of which came to be favored among the sources used here. For example, the broken promises rationale emerged in Phase Two and was used only by President Bush. Yet, by Phase Three, every member of the administration mentioned in this work, John McCain, the Congressional Record, and the media were using the rationale, too. Thus, broken promises seems to be another well-supported reason for the war with Iraq. Another example is the imminent threat rationale, emerging in Phase Three with President Bush’s speech to the United Nations. This rationale was then adopted by Powell, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Daschle, Lott, and the Congressional Record. In the final phase, this rationale came to be a large part of the argument of many of the key players in the decision to go to war.

Many of the new rationales did not go over as well, though. Some rationales were only used by one source. Only President Bush highlighted America’s commitment to its children as a consideration in the war decision. Only Richard Perle cited gaining favor with the Middle East and setting Iraq as an example as reasons to go to war with the state. Only Joe Lieberman offered because Saddam Hussein hates the U.S. as a basis for a strike against Iraq. And only Colin Powell mentioned that Iraq was in violation of international law and used it as another motive for war. Some rationales were only used by a few sources. President Bush called history into play in Phase Two, stating that history had called the U.S. into play to take action against Iraq. Yet, only Condoleezza Rice mentioned this rationale again, in one speech in Phase Three.
The revenge hypothesis was only covered by four sources: President Bush, Joe Lieberman, the Congressional Record, and the media. Additionally, the war for oil argument only appeared in the sentiments of five sources: Colin Powell, Tom Daschle, Trent Lott, the Congressional Record, and the media. And the threat to the region rationale only appeared in five sources, President Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, and the media, though it did appear in more than one phase. The uniqueness of Iraq was addressed in Phase Three by Don Rumsfeld and President Bush, but no one else jumped on the bandwagon. In fact, many of the Phase Three rationales were not heavily used (meaning only four to five sources took the time to add the rationale to their list): preservation of peace, threat to freedom, stimulation of the economy, and the relevance of the U.N.

This leaves several rationales somewhere in the middle, between heavy use and light use, between main reasons and extraneous reasons. Thus, these seem to be secondary reasons, used more frequently than some rationales but not as often as other rationales. They are: because we can, unfinished business, disarmament, and safety of the world. The because we can rationale appeared in all three phases, though was not espoused by all sources. Those that did adopt the rationale were Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Trent Lott, John McCain, and the media. Unfinished business appeared in Phases One and Three and was discussed by Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Joe Lieberman John McCain, and the media. The disarmament rationale emerged in Phase Three and was utilized by President Bush, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, the Congressional Record, and the media. The debate over the connection between al Qaeda and Iraq was discussed in Phase Three, as well. It was mentioned by President Bush, Rumsfeld, Rice, Perle, Lott, and the media. The safety of the
world idea also emerged in Phase Three and was espoused by President Bush, Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Joe Lieberman, the Congressional Record and the media.

To break it down once again, the primary rationales for the war with Iraq were: war on terror, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of inspections, the removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, liberation of the Iraqis, broken promises, and imminent threat. The secondary rationales were: because we can, unfinished business, disarmament, connection to al Qaeda, and safety of the world. And the remaining rationales were: revenge, war for oil, threat to the region, for the sake of history, preservation of peace, threat to freedom, the uniqueness of Iraq, the relevance of the U.N., commitment to the children, gaining favor with the Middle East, stimulation of the economy, setting Iraq as an example, because Saddam Hussein hates the U.S., and Iraq’s violation of international law.

**Conclusion**

Finally, the question of the road to war with Iraq has received some answers. The rationales discussed in great detail above provide a sense as to the direction in which the administration, Congress, and the media were headed well before the fighting actually began. It can be easily determined who established the majority of the rationales and who supported them throughout the three phases. It is not hard to see which of the rationales received the most attention and which died quickly after being mentioned once or twice. It has been noted that the main rationales highlighted early on in the game remained the main points of the debate through to the day that the resolution authorizing force passed in both houses of Congress. This empirical information can be scrutinized in some respects, in as much as the research methods are imperfect and the meanings drawn from the various remarks and articles can be somewhat subjective. However, it must be said that the data speaks for itself.
What is not quite so easy is determining what effect these rationales have on the war now, in 2004. Again, the main rationales highlighted in Phase One remained the main rationales through Phase Three. As a reminder, those main or primary rationales for the war on Iraq were war on terror, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of inspections, removal of the Hussein regime, Saddam Hussein is evil, liberation of the Iraqi people, broken promises, and imminent threat. Yet, many of these reasons have been questioned in light of the outcome of the war, since nearly one year ago, President Bush declared victory in Iraq while American troops still fight and die there daily, thousands of miles from home. So, where do all of these rationales stand today?

Without a doubt, the war on terror is the strongest reason for invading Iraq. Wanting to protect the people of this country and prevent another disaster like that of 9-11 is a hard motivation with which to argue, though whether invading Iraq was an answer to the problem of terrorism is up for debate. Wanting to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a valid claim, as well. Unfortunately, no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, making the need to invade and remove the weapons a questionable move. To be fair, just because no weapons have been found yet does not preclude there being weapons hidden somewhere in Iraq. Yet, now the administration talks about “weapons programs” as opposed to claiming that Iraq actually had weapons of mass destruction; however, administration members can be found stating that Iraq did have the weapons, some even saying that the knowledge was “certain.” So, if there are no weapons, then where is the imminent threat? Only one of the officials actually used the words “imminent threat” in his remarks; but trying to say that that was not the meaning of the other officials’ words seems trivial and picky, like the controversy over what “is” meant during the Clinton scandal. The media or some other source may have coined the term
“imminent threat” but that should not remove the administration and Congress from blame if, in fact, the threat from Iraq was not as pressing as they made it out to be. Though President Bush and his advisers may not have said that the threat was imminent, they did not dispel the myth and they certainly did not make remarks to the contrary; rather, they made comments about a “grave and gathering danger,” the need to stop the gun from firing, and the impossibility of knowing the true magnitude of the Iraqi threat. Whether or not that meant imminent, one cannot say. Yet, one can infer from these comments that America should have been seriously concerned about Iraq and should have done something immediately to halt the impending doom that was sure to come our way if Saddam Hussein was not stopped. So the U.S. pushed for inspections and got them; then the U.S. chose not to believe the inspectors. Thus, the lack of inspections rationale seems to be a moot point on two levels. First, the inspections took place, and, second, the U.S. ignored their results, whether for good reason or not, rendering them useless. It seems worth stating here that even Colin Powell recently admitted to a mistake in identifying weapons sites in Iraq. The fact that Iraq had broken promises to the U.N. seems to be a good line of reasoning, but then why did the U.N. not get involved? Was a U.S. invasion the only way to right the wrongs of Iraq? On a positive note, the Iraqi people have been liberated and the Hussein regime has been destroyed. The Iraqis no longer face an oppressive dictator and can begin to rebuild their society in the spirit of freedom, liberty, and justice. Yet, there is chaos in the streets and rebel groups continue to battle the allies. Additionally, Iraqi citizens have never known democracy; can they learn it now? And what about the fact that many people saw the regime change as a violation of international law and the U.N. Charter, which states that nations may only attack other nations in self-defense? Was this self-defense? Finally, we are left with the
fact that Saddam Hussein is, or was, evil, which has never been questioned, not even by those people who were opposed to the war.

This is not to say that these are not good enough, well-supported reasons for the war to have been launched nor is it to say that the America people would not have supported such a war. And, as always, hindsight is twenty-twenty. However, there are questions surrounding nearly every major rationale for the war. People may wonder, why are our men and women over there? Why did we go to war? Were we misled? In this important year, an election year, these questions and concerns deserve answers. And though this paper cannot answer these questions definitively, it can provide some insight into the thinking of the powers-that-be during the earliest stages of war preparation and give the American people a chance to answer these questions for themselves.
Appendix A-Timeline of Events

**September/October 2001**
- Osama bin Laden linked to 9-11
- U.S. declared war on terrorism
- Anti-aircraft sites in Iraq attacked by allied forces
- Iraq applauds 9-11 but no ties between Iraq and the attacks are found
- Mention of plans to attack Iraq and clean up unfinished business
- Osama bin Laden’s anger stems from the U.S. invasion of the Middle East, after Iraq invaded Kuwait
- Strategy of the U.S. for Afghanistan: bombs and food
- Britain wants to find “senior associates”
- In order to eliminate terrorism, must eliminate weapons of mass destruction, especially in the Middle East
- The U.S. asks Pakistan for support

**November/December 2001**
- What if Saddam did it? Evidence and speculation of his possible involvement
- The administration’s strategy is Afghanistan first
- Some already talking about a second Gulf War, one that would be trickier and that the U.S. would fight alone
- No known or suspected al Qaeda cells are located in Iraq
- Women’s liberation as a part of winning the war on terror
- Problems with civil liberties arise in the U.S. with arrests of terror suspects
- Osama bin Laden still not found
- Where will al Qaeda go? Iraq is not mentioned as a new home

**January/February 2002**
- Where is Osama bin Laden?
- Nuclear problems between India and Pakistan
- The ashes of al Qaeda in Afghanistan; more attacks may be planned on the network
- Continued problems in the Middle East, though not because of Iraq
- Moving to the Philippines—U.S. wanted a military foothold there again. Media speculation—real threat or easier second target?
- Dangerous peace in Afghanistan
- Concerns about Iran
- “Axis of evil” and the possibility that Iraq will be next

**March 2002**
- Arab-Israeli conflict intensifies
- The U.S. needs friends to attack Iraq but no Middle East help available while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rages on
- The importance of Saudi Arabia (more assertive in Middle East problems and politics)
- The global hunt for al Qaeda continues
• Vice-President Dick Cheney goes to the Middle East to get support for an anti-Iraq campaign
• The U.S. prepares for war with Iraq
• The U.S. is willing to work with many opposition forces in Iraq for diplomatic cover
• The Israeli-Palestinian conflict disrupts the war on terror, as the U.S. must control the violence in the region before invading Iraq

April/May 2002
• Conflict in the Middle East continues
• Taliban found in Pakistan, which remains anti-U.S.
• President Bush commits to solving the problems in the Middle East
• The Bush Doctrine: you’re either with us or against us
• Will U.S. troops be needed in the Middle East? The U.S. lays out a plan as Colin Powell visits the Middle East
• Yassir Arafat condemns terror
• Saddam Hussein and the icons of himself around Iraq; yet, people are starving
• No progress in the Middle East, as there are problems with advisers and the Bush strategy
• May 13: Saddam Hussein on the cover of Time—the strength of his regime and leadership is discussed, along with the questions surrounding his biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities
• The U.S. plans to remove the Hussein regime are delayed but certain
• Did 9-11 have to happen? What was known at the time is reported

June/July/August 2002
• Al Qaeda remains a threat; Osama bin Laden is believed to be in hiding, as messages from him are still being sent and received
• The problem of warlords in Afghanistan
• The U.S. plans to reform homeland security
• Osama bin Laden still presumed to be alive but the U.S. cannot find him
• Pre-emptive attack planned for Iraq, as the U.S. will not wait for Saddam to strike
• “Forward leaning” strategy of the U.S. but the strategy is not self-defense, according to the U.N. and as the U.N. prescribes
• War within the administration about whether and how to fight Iraq
• Al Qaeda resurfaces in Pakistan
• Does the U.S. need Saudi Arabia in order to invade Iraq?
• Osama still missing in August
• The U.S. had planned to suppress al Qaeda prior to 9-11 but failed
• The administration continues to debate the war; President Bush is ready but his team is asking how

September 2002
•Suspicion of an Osama-Saddam link arises but there is no proof, though the administration wants to find a link in order to further the war effort
• Al Qaeda members are receiving shelter in Iraq
• President Bush indicates that he will ask Congress for war

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• Congress asks for more evidence for a war with Iraq
• U.S. hopes to gain more allies
• More al Qaeda members are captured
• Colin Powell agrees to go through the U.N. first, regarding Iraq (while President Bush, Dick Cheney, and Don Rumsfeld are skeptical of the move)
• Iraq agrees to allow inspectors into the country
• U.S. wants a stricter U.N. resolution that would allow military action upon Iraq’s first mistake
• France and Russia are wavering, as they want the U.N. to work
• The administration finds the inspections to be a waste time, simply going through the motions

October 2002
• Some Congressmen are concerned about the timing of the resolution and election season
• Is Karl Rove too powerful? Is he controlling the Iraq crisis?
• An editorial appears about the possible colonization of Iraq
• Congress prepares to vote
• The C.I.A. says that Iraq may not pose an immediate threat, which is not what President Bush wants to hear
• Al Qaeda network attacked in various countries
• Some fear more terror attacks on the U.S.
• Concern arises over North Korea and its nuclear arms

November/December 2002
• President Bush asks U.S. citizens to accept his plan in good faith, as he plans for war and talks of peace
• Did the U.S. win in Afghanistan?
• The importance of Karl Rove
• Why can the U.S. not catch Osama bin Laden (as another tape surfaces)?
• Iraq agrees to U.N. resolution and inspections
• The U.S. is working to undermine the Hussein regime before war
• U.S. troops are being readied for war
• Will the U.S. be safer after Saddam is removed from power?
• U.N. inspectors in Iraq

January/February 2003
• What about North Korea?
• Germany and France are still opposed to the war in Iraq
• Discussion over the role of the C.I.A. in the war on terror
• U.S. continues preparations to prevent terror attacks
• Americans are nervous because of all of the terror warnings
• Opposition to the war arises in the U.S.
March/April/May 2003
- Invasion of Iraq in late March
- The war is more difficult than expected (guerilla warfare); there is no shock and awe
- Troops reach Baghdad but do not find Saddam Hussein
- The Hussein regime is toppled
- The sadness over Iraq’s lost treasures and culture because of the bombings and looting
- There is chaos in Iraqi cities
- No weapons of mass destruction are found
- In May, victory is declared in Iraq
- Anti-U.S. Iraqis still exist
- The U.S. stopped a potential al Qaeda attack
- The rebuilding of Iraq begins
- Problems still consume the Middle East and Arabs and Israelis
- Terror bombings occur in Saudi Arabia

June/July/August 2003
- Still no weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq
- Disorder in Iraqi cities and towns
- Continued problems with the Israelis and Palestinians
- The twilight phase of the war on Iraq begins
- Saddam Hussein still not found
- The truth about the evidence for the war surfaces; there was flawed information about the need to go to war
- In August, Saddam Hussein’s sons are killed
- Osama bin Laden still missing

December 2003
- Saddam Hussein captured

April 2004
- Osama bin Laden still has not been found
Appendix B-Research Methods

Research Method for News Articles in Preliminary Statistics:
- Keyword search for “Saddam” and “Hussein” in New York Times articles (entire article) for one month time periods in Lexis-Nexis database.
- Keyword search for “Osama” and “bin Laden” in New York Times articles (entire article) for one month time periods in Lexis-Nexis database.
- Count the number of articles containing the keyword for each month.

Research Method for News Articles in Phases One-Two:
- Keyword search for “Iraq” and “war” in New York Times articles (entire article).

Research Method for News Articles in Phase Three:
- Keyword search for “Iraq” and “war” in New York Times articles (heading, terms, lead paragraphs).

Research Method for President Bush in Preliminary Statistics:
- Keyword search for “Saddam” in public statements of President Bush on Project Vote Smart webpage. Eliminate all non-English statements that duplicate English statements. Compared to search for “Saddam Hussein” and found that numbers are the same.
- Also searched for “Iraq” to find all statements containing information about the impending war with Iraq.
- Keyword search for “Osama” in public statements of President Bush on Project Vote Smart webpage. Eliminate all non-English statements that duplicate English statements. Compared to search for “Osama bin Laden” and found that numbers are the same.
- All searches counted the number of hits for one month time periods.

Research Method for President Bush in Phases One-Three:
- Read all statements containing mentions of Iraq.

Research Method for Colin Powell in Phases One-Three:
- Search for all statements and interviews during the phases on the Department of State webpage, www.state.gov.
- Read all statements to find those containing information about the Iraq war.

Research Method for Don Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz in Phases One-Three:
- Search through archives of speeches and news during the phases on the Department of Defense webpage, www.defenselink.mil.
- Read all speeches and news to find those containing information about the Iraq war.

Research Method for Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice in Phases One-Three:
- Read all White House releases from Cheney and Rice containing information about Iraq.
• Keyword search for “Iraq,” “war,” and either “Cheney” or “Rice” in Lexis-Nexis database (entire transcripts of ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, CNBC, Fox News, Newshour with Jim Lehrer).

Research Method for Richard Perle and all four senators in Phases One-Three:

Research Method for Congressional Record in Preliminary Statistics:
• Keyword search for “Saddam Hussein” in Congressional Record on www.thomas.loc.gov.
• Count all exact matches and check those matches containing one or more search words to find exact number.
• Keyword search “bin Laden” in Congressional Record on thomas.loc.gov.
• Count all exact matches. Compared to search for “Osama,” more matches with “bin Laden.” Assume that more inclusive search with “bin Laden.”
• All searches for one month time periods.

Research Method for Congressional Record in Phases One-Three:
• Keyword search for “Iraq” in Congressional Record on www.thomas.loc.gov.
Appendix C-Figures and Tables

Figure A1: President Bush Remarks Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein and Iraq

![President Bush Remarks](image-url)

Figure A2: *New York Times* Articles Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein and Iraq

![New York Times Coverage](image-url)

Figure A3: Congressional Record Documents Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein and Iraq

![Congressional Record](image-url)
Figure A4: *New York Times* Articles Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden

Figure A5: President Bush Remarks Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden

Figure A6: Congressional Record Documents Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden

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Table A1: *New York Times* Articles Containing Given Keywords; Comparing Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and Osama bin Laden

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*Indicates person who definitively originated the rationale.
--Numbers indicate phase in which rationale occurred: 1-Phase 1, 2-Phase 2, 3-Phase 3
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Representative Tierney of Massachusetts speaking about making America


