Economics 557: Topics in Micro III

Spring Semester, 2016

The course will focus on market design and the rules for organizing trade of a private good. We will begin with a three-lecture short course on the k-double auction model. After this introduction, we will then shift to the format of a reading group. Each student is expected to prepare for class by reading the paper that will be discussed in that class. You are also expected to participate in the class discussion. Students will also be asked to present materials from the papers to the class. Your class grade will be based upon your contributions to the class.

Here are the notes and the slides for the introductory course on the k-double auction.

Simon Loertscher, Leslie Marx and Tom Wilkening. "A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers." Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Literature.

R. Preston McAfee. A Dominant Strategy Double Auction. Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 56, Issue 2, April 1992, pp. 434-450.

Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations." Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Sep., 2001), pp. 1237-1259.

Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams. “The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism.” Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 5 (Sep., 2002), pp. 1841-1863.

Martin W. Cripps and Jeroen M. Swinkels. “Efficiency of Large Double Auctions.” Econometrica,Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 47-92.

Philip J. Reny and Motty Perry. "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium." Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 5 (Sep., 2006), pp. 1231-1269.

Mark A. Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zacharias. "Price Discovery Using a Double Auction." Working paper (2015). Here are the slides for the paper.

Mark A. Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zacharias. "The Asymptotics of Price and Strategy in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction." Working paper (2014).

Simon Loertscher and Leslie M. Marx. “Prior-Free Bayesian Optimal Double-Clock Auctions.” Working paper (2015).

Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, and John Shim. “Implementation Details for Frequent Batch Auctions: Slowing Down Markets to the Blink of an Eye.” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, May 2014, Vol 104(5): 418–424.

Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, and John Shim. "The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response". The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2015) 130 (4): 1547-1621.